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This study investigates Indonesian firms managers’ and executives’ perception of the 
impact of organisational culture and internal corporate governance on organisational 
performance. The research was motivated by the slow progress in improving 
organisational performance following the economic crisis in Indonesia from 1997 to 
1998. In general, literature suggests that a positive organisational culture is a 
resource that produces better organisational performance; there is also 
acknowledgment of the importance of organisational culture on corporate 
governance; and that improved corporate governance brings better organisational 
performance. 
 
The relationship between organisational culture, internal corporate governance, and 
organisational performance has been tested. However, empirical measurements and 
tests are limited with mixed results and largely based in western countries. This 
research is undertaken in Indonesia to contribute to the body of knowledge by 
adopting a detailed and different way of measuring internal corporate governance 
and organisational culture in the context of Indonesia. In particular, a two-tier 
corporate governance system in Indonesia dictates a very different practice of 
internal corporate governance compared to those of western systems. As no 
comprehensive measure of organisational culture is available in the Indonesian 
context, this study also incorporates an organisational culture measure. Also, as the 
validity and the reliability of secondary data in Indonesia are subject to debate, this 
study uses primary data as alternative measure of organisational performance. 
 
The study first develops a research model that links the constructs of organisational 
culture, internal corporate governance and organisational performance. This is 
followed by developing a research instrument based on theoretical reviews and 
interviews, which is pilot-tested in a later stage of instrument development. A field-
survey is then administered to 1000 managers and company executives to gather the 
data. Of the useable responses, the measures for constructs are developed and tested 
using factor analysis and structural equation modelling, and the hypotheses are 
empirically tested using structural equation modelling.  
 
 v
The results of the research show that organisational culture is not a statistically 
significant determinant of organisational performance. Organisational culture, 
however, is a strong determinant of internal corporate governance. Lastly, internal 
corporate governance does not significantly impact organisational performance.  
 
The above results confirm that both organisational culture and internal corporate 
governance are positively related to performance, but are not statistically significant. 
This weak linkage to performance is contested with the mixed results identified in 
Western countries and may be explained by the different construct definition and 
measurement methods applied in the various studies. There is a need to look at the 
longitudinal view of the relationship of the constructs in future research to provide 
fresh evidence and also to reveal the extent to which the new concept of internal 
corporate governance has been embraced by corporate officers over time. There is 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Following the economic crisis that hampered several Asian countries from 1997 to 
1998, efforts have been carried out to rebuild the economy of affected countries. 
International bodies, such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) sought solutions for the problems faced by 
many Asian countries. In Indonesia, the IMF in particular urged a wide-ranging 
institutional reform which included reforming the governance of the government and 
corporations (Sato 2004), while the ADB launched a study of corporate governance 
and financing in November 1998 (Capulong et al. 2000). These were in accordance 
with the program of the OECD, in which its Principles of Corporate Governance 
offered a benchmark of a country’s corporate governance framework and company 
practices (OECD 1999). In a similar effort, the World Bank worked closely with 
government to overcome poverty and reduce Indonesia’s financial burden, which can 
be seen in the Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank (Indonesia Country 
Assistance Strategy FY 04-07 2003).  
The Government of Indonesia itself, considering it had been severely affected 
by the economic crisis, had been implementing legal restructures and creating new 
institutions to deal with poorly governed and poorly performing firms. For instance, 
a new bankruptcy law was enacted in 19981, and subsequently, in 19992 the 
government of Indonesia ratified laws against corruption, collusion and nepotism. At 
the same time, authorities in Indonesia created the Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
Agency or IBRA (Badan Penyehatan Perbankan National or BPPN) in 1998 to 
restructure troubled banks; and they formed the Indonesian Debt Restructuring 
                                                 
1 The Law of Bankruptcy of June 1905 was amended with Government Regulation in lieu of Law 
No.1 of 1998. This new regulation then was confirmed by Parliament in the Bankruptcy Law, Law 4 
of 1998. Furthermore, in 2004, Law 4 of 1998 was replaced with the Bankruptcy and Suspension of 
Debt Payments Law, Law 37 of 2004. 
2 Law 28 of 1999, on the establishment of a state free from corruption, collusion and nepotism. This 
was supported by Law 31 of 1999, which was amended by Law 20 of 2001, on the eradication of 
corruption as a criminal offence. Further efforts to eliminate corruption were then strengthened with 
the ratification of Law 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission.  
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Agency or IDRA to reorganise foreign debts. To date, however, the progress seems 
to have been very slow.  
The impediments to progress have not been analysed thoroughly; to date 
there has not been much published work on Indonesian corporate performance and 
governance (see, for instance,  Lukviarman 2004; Nam and Nam 2004). To make 
matters worse, rigorous studies dealing with particular causes that have made 
Indonesian firms poorly performed have not been undertaken. To simply assert that 
Indonesian firms are badly governed is not enough. Economy-wide approaches such 
as legal restructuring and new institution building may create the necessary 
conditions, but alone they are not sufficient to overcome poorly performed and 
poorly governed firms. Similarly, a country culture-wide approach3 is unlikely to 
touch the bottom line of corporate governance as it is within companies the corporate 
governance takes place. As, by definition, corporate governance is ‘the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled’ (Cadbury Committee 1992), a more 
precise study should be directed at the extent to which corporate governance is 
practiced within the firm. This is also emphasised by the Dean of Asian 
Development Bank Institute who stated ‘it is often the case that important aspects of 
governance issues need to be tackled at the firms…’ (McCawley 2005 p. 1).  
Subsequently, following McCawley’s line of thinking, a growing number of 
studies in corporate governance have acknowledged the importance of the firm-level 
approach to corporate governance. For example, institutional investors, including the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and the Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association - College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA - 
CREF) are requesting that firms be managed effectively (Crutchey, Hudson, and 
Jensen 1998; TIAA-CREF A Concerned Investor 2005), while a variety of 
organisations have published guidelines for corporate governance, such as the 
Cadbury Report of The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Jones and 
Pollitt 2004), and the Commission on Director Professionalism of the National 
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella Jr 2003). 
Promising moves such as these need to take place in developing countries, such as 
Indonesia, if better corporate performance and governance are to occur.  
                                                 
3 This can be seen in the reports of international bodies, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the 
OECD. They have highlighted that the unsuccessful implementation of their programs to aid 
developing countries has been due to the ignorance of the cultural factors of those countries. 
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In regard to the study of corporate governance, several weaknesses can be 
highlighted. To name a few: its mixed results, and the fact that it has been largely 
undertaken in western countries, meaning the research’s outcomes are almost 
impossible to apply in other circumstances. To make matters worse, the debate 
relating to the cause of poorly governed and poorly performing firms has mostly 
been analysed from either the strategic choice or the environmental perspective 
(Astley and Van de Ven 1983; Helfat and Peteraf 2003; Porter 1980) and 
disentangling the effects of either one is difficult. To overcome such a dilemma, 
Yoshimori (2005), proposed the internal corporate governance mechanism within 
which the duties of all a company’s governance structures or organs should be 
assessed. This mechanism is the reflection of governance practice within firm.  
Having observed that organisational culture is a resource that produces a 
firm’s competitive advantage (Hitt et al. 2001) which in turn enables a firm to 
achieve better performance, this study examines the relationship between 
organisational culture and organisational performance. Although studies relating 
these variables were undertaken in the past (Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski 2000), 
the explanatory power of organisational culture is even more important nowadays, as 
‘intangible resources are more than tangible resources to produce a competitive 
advantage’ (Hitt et al. 2001 p. 14). In this context, Indonesian companies are no 
exception, since organisational culture is a long-lasting resource that delivers better 
organisational performance. This is due to the nature of organisational culture, which 
is considered valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitable (Barney 1986).  
With regard to the importance of culture on corporate governance, it is 
unfortunate that there have been few published works on this relationship. The 
argument advanced here is similar to that of Tabalujan (2002 p. 31) who claimed that 
‘mainstream corporate governance literature largely ignores the role of culture in 
corporate governance’. If cultural factors are to be given due weight, they need to be 
studied rigorously in order to reveal their role in corporate governance. Treating 
culture as a residual factor (Bebchuk and Roe 1999), one that merely accounts for 
discrepancies that have not been explained by the research variables, should be 
answered by incorporating organisational culture into corporate governance research. 
This is even more important if one considers the contribution of organisational 
culture in the fulfilment of the duties of companies’ governance structures (Schein 
1991; Semenov 2000).  
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From the theoretical point of view, internal corporate governance helps to 
prevent corporate scandals, frauds, and any potential liability that may damage the 
company. A company with a good internal corporate governance image enhances its 
reputation, and makes it more attractive to customers, investors, and suppliers. 
Usually, the better-governed companies will have better organisational performance 
(Florackis 2005). Unfortunately, published studies relating internal corporate 
governance and performance, particularly post economic crisis in Indonesia, is 
sparse. Further, observing that the corporate governance system in Indonesia is 
unique in terms of its two-tier system, this research is required to fill the gap in the 
lack of published work in this area, and to observe the nature of internal corporate 
governance employed by Indonesian companies.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
The above discussion highlights the following. First, there is the acknowledgment of 
the importance of culture to organisational performance. Second, there is the absence 
of rigorous studies revealing the power of organisational culture in determining 
corporate governance. Third, there is an appreciation of the importance of internal 
corporate governance in guarding corporations from activities that places them in 
jeopardy. Therefore the research questions developed for this study are: 
a. Does organisational culture affect organisational performance?  
b. Does organisational culture affect internal corporate governance? 
c. Does internal corporate governance affect organisational performance?  
 
1.3 Objectives 
Based on the above questions the research objectives of the study are: 
a. To examine the impact of an organisation’s culture on organisational 
performance; 
b. To examine the impact of an organisation’s culture on internal corporate 
governance; and  
c. To examine the impact of internal corporate governance on organisational 
performance. 
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1.4 Significance  
This study investigates the impact of organisational culture and internal corporate 
governance on performance. Further, the proposed study addresses the issue of 
culture as the central determinant of internal corporate governance. In most previous 
studies culture has either been omitted or insufficiently measured. Studies carried out 
by Stulz and Williamson (2002) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), for instance, 
suffered from a lack of comprehensive measurement of culture, and thus did not 
precisely observe the impact of organisational culture and internal corporate 
governance on performance. In addition, the two-tier board system in Indonesia 
(Husnan 2000) makes this study unique since most previous studies of corporate 
governance have taken place on a one-tier systems. Within a two-tier system the 
board of commissioners (BOC) is the owners’ representative, elected by 
shareholders, and it has the duty to appoint and oversee the board of directors 
(BOD). The BOD leads the company and makes strategic and operational decisions 
which are executed by managers. Thus the BOC – not the BOD –  has the right to 
obtain any information relating to the firm, to ask for an audience with directors, and, 
to call a shareholders’ meeting if necessary (Husnan 2000). Although research on 
corporate governance in Indonesia has been carried out recently (Lukviarman 2004), 
the involvement of cultural variables is a major innovation in explaining the impact 
of organisational culture and internal corporate governance upon performance in 
Indonesian companies. 
From a practical point of view, this study is expected to give a clear picture of 
how Indonesian companies behave and to assist both domestic and foreign investors 
in making informed investment decisions. As the government of Indonesia has 
established the National Committee of Corporate Governance (NCCG), which 
provides principles and guidance to the good governance of companies, it is worth 
knowing the extent to which companies in Indonesia comply with or respond to these 
principles. It is also beneficial to understand how corporate culture plays a role in 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and organisational performance. Given 
these expectations, this study will contribute valuable recommendations or guidelines 
for governing companies efficiently and effectively.  
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1.5 Organisation of Thesis 
Following this chapter, the thesis will be organised as follows. Chapter Two presents 
a review of the relevant literature and the theoretical background that underpins this 
research. Chapter Three describes the research paradigm, research model, and 
hypotheses development of this study. In the first part of this chapter, the research 
paradigm will be discussed, and the choice of realist paradigm that this study will use 
will be embraced. The next section will describe the research model employed by 
this study and a definition of terms used. Finally, based on the literature review in 
Chapter Two, Chapter Three develops the research hypotheses. 
Chapter Four illustrates the research design and methods that are used in this 
study. The development of the research instrument will also be discussed in detail. 
The instruments validation and data collection procedure and a discussion relating to 
data analysis are also described. 
Chapter Five provides the procedure of conducting pre-test and pilot studies. 
The chapter also presents demographic characteristics of the pilot studies. Qualitative 
and quantitative validations of the research instrument are also presented in this 
chapter.  
Chapter Six presents survey results and factor analysis. In the first section, 
the response rate and the demographic characteristics of respondents will be 
highlighted. In the second section, discussions related to the method of factor 
analysis, the use of a correlation matrix, factor extraction, factor rotation, reliability 
analysis, and construct validity analysis are presented. Results of factor analysis are 
also presented in Chapter Six. 
Chapter Seven presents the results of using LISREL in analysing the data 
collected using the questionnaire. The discussion relating to the selection of 
estimation method within LISREL software is provided. The measurement properties 
and the assessment of structural path are discussed. Chapter Seven also presents 
hypotheses testing for the research model. 
Chapter Eight presents the results of hypotheses testing, model analysis and 
the implications of those results. A discussion regarding the managerial implications 
of this study is presented in the last part of this chapter.  
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As a conclusion, Chapter Nine provides a summary of this study. The 
significance of the result, limitations of this study and potential areas of further 
research also will be highlighted in this chapter.  
 
1.6 Summary 
Despite wide-ranging recovery programs having been conducted by international 
bodies and the government of Indonesia as a response to the economic crisis that hit 
this nation during 1997-1998, the progress has been slow. Past studies indicated that 
the unsuccessful implementation of programs designed by international bodies to aid 
developing countries was due to ignorance of cultural factors. In addition, economy-
wide approaches in the form of legal structures and new institution building are 
deemed insufficient in overcoming poorly governed and poorly performing firms, as 
many important aspects of governance need to be tackled at the firm level.  
The current study aims to extend past studies by investigating the impact of 
organisational culture and internal corporate governance on organisational 
performance in Indonesian companies. The contributions expected from this study 
are, among many others, to observe the impact of organisational culture and internal 
corporate governance upon performance in Indonesian companies, to address the 
issue of culture and its role as a determinant of internal corporate governance, and to 
gather insight into the extent to which the companies in Indonesia comply or respond 
to the principles and guidelines for good governance which have been established by 












Chapter 2: Literature Review∗†
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a literature review of the major issues in this dissertation. First, 
the principal themes relating to organisational culture, the perspective of qualitative 
and quantitative studies on organisational culture, and the approaches to and the 
content of the organisational culture construct are highlighted. Second, primary 
themes relating to corporate governance and internal corporate governance are 
reviewed, and important findings in these areas are highlighted. The chapter also 
highlights the primary themes regarding organisational performance. Third, the 
chapter contains a review of the relationship between organisational culture and 
organisational performance; organisational culture and internal corporate 
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governance; and internal corporate governance and organisational performance. 
These reviews are to provide a thorough theoretical background for the research 
topic. These reviews are strengthened with a section that highlights the historical and 
regulatory development of corporate governance in Indonesia, and presents a broad 
overview of corporate governance in western countries. 
 
2.2 Organisational Culture 
In their comprehensive study, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (cited in Detert, Schroeder, 
and Mauriel 2000) reviewed over 150 definitions of culture from various literature.  
They determined it was very unlikely to have a single widely agreed upon conception 
or definition of culture. Nevertheless, research into organisational culture can not be 
overlooked as the number of studies investigating the topic grew considerably during 
the last century. Hundreds of journal articles and book chapters, and large volume of 
books, had been published in the 1980s (Gordon and DiTomaso 1992). In the late 
1970s, Pettigrew (1979) introduced the term ‘organisational culture’ to the academic 
literature, and in the middle of that decade Silverzweig and Allen (1976) proposed 
the term ‘corporate culture’. It seems that the popularity of these terms grew because 
of the works of Deal and Kennedy4 (1982) and Peters and Waterman5 (1982), who 
belonged to the McKinsey-Harvard Business School team. Since then, an enormous 
literature has developed on these topics. Although no conclusive definitions have 
been widely agreed upon among researchers, there are common characteristics of 
culture, which involve some combination of artefacts (also called practices, 
expressive symbols or forms), values and beliefs, and underlying assumptions that 
organisational members share about appropriate behaviour (Gordon and DiTomaso 
1992; Schein 1992).  
As organisational culture is a based theme, it can be viewed as values as well 
as practices. Viewing culture as values has been referred to by Schein (1992 p. 12), 
who defined culture as  
                                                 
4 Their book, Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life, was regarded as a ‘must-
read’ when it was published, and is still regarded as a ‘must read’ by Chris Argyris of Harvard 
University and Monitor Company. Over 200,000 copies had been sold, according to the most recent 
publication in 2000. 
5 Their management book, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America’s Best Run Companies, 
was and is regarded as the one of the biggest selling and most widely read business books. It is 
reported in the latest edition in 2004 that this book was #1 National Bestseller with more than 3 
million copies in print. 
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a pattern of shared basic assumption that the group learned as it solved its problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problem.  
 
The term ‘shared basic assumption’ means that there are high levels of agreement 
among members of an organisation toward a set of values within that organisation. 
Alternatively, viewing organisational culture as perceptions of organisational work 
practices has also been documented in many previous studies (Kostova 1999; 
Marcoulides and Heck 1993). In this regard, Kostova (1999, p. 309) defined it as  
particular ways of conducting organisational functions that have evolved over time 
under the influence of an organisation’s history, people, interests, and actions and 
that have become institutionalised in the organisation.  
 
Here, organisational practices are believed to reflect the ‘collective wisdom within an 
organisation about how things can best be done’ (Wilderom and Van den Berg 2005, 
p. 6).  
Viewed from a different perspective, organisational culture is like an onion – 
its elements have different levels of visibility, ranging from the most visible to the 
least visible (Schein 1992). The former reside in the external layer of cultural 
elements, examples of which are visible and audible behavioural patterns, and a 
constructed physical and social environment. By contrast, the latter exist in the 
deepest layer of culture, which includes basic assumptions and beliefs about human 
nature, and humans’ relationship to the environment. In this regard, the parts of 
culture that reside in the deeper levels are more difficult and time-consuming to 
change than those which are on the surface (Kilmann cited in De Witte and Van 
Muijen 1999).  
Seen in this light, the organisational work practices proposed by Kostova are 
undeniably visible, and reflect the shared knowledge and competence of the 
organisation. These practices are learned behaviours that can be transmitted from one 
group to another or one generation to another independent of genetics (Redmon and 
Mason 2001). Further, these practices are viewed as ways of doing certain tasks that 
are taken-for-granted (Kostova 1999). Assessing organisational work practices is 
also easier — since they are visible and audible — compared to assessing shared 
values — as these are sometimes unrecognisable to the members of an organisation.  
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An emphasis on shared values makes the idea of cultural strength arise, which 
suggests that employees have a similar set of values. Strong cultures have been 
defined as homogeneous (Ouchi and Price 1978); thick and widely shared (Sathe 
1983); cohesive and tight-knit (Deal and Kennedy 1982); characterised by congruent 
rule-based expectations (Schall 1983); stable and more intense (Schein 1984); fully 
articulated and highly differentiated (Schein 1985); and coherent (Weick 1985). In 
accordance with these above arguments, Peters and Waterman (1982) and Deal and 
Kennedy (1982) strongly argued that excellent companies were characterised by a set 
of values to which employees were undeniably committed. The above arguments 
lend support to the conclusion that a notion of widespread sharing or consensus is the 
dominant characteristic of strong culture. Weak culture, on the other hand, can be 
defined as the opposite of the above definitions. In their popular book, Deal and 
Kennedy argued that both weak and strong culture can exist, and in strong culture 
‘everyone knows the goals of the corporation and they are working for them’ (p. 4). 
Accordingly, there is alignment between employees’ and management’s goals.  
Looking at the methodology of assessing strong cultures, one can conclude 
that cultural strength was assessed using the frequency of agreement among the 
members of an organisation. The higher the frequency of agreement about norms and 
values the higher the strength of the culture (Gordon and DiTomaso 1992; Kotter and 
Heskett 1992; O'Reilly and Chatman 1996). However, caution should be taken as 
‘meanings are central, not frequencies’ (Van Maanen and Barley 1984, p. 307). 
Further, cultural strength is believed to be too limited to capture the complex 
phenomenon of culture (Van den Berg and Wilderom 2004). As the most cited 
reference relating to strong culture, the works of Deal and Kennedy (1982) and 
Peters and Waterman (1982) failed to prove their claims. Carroll (1983) indicated 
that some of Peters and Waterman’s 36 ‘excellent companies’ experienced serious 
financial problems just a few years after the completion their study. Another 
convincing claim was published in Business Week (1984, 5 November), which stated 
that thirteen of the ‘excellent companies’ faced financial and/or market difficulties, 
most of them because they did not adapt to the evolution of their environment. This 
finding is not surprising, especially for Cooke and Szumal (2000) who found that it 
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was not the espoused values that have a direct relationship to the organisational 
outcomes, but rather the operating culture of an organisation6.  
Since knowledge about organisational culture has emerged to the point where 
its finer dimensions are available, future research can be better conducted using 
cultural dimensions rather than consensus among employees on a particular set of 
values. Further, as organisations show more differences in practices than in values 
(Hofstede 2001), research might better focus on organisational practices. Providing 
support for this argument, Wilderom and Van den Berg (2000), who define 
organisational culture as organisational practices, argue that values are naturally 
invisible and that organisational practices typically express the organisational values.  
Having followed definition of organisational culture as perceptions of 
organisational practices, the study acknowledges the similarity of this concept with 
organisational climate. Denison (1996), for instance, defined organisational climate 
as employees’ perceptions of observable practices and procedures. In the early days, 
the distinction between climate and culture was clear, as Schwartz and Davis (1981, 
p. 32) emphasised, ‘one way to understand culture is to understand what it is not’, 
and as Denison (1996, p. 621) stressed, ‘whatever culture is, it is not climate’. Other 
stark differences between these concepts can be appreciated by looking at the 
methods that were used. Most previous studies on culture were dominated by 
qualitative research methods and an appreciation for the unique aspects of individual 
social settings (Schein 2000; Denison 1996; Van den Berg and Wilderom 2004; Siehl 
and Martin 1988). In contrast, studying organisational climate predominantly 
required quantitative methods and assumed generalisation across social settings 
(Schneider 2000; Denison 1996; Van den Berg and Wilderom 2004).  
More recently, however, a blur in the distinction has emerged. Many studies 
of organisational culture have begun to use quantitative methods or a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods (Chatman 1991; Denison and Mishra 1995; 
Gordon and DiTomaso 1992; Hofstede et al. 1990; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Cadwell 
1991). Further, what were believed to be the dimensions of climate have been also 
                                                 
6 In backing up their argument Cooke and Szumal (2000) proposed a theoretical model of how culture 
works. They proposed an operating culture that arose from twelve sets of behavioural norms 
associated with three general types of organisational culture: constructive, passive/defensive, and 
aggressive/defensive. The behavioural norms were humanistic-encouraging, affiliative, approval, 
conventional, dependent, avoidance, oppositional, power, competitive, perfectionistic, achievement, 
and self-actualizing norms. 
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seen to be the dimensions of culture. Concisely stated, there is significant overlap 
between the dimensions used. Supporting this argument, Parker et al. (2003, p. 389), 
using a meta-analytic technique, claimed that there is ‘considerable confusion 
regarding the constructs of … organisational climate, and organisational culture…’. 
Early on, Denison (1996) highlighted similar evidence and concluded that the 
dimensions of culture overlapped with the dimensions of climate. These are 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Overlapping Dimensions in Culture and Climate Studies 
No. Culture Study Climate Study 
1 Risk taking (Chatman 1991) Risk taking (Litwin & Stringer 1968) 
2 Person-environment fit (O’Reilly, 
Chatman and Caldwell 1991) 
Person-environment fit (Joyce & Slocum 
1982) 
3 Decision-making, communicating, and 
organising (Schwartz & Davis 1981) 
Decision-making practices, 
communication flow, and the 
organisation of work (Taylor and Bowers 
(1973) 
4 Peer relations (Schein 1985; Schein 1992) Peer relations (Joyce & Slocum 1982) 
5 Concept of social control (Wilkins 1978) Concept of autonomy (Porter & Lawler 
1973) 
6 Humanistic culture (Cooke & Rousseau 
(1988) 
Dimension of consideration (Campbell, 
Dunnette, Lawler & Weick 1970) 
Note: Summarised from Denison’s (1996) work. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the overlapping dimensions of organisational culture 
and organisational climate are not stressed, rather they are assumed to represent the 
practices within an organisation, as ‘culture and climate actually address a common 
phenomenon’ (Denison 1996, p. 646). 
As a current study, the work of Van den Berg and Wilderom (2004) is worth 
discussing. Obviously, their research is not the only study focusing on organisational 
culture. Many previous works which have studied organisational culture 
quantitatively can be named, such as Marcoulides and Hecks (1993), Van Muijen et 
al. (1999), Hofstede et al. (1990), O'Reilly, Chatman and  Cadwell (1991), Gordon 
and DiTomaso (1992), and Denison and Mishra (1995), among others. A comparison 
of the above studies is made and is presented in the Table 2.2. Looking at this table 
in detail, one can note that the five dimensions of Van den Berg and Wilderom’s 
(2004) organisational culture correspond with those of the other studies. Autonomy, 
for instance, although labelled differently by other studies, is associated with all 
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previous studies in Table 2.2. This is also the case for the Human Resource 
Management and Improvement Orientation dimensions, which have much 
correspondence with the task organisation of Marcoulides and Heck, support 
orientation of Van Muijen et al., the employee vs. job oriented dimension of 
Hofstede et al., the people oriented dimension of O'Reilly, Chatman and Cadwell, 
and all dimensions in the other studies mentioned in the table (although again 
labelled differently). Additionally, the two other dimensions of External Orientation 
and Inter-departmental Coordination have some association with dimension in other 
works. Therefore, on the basis of the literature review presented in Table 2.2, this 
study, which defines organisational culture as organisational practices, will use Van 
den Berg and Wilderom’s (2004) cultural dimensions as the basic conceptual 
dimensions to measure the construct of organisational culture. These dimensions are 
1) autonomy, 2) external orientation, 3) interdepartmental coordination, 4) human-
resource management, and 5) improvement orientation. In accordance with these 
above dimensions, Detert et al. (2000), who performed a qualitative content analysis 
of the extant literature summarised in Table 2.3, lend support to utilising these 
dimensions in researching organisational culture. 
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Table 2.2: A Comparison of Van den Berg and Wilderom (2004)’s Organisational Culture Dimensions with Six Other Studies 
Organisational culture dimensions in several studies grouped with respect to similarity Correspondence with Van den Berg & 
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Note: - = hardly any correspondence, + = some correspondence, and ++ = much correspondence 
Source: Van den Berg & Wilderom (2004, p. 575) and author’s compilation
Table 2.3: General Dimensions of Organisational Culture from the Literature 
Ideas About References 
1. The basis of truth and 
rationality in the 
organisation 
Beyer (1998); Dyer (1985); Gordon & Cummins (1979); Halfhill, 
Betts, & Hearnsberger (1989); Hofstede (1991); Reynolds (1986); 
Saphier & King (1985); Sashkin (1996); Schein (1992); Tucker & 
McCoy (1988) 
2. The nature of time and 
time horizon 
Denison & Mishra (1995); Halfhill, Betts, & Hearnsberger (1989); 
Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1983); Reynolds (1986); Sashkin & Sashkin 
(1993); Schein (1992); Tucker & McCoy (1988) 
3. Motivation Beyer (1993); Dyer (1985); Hofstede (1991); Lorsch (1985); 
Reynolds (1986); Saphier & King (1985); Sashkin & Kiser (1991); 
Schein (1992); Tucker & McCoy (1988) 
4. Stability versus 
change/innovation/ 
personal growth 
Beyer (1998); Cooke & Szumal (1993); Denison & Mishra (1995); 
Gordon & Cummins (1979); Halfhill, Betts, & Hearnsberger (1989); 
Heck & Marcoulides (1996); Hofstede (1991); Kilman  & Saxton 
(1991); Leithwood & Aitken (1995); Lortie (1975); Marcoulides & 
Heck (1993); O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell (1991); Quinn & 
Rohrbaugh (1983); Reynolds (1986); Saphier & King (1985); 
Sashkin (1996); Snyder & Acker-Hocevar (1995) 
5. Orientation to work, task, 
and coworkers 
Cooke & Szumal (1993); Hofstede (1991); Kilman  & Saxton 
(1991); Leithwood & Aitken (1995); O’Reilly, Chatman, & 
Caldwell (1991); Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1983); Reynolds (1986); 
Rokeach (1973); Saphier & King (1985); Sashkin (1996); Schein 
(1992); Tucker & McCoy (1988) 
6. Isolation versus 
collaboration/cooperation 
Denison & Mishra (1995); Firestone & Louis (1998); Halfhill, 
Betts, & Hearnsberger (1989); Heck & Marcoulides (1996); 
Hofstede (1991); Kilman  & Saxton (1991); Leithwood & Aitken 
(1995); Lortie (1975); O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell (1991); 
Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1983); Reynolds (1986); Saphier & King 
(1985); Sashkin (1996); Sashkin & Kiser (1993); Schein (1992); 
Smart & Hamm (1993); Tucker & McCoy (1988) 
7. Control, coordination, 
and responsibility 
Beyer (1998); Gordon & Cummins (1979); Halfhill, Betts, & 
Hearnsberger (1989); Heck & Marcoulides (1996); Hofstede (1991); 
Kilman  & Saxton (1991); Leithwood & Aitken (1995); Leonard 
(1997); Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1983); Reynolds (1986);  Sashkin 
(1996); Sashkin & Kiser (1993); Smart & Hamm (1993) 
8. Orientation and focus-
internal and/or external 
Denison & Mishra (1995); Dyer (1985); Halfhill, Betts, & 
Hearnsberger (1989); Hofstede (1991); Leithwood & Aitken (1995); 
Leonard (1997); Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1983); Reynolds (1986);  
Sashkin (1996); Smart & Hamm (1993); Tucker & McCoy (1988) 
Source: Detert et al. (2000, p. 854) 
Combining the last two tables, this study highlights the following discussions. 
The dimension of autonomy was selected because it refers to the freedom of 
employees to contribute the skills they have in advancing the company. This 
dimension was also used by Gordon and DiTomaso (1992), who labelled it 
‘accountability and systematic decision making’; Marcoulides and Heck (1993) who 
named it ‘organisational structure/purposes’; Hofstede et al. (1990) who labelled it 
‘loose vs. tight control’; and Detert et al. (2000), who termed it ‘control, 
coordination, and responsibility’. The external orientation is similar to willingness 
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and effort to quickly anticipate and respond to customers’ demands. The work of 
Hofstede et al. (1990) termed this as ‘open vs. closed system’; the study of O’Reilly 
et al. (1991) labelled it as ‘aggressive vs. easy going’; and the research of Detert et 
al. (2000) called it ‘orientation and focus – internal and/or external’ — each of which 
can be referred to this dimension. The dimension of inter-departmental coordination 
was chosen since modern organisations commonly have divisions of work, which 
increase the flow of work and information among members. As a result of increasing 
barriers, an organisation’s functioning is likely to be adversely influenced. Previous 
studies which support the use of this dimension are O’Reilly et al. (1991), who used 
the term ‘team oriented’; Denison and Mishra (1995) who labelled it as 
‘involvement’; and Detert et al. (2000) who named it ‘isolation versus 
collaboration/cooperation’. 
The human resource management dimension has been considered as one 
aspect of organisational culture by many in the past. Marcoulides and Heck (1993) 
termed it ‘task organisation’; Van Muijen et al. (1999) named it ‘ support 
orientation’; Hofstede et al. (1990) labelled it ‘employee vs. job oriented’; O’Reilly 
et al. (1991) called it ‘people oriented’; and Detert et al. (2000) termed it ‘orientation 
to work, task, and coworkers’. This dimension covers the process of employee 
selection, the support to employees’ functioning and whether the performance 
mechanism was taking place. Reflecting humans’ ambition, improvement orientation 
is utilised in this study. Most people are stimulated to achieve a better result both for 
themselves and their company. Backing the use of this dimension are the studies of 
Van Muijen et al. (1999), who labelled it ‘innovation orientation’; O’Reilly et al. 
(1991) who named it ‘innovation oriented’, Gordon and DiTomaso (1992), who 
called it ‘innovation/risk taking’; and Detert et al. (2000), who named it ‘stability 
versus change / innovation / personal growth’. 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is ‘a fashionable concept, and like many fashionable concepts, 
it is somewhat ambiguous and a bit of cliché’ (Farrar 2005, p. 3). No single 
definition has been approved by many scholars. Experts define corporate governance 
depending on the issues they would like to deal with. For example, Blair (1995 p. 3) 
has defined corporate governance as  
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the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what 
publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is 
exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are 
allocated.  
 
A broad definition is also used by Monks and Minow (2004, p. 2), who 
defined it as ‘the structure that is intended to make sure that the right questions get 
asked and that checks and balances are in place to make sure that the answers reflect 
what is best for the creation of long-term, sustainable value’. In contrast, a tight 
definition of corporate governance as was proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997 p. 
737), who said that corporate governance deals with ‘the ways in which suppliers of 
finance assure themselves of getting a return on their investments’; similarly, the 
Cadbury Committee of the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance defined it as 
‘the system by which companies are directed and controlled’ (Cadbury Committee 
1992). These diverse definitions reflect the perspective of what corporate governance 
is likely to deal with and the areas it should overcome. These broad definitions 
capture not only the functions of companies’ governance structures or organs but 
also the external environment, comprising social influences, government rules 
regulating firms, and capital and labour markets. While narrow definitions place 
corporate governance only as a matter of firms’ businesses, including the internal 
structure and processes of running the companies.  
Historically, the work of Berle and Means (1932) was believed to be the 
earliest study that underpins the research in corporate governance. As companies 
develop, the pattern that mostly follows is the increasingly burdensome load faced by 
owners to run the firm efficiently and effectively. Further, single owners are 
incapable of fulfilling the resources needed by the firm in a competitive environment. 
The solution most often preferred is hiring capable people to run the company on a 
daily basis, and inviting many people to invest and therefore share the ownership of 
the firm. This situation is known as agency relationship, which is defined as  
a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976 p. 308).  
 
Under owners-managers ownership there is an absence of need to control 
firms since the interests of owners are also the objectives of managers. However, 
once the owners decide to hire professional managers to run their companies the 
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problem of control or agency conflict automatically emerges. Berle and Means 
argued concisely: 
The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interest of 
owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the 
checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear (1932 p. 7). 
 
It can be seen that agency theory assumes that the agent is individualistic and 
has self-serving behaviours. To limit the divergences from their interests, principals 
employ several means, such as managerial incentive arrangements and direct 
monitoring by owners through boards of directors. According to Walsh and Seward 
(1990), shareholders as principals can choose either internal or external governance 
mechanisms in order to ensure that the managers’ interests are in line with theirs. The 
internal governance mechanisms include a well-performing board and executive 
compensation, the latter of which brings interests of managers and shareholders into 
congruence. They also focus on ownership which has lead to active monitoring.  The 
market for corporate control provides an external mechanism when the above 
internal mechanisms fail to operate.  
Comparing the two types of mechanisms, however, Walsh and Seward 
argued that external control is less preferable to shareholders since acquisition, 
divestitures, and ownership amendments are more expensive for owners to bear. 
Accordingly, the two most prominent internal controls, namely executive 
compensation schemes and governance structure, are favourable. With regards tying 
the executive pay to performance, the results of research have been mixed and the 
debate is continuing. At one end of the continuum, Murphy (1985), and Coughlan 
and Schmidt (1985) concluded that executive compensations associated with 
shareholders wealth, while at the other end, Kerr and Bettis (1987) found no such 
relationship.  
Subsequently, discussions relating to the second type of internal control were 
numerous, as cited in the following arguments. As one governance structure, 
ownership structure has been a subject of many empirical studies, and the results of 
these studies again have been mixed. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) analysed the impact 
of three ownership concentrations, namely (1) the percentage of the firm’s 
outstanding common equity owned by the five largest shareholders; (2) the 
percentage of shares owned by the 20 largest shareholders and (3) Herfindahl 
ownership concentration on the performance of the firms. Using the mean value of 
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annual accounting profit after taxes as a percentage of the book value of equity as 
dependent variable, this research showed that there was no significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and accounting profit and especially no significant 
positive relationship. A similar result was shared by other studies; Cho (1998) who 
use insider ownership as a proxy of ownership structure found no evidence of 
supporting the notion that ownership structure influences corporate value; Loderer 
and Martin (1997), who utilised executive stock ownership to measure the structure 
of ownership, claimed that ownership does not improve performance in any 
appreciable way. In contrast, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) reported that by dividing 
ownership into 5 categories (0-10%, 10-20%, 20-50%, 50-75%, and 75-100%) 
Market-to-Book Value is positively and significantly influenced by ownership of 
stock.  
There were also interesting findings in the studies of ownership structure and 
performance; for instance, Chang (2003) showed that a firm’s profitability and firm 
value affect the degree of its inside ownership but not vice versa; and Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) claimed that a non-monotonic relationship between 
managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q was evidenced in their empirical research.  
Another form of governance structure is appointment of outsiders to become 
members of BOD. Theoretically, the existence of outsiders in board composition will 
increase the degree of independency compared to the board which comprises insiders 
only. Subsequently, outsiders are believed to contribute to the firm by making better 
decisions (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003), which in turn influence the performance of 
the firm. Interestingly, this prescribed-outside-board composition offered by agency 
theory has not been supported by many empirical findings, of which Mehran (1995), 
Klein (1998), and Bhagat and Black (1999) are examples who have reported that 
there is no noticeable relationship between the existence of outside board of directors 
and firm performance. On the contrary, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) found a 
non-monotonic relationship between outside board members and performance; 
performance increases as outsider board membership rises to 5%, decreases in the 
5% to 25% range, and then increases after 25%. In sum, consensus is not easily 
obtained about the extent of the influence of governance structure on performance, 
either with respect to the increase of ownership by a board of directors or 
management, or the existence of outsiders on the board of directors. 
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It must be noted that most of the abovementioned studies were carried out in 
developed countries in which capital markets were functioning more efficiently than 
those of developing countries. Particularly in developing markets, large shareholders 
are very often involved in management tasks rather than serving as monitors of 
management duties. This situation leads to their suboptimal functioning in fulfilling 
duties assigned to them. To be best in performing the duties, each of them should 
stick to the job assigned to them as they stand: one is tasked with management of the 
company and the other is obliged to supervise the actions of managers. This 
inefficiency should be solved by relying on the external market or external 
mechanisms in the form of tender offers, going-private transactions such as LBOs 
and MBOs, mergers, and hostile tender offers (Walsh and Seward 1990). 
Unfortunately in the thin market in developing countries, such mechanisms have not 
occurred effectively as the last control of the divergence of interests between 
managers and shareholders. This was also Aguilera and Jackson’s (2003) argument 
relating to the failure of agency theory to explain key differences across countries 
due to the fact that assumptions that worked well in developed markets did not hold 
in other markets.  
 
2.4 Internal Corporate Governance 
Banks (2004) defined internal corporate governance in terms of the duties that are 
performed by a company’s governance structures or organs, including its board of 
directors, executive management, and independent control functions. He argued that 
in any national system, there are standards to be followed by boards of directors and 
executive management in running corporations. Theoretically, if these ‘rules of the 
game’ are sustained, the principals’ interests will securely be maintained.  
To date, the publications of corporate governance mechanisms are well 
documented. The most-cited references in the study of corporate governance are 
Berle and Means (1932), Jensen Meckling (1976), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 
Fama (1980), and Williamson (1975), among may others. These scholars have 
argued that there are means of aligning the incentives of management with the 
incentives of shareholders through compensation contracts, debt covenants, 
companies’ boards of directors, auditing, labour market, and capital market. 
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In contrast, the study of internal mechanisms of corporate governance, which 
is defined as the fulfilment of the duties of a company’s board of directors, executive 
management and other organs is lacking. Obviously, thus defining the internal 
mechanism of corporate governance demands primary data that should be gathered 
from boards of directors and executives. In this regard, companies are largely 
unwilling to provide such information, and this barrier further inhibits the 
development of research in corporate governance. Nonetheless, research on corporate 
governance using primary data does exist. Pearce II and Zahra (1991), Zahra (1996), 
Zahra, Neubaum and Huse (2000), and Gill, Flynn, and Reissing (2005) to some 
extent used primary data in their studies of corporate governance. Daily, Dalton and 
Cannella (2003) believe that such data will enhance the understanding of the 
effectiveness of corporate governance, and they call it ‘process-oriented data’. The 
potential value of this data has also been recognised by Forbes and Milliken, who 
stated that process-oriented data ‘will enable researchers to better explain 
inconsistencies in past research on boards, to disentangle the contributions that 
multiple theoretical perspectives have to offer in explaining board dynamics, and to 
clarify the tradeoffs inherent in board design’ (1999 p. 502). 
In regard to other forms of internal corporate governance mechanisms, many 
publications have claimed that the M-Form or multidivisional structure has 
relationship with organisational performance. In this light, M-Form is positioned as 
internal structure (Thompson 1981); as internal organisation (Hill 1985); as unique 
structural framework and as an internal capital market in which resources and 
rewards are allocated (Williamson 1975). The above studies utilised archival data 
instead of primary data in their research. Critique to the above studies is well known, 
as the M-form organisation was unable to capture the correct picture of how internal 
mechanisms were taking place.  
Despite the above perspective, there is no single model of corporate 
governance that can be applied to all countries. Governance mechanisms that rely on 
effective markets, and legal and regulatory systems, may not be applicable in 
countries where the assumptions of these mechanisms do not hold. These markets for 
corporate control demand well functioning markets, including capital markets, 
product markets, and labour markets (Fama 1980).  
Looking at the unique characteristics of Indonesia in terms of a less 
developed and illiquid capital market, a relatively weak legal and regulatory 
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framework, weak enforcement of this legal and regulatory framework, less active 
market controls such as takeover and mergers, a highly concentrated family 
ownership, a higher debt ratio (Husnan 2000; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000), 
doubtful quality of secondary data (Baird 2000), and the suspicious independency of 
boards of directors in internal control (Banks 2004; Tabalujan 2002), and taking into 
account the argument advanced by Banks (2004) relating to the duties of companies’ 
governance structures or organs, this study will proceed with an effort to fill the gaps 
in the research of corporate governance by observing the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. The argument advanced here is similar to that of Yoshimori 
(2005 pp. 455-456) who emphasises the importance of internal corporate governance 
research. He strongly argues that  
It may be high time that we looked more closely at internal governance mechanisms, 
instead trying to refine the external governance system, which is becoming 
increasingly complex and onerous while its contribution to corporate performance is 
not conclusively proven. This statement is not intended to dismiss external 
governance but stress more reliance on internal governance.  
 
It is believed that the standard of internal corporate governance performed by 
companies’ governance structures or organs needs to be studied thoroughly. Boards 
of directors, for instance, are tasked to ‘scrutinize the highest decision makers’ 
(Fama 1980, p. 294), or to be ‘the ultimate control’ (Mizruchi 1983, p. 433). The 
executives, on the other hand, were formally appointed to provide return that satisfies 
the owners. Duties of managing other people’s money should be performed, or 
otherwise somebody else will carry them out.  
The advantages of internal corporate governance mechanisms were emerged 
as there were difficulties in disentangling who takes responsibility for poor company 
performance. The debate surrounding this issue is to determine whether strategic 
choice developed by decision makers, or environment shapes the performance of an 
organisation (Astley and Van de Ven 1983). Those who believed that people 
significantly impact performance are becoming supporters of the resource-based 
view of the firm. Within this framework, developing resources, capabilities, and core 
competencies is a way of gaining competitive advantage (Helfat and Peteraf 2003; 
Peteraf 1993). An example of a supporter of the importance of environment in 
contributing to firms’ performance can be seen in Porter’s five forces industry 
structure. Here, the bargaining power of buyers, the bargaining power of suppliers, 
threats of substitutes, threats of new entrants, and intensity of rivalry determine the 
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profitability of the business (Porter 1980). Looking the answer is not straight forward 
since many and mostly unrealistic assumptions such as asymmetry of information, 
unbiased assessment provided by subordinates toward their executives, and time lag 
between effort of executives and company’s outcome and the possible irreversibility 
of previous executives’ decisions further complicate the debate (Walsh and Seward 
1990). Thus, in turn, none of the answers satisfy either the confronting sides. On this 
regard, Walsh and Seward offered a solution by stating ‘the difficulty of 
disentangling the effects of person and situation can be overcome by optimal 
construction of an internal corporate governance mechanism (1990 p. 426 emphasis 
added).  
 
2.5 Organisational Performance 
There is considerable debate relating to whatever the choice of performance 
approach in any organisational research. For many profit-oriented organisations, the 
rational goal approach – in particular financial performance – dominates the 
approach to measuring the performance of the companies. In this regard, assessments 
with accounting-based and market-based measures are in place. Profitability is the 
accounting-based measurement most often used, while stock market returns are 
broadly accepted as the market-based measurement (Glunk and Wilderom 1996). 
Notwithstanding the degree of reliability and accessibility of accounting-based 
measurement and the extent of comparability across various types of industries, 
critiques of using such measurement are: a lack of consistency in corporate 
accounting methods; a lack of standardisation in international accounting 
conventions; an orientation to the past; and a tendency to manipulate the numbers to 
create impressive results. In a similar vein, market-based measurement is not free 
from shortcomings, such as the assumption of a perfect market and a high percentage 
of unlisted firms. Further, as organisations are to fulfil the needs of various 
stakeholders (e.g. customers, suppliers, employees and the community), and not only 
shareholders, a rational goal approach has been challenged due its limitation of 
capturing only the interests of shareholders (Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski 
2000). 
As business organisations are becoming complex webs of relationship among 
various interest claimants (Atkinson, Waterhouse, and Wells 1997) and multiple and 
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partly conflicting goals exist within them, financial performance alone is no longer 
suitable as a performance measurement. It is for these reasons that multidimensional 
performance approaches, including nonfinancial or operational and perceptual 
performance indicators, have emerged (Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski 2000; 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986). Under the term of operational performance, 
measures such as market share, new product introduction, product quality, marketing 
effectiveness, and manufacturing value-added are among others widely used in many 
organisational studies. In regard to perceived performance, Denison and Mishra 
(1995) and Huang (2003), for instance, asked respondents to compare their firm’s 
performance relative to the performance of similar firms on the dimensions of 
profitability, sales growth, quality, employee satisfaction, new product development, 
budget achievement, market share and overall performance. Caution, however, 
should be taken as these later approaches (operational and perceptual) suffer the 
following weakness. If collecting from secondary sources, operational data may not 
be complete, as the various indicators required to develop requisite measures are 
absent, and if gathering from primary sources, operational data is likely to biased 
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986). Similarly, perceived performance is not free 
from weaknesses, such as the influence of objective performance on the perception 
of respondents and/or the effect of respondent biases. 
The above review suggests that no single measurement is adequate for 
judging the organisational performance. Each measure partly suffers from 
operational and conceptual problems, gives limited perspective and conflict with one 
and another (Doyle, 1994). From methodological perspective, one also needs to 
consider the unidimensionality and convergent validity of the organisational 
performance measurement. For example, it is possible to have one company 
experiencing high growth but at the same time its profitability is in the difficult 
situation – as experienced by many firms in embryonic and growth phase of life 
cycle. Uniting these measures into one construct or one latent variable could be 
problematic.  
In regard to the topic of this study, numbers of culture–performance 
researchers have utilised accounting-based measures (Denison 1990; Denison and 
Mishra 1995; Kotter and Heskett 1992; Marcoulides and Heck 1993; Calori and 
Sarnin 1991). More specifically, Denison (1990) and Denison and Mishra (1995) 
utilised return on assets; Marcoulides and Heck (1993) used market share; and 
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Sorensen (2002) utilised liquidity. These studies confirmed the relationship of 
organisational culture and organisational performance. Among others, the study by 
Kotter and Heskett (1992) employed a market-based measure in the form of the 
yearly increase in stock prices. Meanwhile, perceived organisational performance has 
been used in many studies of organisational theory (Denison and Mishra 1995; 
Huang 2003; Wilderom and Van den Berg 2000). In this regard, Wilderom and Van 
den Berg (2000) measured the degree of improvement needed by a firm using the 
dimensions of efficiency, customer satisfaction, managerial behavior, professional 
behavior, service quality, contact with clients, position in the market, and reputation. 
According to the above studies, organisational culture influences perceived 
organisational performance. While Denison and Mishra (1995) and Huang (2003) 
asked the respondents about the weaknesses of their firms compared to competitors, 
Wilderom and Van den Berg  (2000) asked about the things the organisation needs to 
improve. They argued that asking about the things an organisation needed to improve 
was better than asking about the weaknesses of the firm, since improvement is the 
language of most managers. For this reason, this study appointed the perceived 
performance measure developed by Wilderom and Van den Berg as its performance 
measure.  
 
2.6 Organisational Culture and Organisational Performance 
The relationship between organisational culture and organisational performance has a 
relatively long tradition in organisation studies. Hawthorne studies, research initiated 
by Mayo, can be considered as the first study relating to this topic. As organisations 
developed, there were many studies that attempted to examine the predictors of 
organisational performance, and one of the predictors was organisational culture.  
Following the argument of a resource-based view of the firm, which claims 
that the firm is a collection of productive resources, this study argues that 
performance is attributable to resources within the firm. To be productive resources 
should be valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable (Barney 1986). Further, 
Carmeli and Tishler (2004) have asserted that organisational performance can be 
well explained by intangible organisational elements. A stronger claim was made by 
Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989, p. 406) who stated ‘…organisational factors explain 
about twice as much variance in profit rate as economic factors’.  
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In the early days, organisational culture was believed to have become the 
explanatory factor behind the excellent companies in the US (Deal and Kennedy 
1982; Peters and Waterman 1982). Nowadays, the explanatory power of 
organisational culture is even more important in many organisational studies as 
‘intangible resources are more than tangible resources to produce a competitive 
advantage’ (Hitt et al. 2001, p. 14). Organisational culture, as an intangible resource, 
was related to organisational performance in many previous empirical studies 
(Sorensen 2002; Petty et al. 1995; Denison 1990; Calori and Sarnin 1991; Gordon 
and DiTomaso 1992; Kotter and Heskett 1992; Marcoulides and Heck 1993; Denison 
and Mishra 1995; Wilderom and Van den Berg 1998; Sawner 2000). Studies on the 
culture–performance relationship showed that organisational culture was a predictor 
of organisational performance (Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski 2000). 
Specifically, Denison and Mishra (1995), using the four-traits culture model, these 
traits being involvement, consistency, adaptability, and mission, found support for 
the effect of these dimensions on firm performance. Using Structural Equation 
Modelling, Marcoulides and Heck (1993) demonstrated how an organisation’s 
culture affects organisational performance. Further, using dimensions of teamwork, 
trust and credibility, performance and common goal, and organisational functioning, 
Petty et al. (1995) have proved the link between organisational culture and 
organisational performance. Later, Wilderom and Van den Berg (1998), and 
Wilderom and Van den Berg (2000), employing 5 dimensions, namely 
empowerment/autonomy, intergroup orientation/interdepartmental cooperation, 
improvement orientation, external orientation, and human-resource orientation lent 
support to the relationship of organisational culture and organisational performance. 
Likewise, Glunk (1999) argued that organisational practices that foster a proactive 
market orientation, a strong competitor orientation, and professional knowledge 
management, and combine these with satisfying reward practices for their personnel 
and competent top management, will have good chances of gaining a competitive 
advantage on multiple stakeholder performance domains. In accord with previous 
theoretical claims, this study proposes that organisational culture relates to 
organisational performance.  
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2.7 Organisational Culture and Internal Corporate Governance 
Among others, the work of Deal and Kennedy (1982) and Peters and Waterman 
(1982) popularised the term organisational culture. The popularity of organisational 
culture literature during the 1980s appeared to be a response to the deteriorating 
performance of many US firms vis-a-vis their Japanese counterparts. The scholars 
looked for explanations of this decline by relying on culture as a major factor. 
Meanwhile, in recent deep studies (Weimer, and Semenov, cited in Hofstede (2004)), 
the focus on culture has shifted to the power it has on corporate governance, within 
which culture has become a powerful explanatory variable.  
Contrary to the previous argument of the direct relationship between 
organisational culture and performance, the conceptual framework of this study also 
hypothesises that organisational culture does not directly relate to performance, but 
rather does so through internal corporate governance. Saffold III (1988, p. 546) 
argued that a  
… simple model for relating culture to performance no longer fits with the 
knowledge scholars have developed about the role culture plays in organisational 
analysis: a more sophisticated understanding of the tie between culture and 
organisational outcomes must be developed.  
 
Saffold III implicitly acknowledged internal mechanisms which he called ‘the 
performance-related cultural processes’; these were climate formation, behavior 
control, organisational learning, strategy formulation, social efficiency, and 
leadership, and they functioned as intermediary elements of the culture–performance 
link. Another study related culture to performance through an effort at quality 
improvement (Nahm, Vonderembse, and Koufteros 2004). Furthermore, Hofstede et 
al. (1990) claimed that organisational culture influences internal control by 
demonstrating structure, role expectations and job description, how to act on the job, 
how to solve problems, who makes decisions in various situations, how to think 
about and behave toward co-workers and supervisors, and industry norms and 
practices. This was also Schein’s (1991, p. 15) view, namely that organisational 
culture ‘provides group members with a way of giving meaning to their daily lives, 
setting guidelines and rules for how to behave, and most important reducing and 
containing the anxiety of dealing with an unpredictable and uncertain environment’.  
In line with the above supportive empirical findings, Semenov (2000) 
compared the systems of corporate governance in industrialised western countries, 
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and asserted that culture scores explained the differences of corporate governance in 
seventeen western countries better than any of the other economic variables 
suggested in the literature. Licht (2001) followed this argument and revealed a cross-
cultural theory of corporate governance systems based on cultural value dimensions 
relateing to shareholding structures and the regulation of self-dealing, insider trading, 
and disclosure. Notwithstanding the above strong arguments, caution should be taken 
as these studies were national in scope. As organisational culture–internal corporate 
governance studies are rarely undertaken, this study is proposed to fill the gap in the 
literature. The argument advanced here is similar to that of Schwarts and Davis 
(1981, p. 47) who put it, ‘for better or worse, a corporate culture has a major impact 
on a company’s ability to carry out objectives and plans…’  
On the basis of the literature review, internal corporate governance will be 
measured using the following dimensions: duties of board of directors7, duties of 
board of commissioners8, duties of independent commissioners, duties of audit 
committee, duties of internal control group, and codes of conduct. The use of the 
above dimensions was referred to in the studies of Banks (2004) and the FCGI 
(2003), and the Code of Good Corporate Governance, which highlights the 
importance of the five actors (BOD, BOC, independent commissioners (IC), audit 
committee (AC) and internal control group (ICG)) and the availability of codes of 
conduct (COC) in enforcing control and accountability of the company (NCCG 
2001). Banks (2004 pp. 8-9) claimed that the failure of many companies is 
characterised by the following: 
a. unethical conduct within a company, where directors, executives, and/or 
employees exhibit poor judgment or behavior; 
b. weak boards that can be influenced and cajoled by powerful (and often 
charismatic) chief executives, and a lack of the expertise to actively 
manage and challenge; 
c. inattentive directors who fail to focus on issues of importance, and 
conflict-ridden directors who derive personal gain from their ties to 
executive management; 
                                                 
7 Indonesian company law adopts a two-tier management structure comprising a board of directors 
and board of commissioners. Boards of directors are tasked with the management of the company, and 
their role is similar to that of executive management in western management structures. 
8 Boards of commissioners are tasked with supervising and advising the directors, and are similar to 
boards of directors in western management structures. 
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d. ineffective internal controls that cannot detect or prevent problems; 
e. poor external ‘checks and balances’ (for example, regulators, auditors, 
capital market, legal framework) that are unable to set or enforce proper 
standards.  
Given the above theoretical point of view, and a strong belief that the cultural 
facet has a considerable impact on the way managers manage their firms,  this study 
posits the significant impact of organisational culture on internal corporate 
governance.  
 
2.8 Internal Corporate Governance and Organisational 
Performance 
The Cadbury Committee on Corporate Governance of the United Kingdom defined 
corporate governance as ‘a set of rules that define the relationship between 
shareholders, managers, creditors, the government, employees and other internal and 
external stakeholders in respect to their rights and responsibilities, or the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled’ (FCGI 2003). Since the beginning of 
the 1930s, experts have realised that the separation of ownership from control creates 
condition of interests’ divergence between owners (principals) and managers (agents) 
(Berle and Means 1932). As most companies are no longer owned by equityholders, 
there should be controls by which the interests of managers are brought into line with 
the interests of the owners. Jensen and Meckling (1976) provided one solution by 
asserting that losses to the principal resulting from interest divergence may be 
restricted by enforcing a control structure upon the agent. Walsh and Seward (1990) 
argued that internal or organisationally-based mechanisms and external or market-
based mechanisms would bring the interests of agents and principals into 
congruence.  
Despite internal corporate governance being a key for safeguarding the 
interests of shareholders (Walsh and Seward 1990), few researchers have examined 
this topic in an Indonesian context (Lukviarman 2004; Nam and Nam 2004). 
Interestingly, when they have there have been mixed results, as Lukviarman (2004) 
claimed that controlling shareholders – one form of governance structure in 
Indonesia – did not improve shareholders’ value, while Nam and Nam concluded that 
board effectiveness was significantly associated with performance. In particular, 
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Lukviarman acknowledged his study’s limitations in terms of data, and 
measurement. Concerning this case, Indonesian external governance is very weak. 
Within a five year period (1992 - 1997) there were only 5 out of 40 acquisitions that 
happened outside family-controlled firms (Banks 2004); these featured no effective 
checks or controls from the market. Further, researching corporate governance in 
Indonesia using secondary data may yield unsatisfactory results due to the following: 
recommendations to create boards of commissioners and to appoint independent 
directors are executed – but on paper, the degree of independence can be questioned 
(Tabalujan 2002); disclosure has been weak (Banks 2004); and fraud and insider 
transactions have been common (Baird 2000). These bring the quality of secondary 
data into doubt. In regard to this, the Chairman of The Audit Board of The Republic 
of Indonesia – referring to a World Bank report – stated that the Indonesian 
Accounting System had contributed to the monetary crises of this country, due to its 
inability to produce reliable, transparent, and accountable reports (Nasution 2003). 
As reliable and valid data are essential in research measurement, and as there are 
limited publications on this topic, further innovative research is called for to provide 
fresh evidence of the relationship between internal corporate governance and 
performance. For this study, the use of primary data to examine the impact of 
internal corporate governance on organisational performance will overcome this 
problem. Analysing the above empirical findings, the study proposes that internal 
corporate governance relates to organisational performance.  
 
2.9 An Overview of Corporate Governance in Indonesia  
The evidence given by the World Bank, which explicitly concluded that poor 
corporate governance was becoming one of the main impetuses factor of the 
meltdown of several Asian countries (Baird 2000), has awakened corporations and 
governments to the importance of corporate governance principles. This is also the 
case in Indonesia, where the awareness and understanding of the importance of the 
implementation of good corporate governance principles in Indonesia just begun 
following the monetary crisis in 1997 (Herwidayatmo 2003). 
In regard to corporate governance, the ADB showed that the following 
characteristics were reflective of the poor corporate governance in Asian countries: 
1) concentrated ownership structure; 2) excessive government interventions; 3) 
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under-developed capital markets; and 4) the weak legal and regulatory framework for 
investor protection (Capulong et al. 2000). In a more specific context, Lukviarman 
(2001) observed the characteristics of companies in Indonesia, and found similar 
features in his study, namely 1) concentrated ownership of the firms by individuals 
or groups of shareholders; 2) pyramid ownership structures in the hands of small 
numbers of families; 3) appointment of family members as members of board or 
management’s team; 4) ineffective supervisory role due to close relationship between 
owners and board; 5) the absence of market control since only small portions of 
shares are sold to public; 6) a high debt-to-equity ratio; 7) many banks which 
financed the companies were also owned by the same group of companies as were 
the borrowers. He argued that the aforementioned factors influence the 
implementation of corporate governance.  
Reacting to poor corporate governance and believing that corporate 
governance is essential for promoting healthy economic growth, Indonesia has taken 
important steps since 1999 by establishing the National Committee for Corporate 
Governance (NCCG) through a ministerial decree No:KEP-10/M.EKUIN/08/1999. A 
year later, a revised decree was created through KEP-31/M.EKUIN/06/2000, and in 
2004 a new decree was put in place through KEP-49/M.EKON/11/2004 and the name 
of the committee was changed to Komite Nasional Kebijakan Corporate Governance 
(National Committee for Corporate Governance (NCCG))9. The main task of the 
NCCG is strengthening, disseminating, and promoting good corporate governance 
principles, not only in the private sector but also in the public sector. In search of 
better-governed State Ownership Enterprises (SOEs), Minister of SOEs released a 
ministerial decree Kep-117/M/MBU/2002 about the implementation of the practice of 
good corporate governance among SOEs. It is becoming mandatory for SOEs to 
implement good corporate governance consistently and to use good corporate 
governance as an operational foundation.  
Besides the NCCG, which was set up by the Government of Indonesia, the 
private sector is developing initiatives to help socialise corporate governance in 
Indonesia, namely the Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI), 
Corporate Leadership Development in Indonesia (CLDI), the Indonesian Institute for 
Corporate Directorship (IICD), Indonesian Directors and Commissioners Initiative, 
                                                 
9 Although in Bahasa Indonesia the name of the national committee was changed, the translation into 
English was still National Committee of Corporate Governance (NCCG). 
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the Indonesian Institute of Independent Commissioners, KADIN Corporate 
Governance Task Force, and The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance.10  
Apart from the effort of Government and the attention of Non-Government 
Organisations (NGOs) as listed above, it is on the shoulder of companies to ensure 
that corporate governance is in place. As the General-Secretary of OECD highlighted 
in 1999 (OECD 1999 p. 7):  
While governments play a central role in shaping the legal, institutional and 
regulatory climate within which individual corporate governance systems are 
developed, the main responsibility lies with the private sector.  
 
2.9.1 The National Committee of Corporate Governance (NCCG) 
Since its establishment, the National Committee of Corporate Governance (NCCG) 
has developed a number of guidelines to support the implementation of corporate 
governance. In March 2001, the Code for Good Corporate Governance was 
published by this committee, followed by Good Corporate Governance Guidelines 
for Indonesian Banking in 2004, and Guidelines for Independent Commissioners and 
Effective Audit Committee in 2004. The following section provides an overview of 
these three guidelines. 
 
2.9.1.1 The Code for Good Corporate Governance11
As one of the important instruments of good governance, the Code for Good 
Corporate Governance has the objective of becoming the reference point for a Model 
of Good Corporate Governance for the Indonesian Business Community. In its 
preamble it is stated that public companies, state-owned enterprises and companies 
utilising public funds or engaged in the business of managing public funds shall be 
the first to commence proper adherence to the principles of the Code. The purposes 
of the principles set forth in this Code are: 
a. to maximise corporate and shareholder value by enhancing transparency, 
accountability, reliability, and fairness in order to strengthen companies 
                                                 





11 The content of this section is extracted from Code for Good Corporate Governance Ref.#4.0, 
composed by The National Committee for Corporate Governance, 2001 
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competitive position both domestically and internationally, and to create a 
sound environment to support investment; 
b. to encourage the management of the company to behave in a professional, 
transparent, and efficient manner, as well as optimising the use of and 
enhancing the independence of the Dewan Komisaris (The Board of 
Commissioners), the Direksi (The Boad of Managing Directors), and the 
GMOS (General Meeting of Shareholders); and 
c. to encourage shareholders, members of the Dewan Komisaris  and the Direksi 
to make decisions and to act with a strict sense of morality, in compliance 
with the prevailing regulations having the force of law, and in accordance 
with their social responsibility towards the various stakeholders and the 
protection of the environment. 
 
 The Code for Good Corporate Governance contains 13 parts, namely:  
1. Shareholders 
Under this part, the principle states that the rights of the shareholders shall be 
protected and, accordingly, shareholders shall be able to exercise their rights 
through reliance upon appropriate procedures that have been adopted by the 
company concerned, which procedures shall be required under applicable 
regulations having the force of law. In addition it mentions all shareholders 
shall be entitled to obtain a full explanation and accurate information 
concerning the procedures to be followed prior to and at the GMOS, in order 
to enable the shareholders to participate in the decision making regarding 
matters which may affect the existence of the company and the rights of the 
shareholders. Shareholders of the same kind of shares shall be treated 
equitably based on the principle that shareholders of the same kind of shares 
have equitable position in the company. Apart form those, the principle 
declares that the Dewan Komisaris should recommend to the GMOS the 
establishment of a Nomination and Renumeration committee.  
2. Dewan Komisaris (The Board of Commissioners)  
This principle states the Dewan Komisaris shall be responsible and shall have 
the authority to supervise the actions of the Direksi, and shall give advice to 
the Direksi when required. The principle also organises the composition of 
the Dewan Komisaris by stating that depending on the specific characteristics 
 34
of a company, at least 20% of the members of the Dewan Komisaris should 
fall under the category of outside members. Such members of the Dewan 
Komisaris shall be independent from the Direksi and controlling 
shareholders. Apart from the above principles, the Dewan Komisaris shall 
consider establishing from among their members certain committees to 
support the implementation of the tasks of the Dewan Komisaris. The 
following are a number of the Dewan Komisaris’ duties in respect of which 
decision-making can be prepared by various committees: the Nomination 
Committee, Renumeration Committee, Insurance Committee, and Audit 
Committee.  
3. Direksi (The Board of Managing Directors) 
This principle states that the Direksi are charged with the overall 
management of the company. The Direksi shall be responsible for the 
implementation of their duties to the shareholders at the GMOS. Relating to 
the composition of the Direksi, it states, depending on the specific character 
of the company, at least 20% of the members of the Direksi should be 
“outside directors”. Such members of the Direksi shall be independent from 
the Dewan Komisaris and the controlling shareholders.  
4. Audit System.  
Under this section, it is acknowledged that the external auditors shall be 
appointed by the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMOS) from candidates 
nominated by the Audit Committee. In addition, the Dewan Komisaris shall 
establish an Audit Committee comprised of certain members of the Dewan 
Komisaris.  
5. Corporate Secretary  
It is stated in this principle that depending on the specific characteristics of 
the company, it is recommended that the Direksi recommend a person as 
corporate secretary who should act as a liason officer and can be assigned to 
administer and maintain corporate documents, including but not limited to 
the Register of Shareholders, the Special Register and the Minutes of all 
meeting of the Direksi and GMOS.  
6. Stakeholders  
In this section, it is admitted that the rights of stakeholders under prevailing 
regulations, having the force of law and/or pursuant to any contracts entered 
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into by the company with customers, suppliers, creditors and the surrounding 
community, shall be respected. Furthermore, stakeholders shall be afforded 
appropriate means of redress if there is evidence of infringements of their 
rights.  
7. Disclosure  
This principle declares that the company shall disclose material information 
through its Annual Reports and financial statements to shareholders and the 
relevant government authorities in accordance with the prevailing 
regulations, having the force of law, in a timely, accurate, understandable and 
objective manner.  
8. Confidentiality 
It is stated in this principle that the Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi are 
under an obligation of confidentiality to the company. Confidential 
information, which their members have obtained while acting as a member of 
the Dewan Komisaris or as members of the, or key executives, must remain 
confidential according to the prevailing regulations having the force of law.  
9. Insider Information  
Under this section, it is declared that members of the Dewan Komisaris and 
the Direksi holding shares in the company and, for public companies, any 
other “insiders” as meant in prevailing regulations having the force of law, 
shall not misuse such material information in relation to the company. 
Information concerning take-overs, mergers, and share repurchase programs 
is in general considered as insider information and the Dewan Komisaris and 
the Direksi and key executives of the companies concerned with the planning 
and implementation of these programs should afford fair treatment to all 
affected shareholders.  
10. Business Ethics and Corruption  
This principle mentions that members of the Dewan Komisaris, the Direksi, 
and all employees of the company shall never make or offer, directly, 
anything of value to a customer or government official to influence or reward 
an action, in accordance with the prevailing regulation having the force of 
law. A business courtesy, such as a gift, contribution or entertainment, should 
never be offered under circumstances that might create the appearance of an 
impropriety. The company should adopt a codification of ethical conduct, 
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which essentially is a statement of values; such Code should be expressed 
brieftly and clearly but be sufficiently detailed to give a clear direction to the 
behavior of those to whom it is directed.  
11. Donations  
As stated in this principle, it is inappropriate that any of the corporate funds 
or assets or profits that rightfully accrue to the shareholders be diverted to 
political donations. Political contributions by the company, or the use of any 
company’s assets, to any political party or any legislative candidate, shall be 
carried out under the prevailing public election regulation, having the force of 
law. Donations to charities are acceptable within reason.  
12. Compliance with Health, Safety and Environmental Protection  
This principle of this part is the Direksi shall ensure that the company, its 
production and manufacturing facilities, plants, shops, and other company 
facilities, comply with applicable environmental and health regulations 
having the force of law. The Direksi shall take appropriate measures to 
prevent workplace injuries and illness. Employees shall be provided with a 
safe and healthy working environment. In carrying out this task, the Direksi 
shall consider evolving industry practices, regulatory, requirements and 
societal standards of care.  
13. Equal Employment Opportunity  
The principle in this part highlights that the Direksi shall use merit, 
qualifications and other job-related criteria as the sole basis for all 
employment-related decisions. The Direksi shall recruit, hire, train, 
compensate, promote and provide other conditions of employment without 
regard to a person’s race, religion, sex, age, disability, or other characteristic 
protected by regulations having the force of law. The Direksi shall provide a 
work environment free of harassment of any kind based on diverse human 
characteristics and cultural backgrounds. 
  
Having a code to become the reference point for a model of good corporate 
governance for the Indonesian business community, and seeking to transform into 
practice, the NCCG strove to realise the following targets (Daniri 2005): 
a. Raising the awareness and implementation of good governance in Indonesia 
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b. Giving feedback to the government, initiatives, and other institutions in 
implementing good governance 
c. Developing Guidelines, Standards, and Codes for the corporate sector 
d. Establishing communication and education in order to increase the 
understanding of good governance 
e. Establishing monitoring and assessment of the implementation of good 
governance in the corporate sector. 
 
2.9.1.2 Code for Good Corporate Governance in Indonesian Banking Sector12
Relating to the implementation of Good Corporate Governance in the Banking 
sector, the Government of Indonesia ratified the Law of Banking, Law No. 10 of 
1998, which consists of a Governance Structure, a Governance Process, and 
Governance Outcomes. Regulations relating to the Governance Structure comprise 
of: 1) Fit and Proper Test for the owners, controlling shareholders, Boards of 
Commissioners, Boards of Directors and other Executives who will run and/or are 
currently running the operational activity of the Bank. 2) Independency of Bank 
Caretaker, which highlights that Boards of Commissioners and Boards of Directors 
shall not have affiliation or financial relationships with other Commissioners and 
Directors or become controlling shareholders of other companies. 3) A Compliance 
Director should be elected to be responsible for the compliance of the bank to 
existing rules. There are three regulations related to Governance Process, namely: 1) 
Risk Management and Internal Control, which stated that banks were obliged to 
implement effective risk management by 31 December 2004. 2) The Bank of 
Indonesia, as the central bank demands banks, to formalise medium- and long-term 
business plans or a corporate plan and fiscal and annual working plans, with 
proposed objectives of having a well-articulated corporate strategy and values. 3)  To 
preserve the healthiness of the banks, the central bank requires banks to have sound 
Capital, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market 
Risks (CAMELS). Rules relating to Governance Outcomes can be classified into: 1) 
Transparency of Financial Condition of Bank and Enhancement of the role of 
External Auditor. 2) Transparency of supervision by Bank Indonesia, which 
                                                 
12 This content of this section is extracted from Pedoman Good Corporate Governance Perbankan 
Indonesia (Indonesian Banking Sector Code) composed by The National Committee for Corporate 
Governance 2004. 
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highlights the intensive and special supervision of banks which experience problems 
of inadequate fulfilment of minimum capital, maximum boundary credit allowance, 
non-performing loans, the level of healthiness of the banks, risk profile and liquidity. 
 
2.6.1.3 Code for Independent Commissioner(s) and Code for the Establishment 
of Audit Committee13
A regulatory framework related to the implementation of corporate governance 
emerged alongside the awareness of the importance of corporate governance. In 
accordance with The Law on Limited Liability Company, Law No 1 of 1995, article 
97, which states that a Board of Commissioners has the duty of supervising the 
policies of the Board of Directors in operating the company along with the duty of 
providing advice to the Board of Directors, The Jakarta Stock Exchange passed 
Jakarta Stock Exchange Director’s decree No. KEP-315/Bursa Efek Jakarta/ 06-
2000. This decree regulates the existence of independent commissioners. According 
to this decree, independent commissioners are defined as those who: 1) do not have 
any affiliation with controlling shareholders of the company; 2) do not have any 
affiliation with the Board of Managing Directors and/or the Board of Commissioners 
of the company; and 3) at the same time do not work as directors of other companies 
which have affiliation with the company. The compliance rate toward the decree of 
the JSX Director has been increasing, from 59.87% in 2001, out of  314 listed 
companies to 99.70% in 2005, out of 330 listed companies (Daniri 2005). 
Relating to audit committees, the Bapepam (The Stock Exchange Supervisory 
Body) enacted circular letter No: SE-03/PM/2000 which recommended the listed 
companies and public companies have an audit committee, which has the task of 
helping The Board of Commissioners, by giving them professional opinions that are 
independent, in order to raise the quality of management’s work, and to reduce the 
deviation of the management of the company. In line with idea of Bapepam, the JSX 
endorsed decree No. KEP-315/BEJ/06-2000, which states that in order to govern 
their company well, listed companies are obliged to have an audit committee in 
which its members should be at least three persons, one of them being an 
independent commissioner who would also become the chair of the audit committee. 
                                                 
13 This content of this section is extracted from Pedoman Komisaris Independen dan Pedoman 
Pembentukan Komite Audit yang Efektif, composed by The National Committee for Corporate 
Governance 2004. 
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The tasks assigned to the audit committee are: supporting the establishment of an 
adequate internal control structure; raising the quality of disclosure and financial 
reporting; reviewing the area and the rightness of external audit, the fairness of the 
costs of the external audit and the independency and objectivity of the external 
auditor; and preparing designated roles and responsibilities of the audit committee 
during the book year, which are audited by the external auditor. As with the 
compliance of the existence of the Dewan Komisaris above, the percentage of listed 
companies which complied to the decree related to an audit committee is rising, from 
14.65% out of 314 listed firms in 2001, to 98.18% out of 330 listed companies in 
2005. 
 
2.10 Corporate Governance (CG) in Western Countries 
The root of corporate governance in western countries is mostly based on agency 
theory. As corporate governance ‘deals with ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments’  (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997 p. 737), the issue of corporate governance emerges when the 
suppliers of finance (the owners or the shareholders of the company) hire other 
people (management team) to responsibly run the company on daily basis. This 
entails an agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976) which may result agency 
conflict (Berle and Means 1932), which the interests of both parties diverge. In this 
regard, the existence of a Board of Directors is very important, creating a link 
between shareholders and managers and thus playing an important role in corporate 
governance. In discussing CG in western countries the inclusion of the three statutory 
bodies — namely the Board of Directors, executive management, and shareholders 
— is therefore required. Further, as there are two broad types of corporate 
governance model in western countries — the Anglo-American and the Continental 
European —, and as the US and Germany represent these two models and are mostly 
referred to in discussion about the two models, this discussion will be directed to 
those countries. 
In general, the US corporate governance system is characterised as a market-
based system in which the capital market is very liquid, company ownership is 
diffused, the market for corporate control is relatively strong, and boards of directors 
are usually dominated by outsiders (Kaplan 1997). By contrast, Kaplan has 
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highlighted the characteristics of Germany’s relationship-oriented corporate 
governance system, in which the capital market is relatively illiquid, company 
ownership is concentrated, the external market for corporate control is small, and 
boards of directors are dominated by banks, large corporate shareholders, and others 
that are intercorporately related.  
In regard to ownership, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), who 
thoroughly examined the ownership structure of large corporations in 27 wealthy 
economies, build an ownership index14 and concluded that: 
a. Compare to Germany, US companies with a ‘Widely Held’ index, close to 1, 
were less likely to have controlling shareholders. 
b. With a ‘Widely Held Financial’ index of 0.25, German companies were more 
likely to have financial companies as controlling shareholders. 
c. Having a ‘State’ index of 0.30, states (domestic or foreign) were more likely 
to have ownership in German companies than in US firms. 
d. With a ‘Family’ index of 0.20, ownership by person was more common in US 
companies than in German firms. 
The results confirm the notion that ownership structure in the US was 
unconcentrated, and distributed widely among many individual investors, while 
companies’ ownership in Germany tended to be more concentrated at a lower scale, 
in the hands of financial institutions and states.  
  Assessing shareholder rights, La Porta et al. (1998) gathered a 
comprehensive sample consisting of 49 countries from Europe, North and South 
America, Africa, Asia, and Australia. In doing so, multiple measures of shareholder 
protection were applied. When an index score was equal to 1, it meant that the stated 
index was regulated by law in the corresponding country. Among of the indices are: 
a. Proxy by Mail Allowed 
b. Shares Not Blocked before Meeting 
c. Cumulative Voting / Proportional Representation 
                                                 
14 The Comprehensive Index can be seen in pages 478-480 of the cited reference. In this section, only 
corresponding indices are applied: 
Widely Held:  Equals 1 if there is no controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. 
Widely Held Financial: Equals 1 if a widely held financial company is the controlling shareholder, 
and zero otherwise. 
State: Equals 1 if the (domestic or foreign) State is the controlling shareholder, 
and zero otherwise. 
Family: Equals 1 if a person is the controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. 
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d. Oppressed Minority 
e. Preemptive Right to New Issues  
f. One Share-One Vote 
g. Percentage of Share Capital to Call an Extraordinary Shareholder Meeting15 
h. Anti-director Rights16 
 
While there was investors’ protection in Law in the first four dimensions above in 
the US there was none in German Law. The only visible shareholders’ protection in 
Germany was in the Percentage of Share Capital to Call an Extraordinary 
Shareholder Meeting. Here, the percentage of share capital needed to call an 
extraordinary meeting was only .05 lower than that required in the US (=0.10). Based 
on their findings, it can be concluded that shareholder protections in the US are much 
better compared to Germany. This is in accordance with Shleifer (2006) who argues 
that under Anglo-American common law the principles-based concept is more 
difficult to circumvent than the alternative rules-based system, which in turn means 
shareholders’ rights are better protected.  
 In regard to the board system, Germany has adopted a two-tier and the US 
has implemented a one-tier system. Under a two-tier board system, German 
companies employ both a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) which monitors and a 
management board (Vorstand) which leads the firm and sets strategy (Davies 2006). 
Within the supervisory board there is also an employees’ representative. As a result, 
the supervisory boards of German firms have wider roles; firstly, they have to 
monitor the management in order to protect shareholders’ interests; and secondly, 
they have to nurture their networking-relationship with the labour force. From the 
shareholders’ perspective, this condition is less than ideal. Hopt (1998), for instance, 
highlighted the weaknesses of this system, stating that a large board contributes to 
the ineffectiveness of the board as a consequence of inadequate information flows, 
either form the management board to the supervisory board, and from the chairman 
to other board members, and also infrequent meetings. Under this system, it is likely 
that the management board gains a stronger role than the supervisory board. 
                                                 
15 In this index, instead of using the number 1 to capture the availability of shareholder protection in 
the Law, the cited reference used percentage of share capital needed to call an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting. The higher the percentage, the harder it is for a minority to organize a meeting 
to challenge or oust the management. 
16 Aggregation of the previous indices. 
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 The so-called ‘shareholder supremacy’ (Farrar 2005 p. 463) is a one-tier 
board system. This system has commonly been adopted by UK and US companies. 
Under the one-tier system, the main task of the board of directors is to safeguard the 
investments of shareholders in the company from potential managerial opportunism 
and incompetence (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990). In doing so, boards of directors 
are exercising the functions of monitoring and disciplining management on behalf of 
shareholders, and helping to define corporate strategy and coach its implementation 
(Lipton 2006). The degree of boards of directors’ involvement in protecting the 
interest of shareholders, however, depends on their attributes. Outside directors, for 
instance, are believed to have more independency than insiders, and suggest strong 
monitoring for the benefit of shareholders (Beaty and Zajaz 1994; Kaplan 2006). 
Outside directors’ stockholding also has been considered to be beneficial to 
shareholders, as giving them equity ownership in a firm aligns their interests with 
those of shareholders (Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994). Another attribute of boards of 
directors that is associated with safeguarding the interests of shareholders is board 
size. More streamlined boards has been believed to operate efficiently, and therefore, 
monitor more effectively (Yermack 1996). The trend of increasingly seeking to 
protect towards shareholders from potential managerial opportunism and 
incompetence was documented by Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), who stated hat 
boards of directors are increasingly likely to fire CEO, and also hire CEOs from 
outside of the firm. 
 
2.11 Summary 
The literature reviewed in this chapter indicates that organisational culture, internal 
corporate governance, and organisational performance studies have mostly been 
performed in organisations in western countries. It is essential to know the 
generalisability of these research findings and their applicability in different contexts.  
The literature provides two perspectives of organisational culture – 
organisational culture as values and organisational culture as practices. These two 
correspond to methodological approaches. The discussion of the importance of 
internal corporate governance measures was begun in this chapter. This was based on 
the duties of companies’ governance structures or organs in Indonesia. Similarly, the 
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reason for the use of perceptual organisational performance instead of archival data 
of organisational performance was also reviewed in this chapter. 
Though organisational culture has been examined and related to 
organisational performance, few researchers have examined this topic in Indonesia. 
Further, the conceptualisation of organisational culture needs further assessment. 
That is to say that an insufficiently measured organisational culture construct suffices 
to guarantee the conceptual development of it, as highlighted in detail in this chapter.  
 Placing organisational culture as the residual factor of corporate governance 
research in general and internal corporate governance in particular should be 
responded to by accommodating this culture into internal corporate governance 
research. Past studies have included national culture instead of organisational culture 
into their research of internal corporate governance. Considering the importance of a 
firm-level approach to internal corporate governance and the acknowledgment that a 
country-wide approach unlikely touches the bottom line of internal corporate 
governance, this study emphases developing a conceptual framework relating 
organisational culture and internal corporate governance.  
 By the same token, although past research reveals the relationship between 
internal corporate governance and organisational performance, few scholars have 
examined the two-tier system of corporate governance, as is the case in Indonesia. 
Hence, a review of the relationship of these variables is discussed in this chapter. 
 This chapter also presents an overview of the uniqueness of the corporate 
governance system in Indonesia, including the law and regulations that function as 
the umbrella of the implementation of corporate governance practices. Then, in the 
latter part of this chapter, an overview of the corporate governance system and 






Chapter 3: Research Paradigm, Research Model 
and Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research paradigm within organisational theory that guided 
the study, the research model that was built upon the literature review, a definition of 
terms that used for the research, and the hypotheses development process of this 
study. In the first part, there is a discussion relating to the two main schools of 
thought, namely qualitative and quantitative paradigms, which are common among 
researchers. Next, the chapter presents a research model based on the literature of 
organisational culture, internal corporate governance, and organisational 
performance. In the third part, this chapter presents definitions of the terms that are 
used in this research. Finally, the fourth part provides the process of developing the 
hypotheses in relation to the research model utilised. 
 
3.2 Research Paradigm 
Generally, for any academic inquiry the stages that have to be taken are (1) 
determining the form and nature of reality, (2) determining the nature of the 
relationship between one who wants to investigate and what can be investigated, and 
(3) determining the methodology to investigate (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Guba and 
Lincoln called the first stage a paradigm, which they defined as:  
(A) set of basic beliefs (metaphysics) that deals with ultimate or first principles. It 
represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the world, the 
individual’s place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its 
part, as for example, cosmologies and theologies do (1994, p. 107). 
 
In dealing with the first stage, to date investigators or inquirers have had many 
approaches available when conducting research. Creswell (2003), for instance, 
named four alternative knowledge claims or paradigms: post-positivism, 
constructivism, advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism. Meanwhile, Lincoln and 
Guba (2000) claimed that there are five basic beliefs of inquiry that are available to 
researchers, namely positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, constructivism, and 
participatory. This last approach extends the work of Guba and Lincoln’s previous 
study, which named only the first four (1994). It seems that the debate relating to the 
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number and the types of inquiry will continue. However, regardless of the above 
perspective, one cannot ignore the dominance of the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches.  
Qualitative research refers to social and behavioural research based on 
unobtrusive field observations, which can be examined without using numbers or 
statistics (Kerlinger and Lee 2000). Here, the focus of research is the ‘processes’ of 
interaction among participants, which are explored by visiting their context and 
gathering information personally (Creswell 2003, 2002), which investigators try to 
make sense of and use to interpret the meaning of their findings (Denzin and Lincoln 
2000). This paradigm leads to the second stage of this school of thought, which 
believes that what exists is mind-dependent, which in turn leads to the impossibility 
of separating what is investigated from the process of investigation. As an idealist 
paradigm, qualitative research sees reality as ontogically ‘becoming’, which leads to 
gaining an understanding of the phenomena (Smith 1983). Assuming the ‘subject – 
subject relationship concept’, interpretive epistemology acknowledges that the 
researcher will be part of the research instrument in collecting and interpreting the 
information. The final stages represented the various methodologies within the 
qualitative approach which are inherent ethnography, grounded theory, case study, 
phenomenological research, and narrative research – among many others.   
On the other hand, the aim of quantitative research is to determine the extent 
or quantity of some phenomenon in the form of numbers (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; 
Kerlinger and Lee 2000). Quantitative research can be experimental, in which 
intervention is allowed, or it can be correlational or survey based, in which case no 
intervention is permitted. Ontologically, this positivist school of thought sees reality 
as ‘being’, which leads the knower to objectively seek to explain and predict the 
relationship between, or the invariant succession of, objects and events (Smith 1983). 
This school of thought assumes that reality is apprehendable and exists 
independently of the knower. Assuming the ‘subject – object relationship’ (Smith 
1983), empirical epistemology admits that researchers can isolate the object of 
research from themselves. In other words, as stated by Creswell (2003), the 
knowledge developed ‘is based on careful observation and measurement of the 
objective reality that exists “out there” in the world’(p. 7). Objectivity is the essential 
aspect of quantitative paradigms, and for this reason attempting to be free from bias 
is paramount in methods of study that are employed. Accordingly, the use of 
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instruments which are unaffected by individual perceptual differences are viewed as 
the way to achieve an accurate reflection or measurement of an independently 
existing object. In explaining and predicting objectively the relationships that exist, a 
quantitative methodology based on equations and statistical modelling is employed. 
Looking for the truth, this realist stance posits that a statement will be judged true 
only if it corresponds to an independently existing reality, and classified false if it 
does not. Thus, absolute truth can never be found.  
This study follows the quantitative approach, which includes a positivist 
ontology, empiricist epistemology, and quantitative methodology. It does so for the 
following reasons. First, the constructs under investigation are measurable and 
observable. Second, there are growing roles for quantitative measures as means of 
assessing the less abstract levels of constructs used in this study (see, for examples, 
Ashkanasy, Broadfoot, and Falkus 2000; Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski 2000).  
 
3.3 Research Model 
Illustrated in Figure 1, the research model is developed from past studies relating to 
organisational culture, internal corporate governance and performance. The 
organisational culture is developed as a second-order construct that is reflected by 
five first-order constructs, namely autonomy, external orientation, inter-department 
coordination, human resource management, and improvement orientation. The 
internal corporate governance construct is also a second-order construct that is 
reflected by six first-order constructs, which are duties of boards of commissioners, 
duties of independent commissioners, duties of audit committees, duties of boards of 
directors, duties of internal control groups, and codes of conduct. The oganisational 
performance is a first-order construct that is reflected by several indicators. The 
relationship between the constructs is discussed in the following section.  
 
3.3.1 Organisational Culture-Organisational Performance Relationship 
Following the argument of a resource-based view of the firm, which claims that the 
firm is a collection of productive resources, this study argues that performance is 
attributable to resources within the firm. To be productive resources should be 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable (Barney 1986). Further, Carmeli and 
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by intangible organisational elements. A stronger claim was made by Hansen and 
Wernerfelt (1989, p. 406) who stated ‘…organisational factors explain about twice as 
much variance in profit rate as economic factors’.  
Prior studies on the culture – performance relationship showed that 
organisational culture was a predictor of organisational performance (Wilderom, 
Glunk, and Maslowski 2000). Denison (1990) and Denison and Mishra (1995) 
provided other empirical evidence that cultural dimensions were positively related to 
organisational performance. Using Structural Equation Modelling, Marcoulides and 
Heck (1993) demonstrated how an organisation’s culture affects organisational 
performance. In addition, the study carried out by Wilderom and Van den Berg 
(2000) verified the culture – performance relationship. Following the previous 
theoretical claims, the proposed research model argues that organisational culture is 
antecedent to organisational performance.  
 
3.3.2 Organisational Culture-Internal Corporate Governance Relationship 
Apart from discussion in the above section, interestingly, organisational culture also 
was seen not to be directly related to organisational performance, as Saffold III 
(1988, p. 546) argued that a  
… a simple model for relating culture to performance no longer fits with the 
knowledge scholars have developed about the role culture plays in organisational 
analysis: a more sophisticated understanding of the tie between culture and 
organisational outcomes must be developed.  
 
In short, Saffold III believed that organisational culture related to organisational 
performance via behaviour control. Another study has related culture to performance 
through efforts at quality improvement (Nahm, Vonderembse, and Koufteros 2004). 
Furthermore, Hofstede et al. (1990) claimed that organisational culture influences 
internal control by demonstrating structure, role expectations and job description, 
how to act on the job, how to solve problems, who makes decisions in various 
situations, how to think about and behave toward co-workers and supervisors, and 
industry norms and practices. It seems that the term ‘internal control’ offered by 
Hofstede above captures the mechanisms within a firm to govern it in a way that 
satisfies those who have relations with the firm. In line with the above supportive 
empirical findings, Semenov (cited in Hofstede 2004) asserted that culture scores 
explained the differences of corporate governance in seventeen western countries 
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better than any of the other economic variables suggested in the literature. Given the 
above theoretical point of view, and a strong belief that the cultural facet has a 
considerable impact on the way managers manage their firms, the proposed research 
model posits the impact of organisational culture on internal corporate governance, 
where internal corporate governance represents behaviour control, and internal 
control within the firm. 
 
3.3.3 Internal Corporate Governance-Organisational Performance 
Relationship 
The impact of corporate governance and performance has been well documented in 
previous empirical studies. External and internal control, as mechanisms of corporate 
governance, will keep the managers’ self-serving behavior in check and guard the 
shareholders’ interests in the objectives that are given priority by managers (Walsh 
and Seward 1990). External mechanisms are applied in the form of tender offers, 
going-private transactions such as LBOs and MBOs, mergers, and hostile tender 
offers. Discussing this external mechanism in the case of Indonesia provides an 
exception, as within a five year period (1992 to 1997) there were only 5 out of 40 
acquisitions that happened outside family-controlled firms (Banks 2004); these 
featured no effective checks or controls from the market. Regarding internal control, 
scholars unequivocally assume that ownership structure influences firm performance 
(Gedajlovic and Shapiro 1998; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 
1986). Further, assessing the independent boards of directors, Hill and Snell (1988) 
provide evidence that the greater the number of directors from outside of the firm, 
the greater the profitability of the firm. Complementary, utilising M-structure as a 
proxy of internal control or internal corporate governance, Hill (1985) found a 
relationship between internal corporate governance and performance.  
In essence, internal control provides mechanisms by which the interests of 
managers are brought into line with the interests of the owners. Internal control who 
monitors the management of the company was in fact exercising behavioural control. 
Saffold III (1988) was among the first scholars who believed that behaviour control 
positively affected company performance. In line with the previous arguments, 
internal corporate governance, who are tasked to ‘scrutinize the highest decision 
makers’ (Mizruchi 1983, p. 433) or to be ‘the ultimate control’ (Hill and Snell 1988), 
safeguard the organisational performance. Considering the previous claims, the 
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proposed research model posits the impact of internal corporate governance on 
organisational performance. 
 
3.3.4 Other Issues in Modelling the Research 
In modelling this research, several issues have been raised and discussed in this 
section. Firstly, in researching organisational culture, there are constraints of culture 
that could be considered. First, as organisational culture is a based theme, it can be 
viewed as values as well as practices. Researching both perspectives in one snapshot 
study is unlikely to be carried out as it requires a considerable effort, time and cost. 
Only a practices perspective is applied in this study. Second, recognising that culture 
is adaptive in some ways, but maladaptive in other ways (Ramsey, 2007), single 
measurement of this concept in this study is unlikely to reveal such natures of 
culture. 
 Secondly, there could be a bunch of variables attributable to performance 
(and leadership can be one of them). However, it must be noted that the majority 
research on leadership categorised as ‘trait’ studies, concentrating on identifying the 
personality traits which characterised successful leaders. Trait theories on leadership 
assume that successful leaders are born and that they have certain innate qualities 
which distinguish them from non-leaders. The ‘leadership trait’ is similar to the 
‘cultural trait’ as the focus is not on the behaviour and situational factor. Considering 
that a similar approach has to be taken, the inclusion of leadership variable in the 
research model requires the same treatment as applied to organisational culture. Due 
to the nature of snapshot study is unlikely to reveal such traits of leader, the inclusion 
of leadership variable in the research model is hardly justified. 
Thirdly, in regard to organisational culture and leadership, Schein (1992) 
observed that these two concepts are intertwined – in the context of organisational 
life cycle. Bass and Avolio (1993) also emphasised that the relationship between the 
two concepts represents an ongoing interplay in which the leader shape the culture 
and is in turn shaped by the resulting culture. Thus, in order to balance the 
approaches in researching the topic of this research, decision has to be taken in 
regard to the snapshot study the research is carried out. This suggests that inclusion 
of leadership variable in the model could improperly portray the leadership concept 




3.3.5 Operationalisation of the Constructs 
For the purpose of the study, organisational culture will be operationalised with five 
subconstructs, namely autonomy, external orientation, inter-department 
coordination, human resource management, and improvement orientation. In this 
regard, the study adapted and modified the previous studies relating to organisational 
culture, particularly the works of Wilderom and Van den Berg (2000), Nahm, 
Vonderembse and Koufteros (2004), Denison (1990), and Hofstede et al. (1990). The 
last two studies above were believed to have had a widespread influence in the 
thinking about organisational culture in the last decade; however, the heavy reliance 
on these studies could hinder the current development of organisational culture 
studies. It is for this reason that the current study also refers to the work of the first 
two empirical studies above, as well as the last two. The mix of items in the five 
constructs of organisational culture developed by this study was tested in two pilot 
studies performed in an earlier stage of this research. 
In terms of internal corporate governance constructs, six subconstructs will be 
utilised to capture the specific mechanisms and actions taken by individual firms to 
enforce control and accountability. These subconstructs are duties of boards of 
commissioners, duties of independent commissioners, duties of audit committees, 
duties of boards of directors, duties of internal control groups, and codes of conduct. 
As the literature of internal corporate governance is under-developed, the study 
developed these above subconstructs through a series of interviews and tests. Earlier 
in this work, a review of the literature of internal corporate governance in western 
countries was used as a starting point to discover what internal corporate governance 
is about; this was followed by study of the Indonesian literature relating to this 
construct as the study will be carried out in Indonesia. In this regard, the Indonesian 
Company Law (Tabalujan 1997), Code for Good Corporate Governance (NCCG 
2001), Guidelines of Effective Independent Commissioners and Audit Committee 
(NCCG 2004), Good Corporate Governance (Daniri 2005), among many others, 
were the main sources used in developing research constructs. The next stages were 
interviews with several experts relating to these constructs and testing of the 
constructs in two pilot studies.  
In terms of the organisational performance construct, the research model 
utilised the perception of organisational members toward the degree of improvement 
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needed for their company in the eight items, which were efficiency, customer 
satisfaction, managerial behaviour, professional behaviour, service quality, contact 
with clients, position in the market, and reputation. This construct was initially 
developed by Wilderom and Van den Berg (2000) and Wilderom, Glunk, and 
Maslowski (2000).  
 
3.4 Definition of Terms 
In this study the terms used are defined as follows: 
a. Organisational Culture: ‘…particular ways of conducting organisational 
functions that have evolved over time under the influence of an organisation’s 
history, people, interests, and actions and that have become institutionalised 
in the organisation’ (Kostova 1999 p. 309). This definition captures the 
perception of organisational work practices within an organisation. 
b. Autonomy: ‘Pertains to the degree to which employees have decision latitude 
at the job level’ (Van den Berg and Wilderom 2004, p. 574). 
c. External Orientation: The degree to which the organisation is responsive to 
the needs of its customers, and the degree of its response toward the actions 
of other organisations in the market (Van den Berg and Wilderom 2004; 
O'Reilly, Chatman, and Cadwell 1991; Hofstede et al. 1990; Gordon and 
DiTomaso 1992; Ashkanasy, Broadfoot, and Falkus 2000).  
d. Inter-departmental Coordination: The process by which inter-departmental 
communication and cooperation is perceived to be performed under 
circumstances of horizontal differentiation within modern organisational 
structures (Denison and Mishra 1995; Gordon and DiTomaso 1992; 
Marcoulides and Heck 1993; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Cadwell 1991; Van den 
Berg and Wilderom 2004). 
e. Human Resource Orientation: The degree to which organisational admiration 
of and concern toward its employees is perceive to be practiced within a 
company (Hofstede et al. 1990; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Cadwell 1991; 
Marcoulides and Heck 1993; Van Muijen et al. 1999). 
f. Improvement Orientation: The extent to which an organisation is eager to 
encourage employees to become innovative and creative (Ashkanasy, 
Broadfoot, and Falkus 2000; Denison 1990; Gordon and DiTomaso 1992; 
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Hofstede et al. 1990; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Cadwell 1991; Van Muijen et 
al. 1999). 
g. Internal Corporate Governance: The specific mechanisms and actions taken 
by individual firms to enforce control and accountability which are centred on 
boards of commissioners, independent commissioners, audit committees, 
executive management, and internal control groups, within which their 
activities are reinforced by codes of conduct that are intended to promote 
proper behaviour. 
h. Duties of Board of Commissioners (BOC): The extent to which the BOC 
fulfils its duties of supervising the policies/actions of the BOD in operating 
the company, along with the duty of providing advice to BOD (NCCG 2001; 
Tabalujan 1997). 
i. Duties of Independent Commissioners (IC): The degree to which Independent 
Commissioners fulfil their duties of proactively supporting the BOC in 
supervising and giving advice to BOD (NCCG 2004). 
j. Duties of Audit Committee (AC): The extent to which the Audit Committees 
fulfils its duties of auditing and controlling the process of financial disclosure 
and reporting, and internal control (Daniri 2005; NCCG 2004, 2001) 
k. Duties of Boards of Directors (BOD) or Executive Management: The degree 
to which BOD fulfils its duties of the overall management of the company 
and are responsible for the implementation of their duties to shareholders at 
general meetings of shareholders (NCCG 2001; Tabalujan 1997). 
l. Duties of Internal Control (ICG): The degree to which the Internal Control 
group is fulfils its duties of safeguarding the company from financial and 
legal manipulation, and identifying and managing the risk in order to 
maximise the utilisation of company resources ethically, effectively and 
efficiently (NCCG 2004; Daniri 2005).  
m. Codes of Conduct: The degree to which codes of conduct are perceived as 
being implemented within a company. Such codes of conduct capture the 
ethical guidelines and norms of the company and act as standards of acting 
and behaving when dealing with others (NCCG 2004; Banks 2004). 
n. Organisational Performance: The degree of improvement needed by the 
organisation in the following dimensions: efficiency, customer satisfaction, 
managerial behaviour, professional behaviour, service quality, contact with 
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clients, position in the market, and reputation (Wilderom and Van den Berg 
2000). 
 
3.5 Hypotheses Development 
Most previous empirical studies that have attempted to relate organisational culture 
and organisational outcomes have pursued culture traits and taken a strong culture 
approach. Usually, traits of organisational culture were developed through qualitative 
studies within which traits were identified, and in subsequent phases quantitative 
studies of exploratory and correlational analysis were performed. In relation to the 
strength of culture, an analysis of agreement among members of an organisation 
toward a set of norms and values was the indicator of the magnitude of a strong 
culture. This approach claimed that a particular culture or the degree of cultural 
strength caused performance to increase. For example, Denison and Mishra (1995), 
using the four-traits culture model — these being involvement, consistency, 
adaptability, and mission — found support for the effect of these dimensions on firm 
performance. In a similar vein, Deal and Kennedy (1982) and Peters and Waterman 
(1982) asserted that strong culture was the driving force behind the excellent 
companies in the US.  
In recent empirical research, organisational culture has no longer been 
defined as traits or values, rather it has been perceived as organisational practices 
(Petty et al. 1995; Wilderom and Van den Berg 1998, 2000). Specifically, 
organisational culture has been defined as the ‘collective wisdom within an 
organisation about how things can best be done’ (Wilderom and Van den Berg 2005, 
p. 6). Petty et al. (1995), for example, using the dimensions of teamwork, trust and 
credibility, performance and common goals, and organisational functioning, proved 
the link between organisational culture and organisational performance. Likewise, 
Glunk (1999) argued that organisational practices that foster a proactive market 
orientation, a strong competitor orientation, and professional knowledge 
management, and combine these with satisfying reward practices for their personnel 
and competent top management, would have good chances of gaining an 
organisation competitive advantages in multiple stakeholder performance domains. 
Proposing a theoretical model of ‘how culture works’, Cooke and Szumal (2000) also 
argued that operating culture — and not espoused values — has a direct relationship 
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to organisational outcomes. In accordance with the above claims, Wilderom and Van 
den Berg (2000) employed 5 dimensions of organisational culture, namely 
empowerment/autonomy, intergroup orientation/interdepartmental cooperation, 
improvement orientation, external orientation, and human-resource orientation, 
which lent support to the relationship of organisational culture and organisational 
performance.  
In regard to the dimensions highlighted by Wilderom and Van den Berg 
(2000), Kirkman and Rosen (1999), using two Fortune 50 organisations and two 
smaller companies, reported that the team empowerment/autonomy dimension was 
significantly related to productivity. The more empowered the team the more 
productive the team, compared to the less empowered team. At an individual level, 
supporting evidence was found in the study by Spreitzer et al. (1997), among many 
others. They claimed that several dimensions of psychological empowerment – 
namely meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact – were associated with 
effectiveness.  A more recent study by Mathieu, Gilson and Ruddy (2006) also 
reported the positive relationship between empowerment and performance.  
The external orientation dimension was mostly associated with market 
orientation in many studies (see e.g. Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Wood, Bhuian, and 
Kiecker 2000; Narver and Slater 1990). As was the case in this study, external 
orientation was reflected by observed variables which capture market intelligence 
generation of companies. These consist of activities to gather, monitor, and analyse 
not only current and future needs of customers, but also factors outside of them, 
including government, and most importantly the competitive actions of current and 
potential competitors. Kahn (2001), surveying profit-oriented firms, asserted that a 
market orientation correlated to performance. In a similar vein, a study of not-for-
profit hospitals by Wood, Bhuian, and Kiecker (2000) confirmed the positive 
association between market orientation and performance.  
In regard to inter-departmental coordination, research has documented its 
association with performance. Specifically, Kingman-Brundage, George, and Bowen 
(1995) stated that the greater the emphasis on coordinating departmental activities to 
facilitate interaction, the greater the value to customers. This finding was in 
accordance with the study of  Kahn (2001), and that of Ellinger, Daugherty, and 
Keller (2000), which found the positive effect of interdepartmental integration on 
performance.  
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For a long time, the dimension of human resource management has been 
associated with performance. For example, Huselid (1995) and Huselid, Jackson, and 
Schuler (1997) claimed the positive impact of human resource management on firm 
performance. In a more recent study, this positive relationship was also revealed 
(Stavrou, Charalambous, and Spiliotis 2007).  
Finally, the positive effect of improvement orientation dimension on 
performance was supported by the studies of Nahm, Vonderembse, and Koufteros 
(2004) and  Fleming, Coffman, and Harter (2005). Thus, the use of perception of 
organisational practice to measure organisational culture has valuable support form 
the studies cited above.  
Given the above empirical arguments, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Organisational culture (that emphasises a higher degree of autonomy, 
external orientation, interdepartmental coordination, human resource orientation, 
and improvement orientation) is positively related to organisational performance.  
 
Comparing the systems of corporate governance within industrialised western 
countries, Semenov (2000) asserts that the best explanation of differences in 
governance mechanisms is provided by culture. Licht (2001) followed this argument 
and reveals that cross-cultural theories of corporate governance systems based on 
cultural value dimensions relate to shareholding structures and the regulation of self-
dealing, insider trading, and disclosure. Notwithstanding these two strong arguments, 
caution should be taken as they approach their studies at a national level.  
At the micro or organisational level of study, empirical studies relating 
organisational culture and corporate governance, and internal corporate governance 
in particular are rarely undertaken. Internal corporate governance, which was defined 
as the specific mechanisms and actions taken by individual firms to enforce control 
and accountability — and which centred on boards of commissioners, independent 
commissioners, audit committees, boards of directors, and internal control groups, 
whose activities are reinforced by codes of conduct that are intended to promote 
proper behaviour — was found to be mechanism within firm. This mechanism rarely 
stands in isolation, but rather exists because of the cultures that put it to works. Thus, 
the fulfilment of duties of each of company organ that put internal corporate 
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governance in place was triggered by culture. Saffold III (1988) was among the first 
to reveal this phenomenon by implicitly acknowledging internal mechanisms which 
he called ‘the performance-related cultural processes’, these being climate formation, 
behaviour control, organisational learning, strategy formulation, social efficiency, 
and leadership, as intermediary elements of the culture-performance link. The 
argument advanced here is similar to that of Schwarts and Davis (1981, p. 47) who 
put it, ‘for better or worse, a corporate culture has a major impact on a company’s 
ability to carry out objectives and plans, especially when a company is shifting its 
strategic direction’. Following the above claims, Hofstede et al. (1990) specifically 
claim that organisational culture influences internal mechanism, namely structure, 
role expectations and job description, how to act on the job, how to solve problems, 
who makes decisions in various situations, how to think about and behave toward 
coworkers and supervisors, and industry norms and practices. It is also Schein’s 
(1991, p. 15) view that organisational culture ‘provides group members with a way 
of giving meaning to their daily lives, setting guidelines and rules for how to behave, 
and most importantly reducing and containing the anxiety of dealing with an 
unpredictable and uncertain environment’.  
 This study suggests that the organisational culture consists of five dimensions 
– autonomy, external orientation, interdepartmental coordination, human resource 
management, and improvement orientation – that act as triggers in the 
operationalisation of internal corporate governance. The dimension of autonomy, 
deals with the empowerment which was needed by company organs to fulfil their 
duties. This was also the case for external orientation, which was needed by 
company governance structures. To satisfactorily performing their roles, they should 
be outward looking or searching for benchmarks for their jobs. Aligning the internal 
mechanisms which were performed by company organs was better organised if there 
was interdepartmental coordination among them. In regard to the human resource 
management dimension, members of company governance structures or organs 
needed to be assured that performing such roles would be objectively assessed and 
related to better human resource practices. Finally, improvement orientation was 
seen as basic to the nature of human beings to serve others well, not only for her/his 
personal reasons (i.e. career advancement), but also for broader reasons that affect 
the wider community. Considering the above arguments in detail, the study proposes 
the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: Organisational culture (that emphasises a higher degree of autonomy, 
external orientation, interdepartmental coordination, human resource orientation, 
and improvement orientation) is positively related to internal corporate governance 
(which is measured by the fulfilment of the duties of boards of commissioners, 
independent committees, audit committees, boards of directors, internal control 
groups, and the reinforcement of codes of conduct).    
 
Since the beginning of the 1930s, experts have realised that the separation of 
ownership from control creates the condition of interests’ divergence between 
owners and managers (Berle and Means 1932). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
provided a solution by asserting that losses to the principal resulting from interest 
divergence may be restricted by enforcing a control structure upon the agent. A 
control structure in terms of ownership structure will significantly influence the 
decision-making process made by managers of the firm. Consequently, managers 
will behave as shareholders expect, namely they will seek to increase the corporate 
value. Relating to control structure, Walsh and Seward (1990) argue that internal or 
organisationally-based mechanisms and external or market-based mechanisms will 
bring the interests of agents and principals into congruence. Comparing the two types 
of controls, however, they argue that external controls are less preferable for 
shareholders since acquisition, divestitures, and ownership amendments are more 
expensive for owners to bear. Accordingly, the two most prominent internal controls, 
namely executive compensation schemes and governance structure, are favourable. 
Internal control, thus, was investigated comprehensively and then related to 
organisational performance. For example, utilising M-structure as a proxy of internal 
control or internal corporate governance, Hill (1985) was among the first who found 
a relationship between internal corporate governance and performance. In regard to 
the first dimension of internal corporate governance, it was observed that those who 
monitor the management of the company were in fact exercising behavioural control. 
This duty was fulfilled by the Boards of Commissioners – one of the company’s 
governance structures or organs. Saffold III (1988) was one of the first scholars who 
believed that behaviour control positively affected company performance. More 
specifically, boards of commissioners, who are tasked to ‘scrutinize the highest 
decision makers’ (Mizruchi 1983, p. 433) or to be ‘the ultimate control’ (Hill and 
 59
Snell 1988), safeguard shareholders’ returns. In another study, the Independent 
Commissioners (IC) dimension was investigated by Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel 
(1994), who stated that the presence of non-board blockholders, the proportion of 
board outsiders, board outsider equity, and board insider equity were related to 
organisational performance. In more recent studies, the positive link between the 
presence of an Independent Commissioner (IC) and organisational outcomes has also 
been validated (Florackis 2005; Matolcsy, Stokes, and Wright 2004). The dimensions 
of Audit Committee (AC) and Internal Control Groups (ICG) were also documented 
as important organs of internal corporate governance. Banks (2004) and the National 
Code for Good Corporate Governance (NCCG 2004) have argued that an Audit 
Committee and Internal Control Group safeguard companies through their fulfilment 
of their duties. In regard to Boards of Directors, these are selected and paid by 
companies to run organisations on a daily basis. They are obliged to provide 
satisfactory returns to the owners of the firms through the strategy they define, and 
its implementation. The contribution of this organ to organisational performance has 
been examined by Coughan and Schmidt  (1985) and Murphy (1985), who concluded 
that there was a positive relationship between a Board of Directors and 
organisational performance. In more recent studies, Florackis (2005) has revealed the 
positive affect of the compensation of boards of directors on performance. This was 
also the case with the Codes of Conduct (COC), as its existence guards the interests 
of shareholders through promotion of proper behaviour (Banks 2004). Analysing the 
above empirical findings, the study proposes a subsequent hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Internal corporate governance (which is measured by the fulfilment of 
the duties of boards of commissioners, independent committees, audit committees, 
boards of directors, internal control groups, and the reinforcement of codes of 
conduct) is positively related to organisational performance. 
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter presents the research paradigm that was utilised to guide the research 
process of this study. Two contrasting perspectives in particular, namely the 
qualitative approach and the quantitative approach, are discussed in this chapter. The 
qualitative approach sees reality as ‘becoming’, while the quantitative approach sees 
reality as ‘being’. A further discussion related to ontology and epistemology is also 
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presented in this chapter. Considering that the constructs investigated in this study 
are measurable and observable, it was suggested that the quantitative approach, 
which includes a positivist ontology, the assumption of reality as ‘being’, and an 
empiricist epistemology fits with this current research. 
 This chapter also presents a research model relating organisational culture, 
internal corporate governance and organisational performance. The first two 
constructs are second-order constructs which consist of several first-order factors. 
Meanwhile, organisational performance is a first-order construct which is reflected 
by several observable indicators. This model is built upon the literature review 
presented in chapter 2. 
 The model developed posits that organisational culture has a positive 
association with organisational performance; that internal corporate governance has 
positive relationship with organisational performance; and that organisational culture 
has positive link with internal corporate governance. These are the hypotheses that 
are built and presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Method∗†
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 presents the systematic research procedures undertaken in this study, based 
on the theoretical perspectives outlined. This chapter begins with an explanation of 
the research procedures that guided this study, followed by a section describing an 
exploratory stage within which the research instruments were developed. This 
includes literature reviews, the objective of which was to capture the measuring 
instruments explaining the constructs used in this study. Following this, a section on 
the instruments validation and the data collection procedure is presented. The next 
section provides an explanation of the target sample, followed by discussion of the 
data analysis tool employed in this research. This begins with a discussion of the 
missing values, factor analysis procedures and the structural equation modelling  
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(SEM) which includes covariance-based and variance-based SEM, LISREL 
estimation methods and model assessment. The next section discusses issues related 
the back-translation process. Finally, other methodological issues are highlighted, 
including common method variance, and the wording and ordering of the questions. 
 
4.2 Research Process 
The research process shown in Figure 4.1 was followed in this study. The literature 
review phase, within which the research questions are derived, is the first and most 
important phase. Albert Einstein, cited in Cooper and Schindler (2003, p. 64), 
highlighted that ‘the formulation of a problem is far more often essential than its 
solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skills. To 
raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle 
require creative imagination and marks real advance in science’. This literature 
review was presented in Chapter 2.  
In the next phase, the research model and hypotheses are developed: these 
were shown in Chapter 3. Developed from past studies relating to organisational 
culture, internal corporate governance, and organisational performance, the research 
model was formulated, and a rational foundation for establishing hypotheses among 
the constructs was built. Following this phase, questionnaire design and instrument 
validation is performed, which includes instrument development, pre-test or a 
qualitative validation based on feedback from selected experts, and a quantitative 
validation in the form of two separate pilot studies. Also, included in this phase is 
discussion of the scale employed in the questionnaire. The results of the 
aforementioned phases are inputs for revising the instrument. Once the research 
instrument is finalised, it is utilised to collect the data in the actual survey. This study 
relied on a survey as the primary method of gathering the data.  
Following the completion of the above phases, the data colleted is analysed in two 
subsequent stages. The first analysis is factor analysis, which is intended to assist the 
researcher in selecting a representative subset of variables while retaining their 
original character. The second analysis is linear structural relationship analysis, 
which is aimed at testing hypotheses derived from the previous phase. These two 
analytical procedures are presented in this data analysis phase. In the final phase, the 
results of this study are interpreted, and the implications of these results are 
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discussed. In doing so, the results are referred to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, 
as shown by the dotted line in Figure 4.1 relating the Results Interpretation phase 
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Figure 4.1 Research Process 
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4.3 Development of Instruments 
For the purpose of this study, the measurement scales were developed and adapted 
from previous studies in the literature of organisational culture and theory, corporate 
governance, and organisational performance. As tables 4.1 to 4.12 show, all 
constructs refer to previous relevant studies. In particular, the internal corporate 
governance construct and its subconstructs were derived firstly from the broad 
literature review, and subsequently from interviews with several experts and 
practitioners of corporate governance in Indonesia, and further reviews of literature 
on Indonesian corporate governance. In the following paragraphs, these constructs 
will be discussed in detail. 
In regard to the scale, the study asked participants to express their opinion of 
the extent of their agreement or disagreement using a six-point Likert scale, namely: 
(1) Strongly Disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Somewhat Disagree, (4) Somewhat Agree, 
(5) Agree, and (6) Strongly Agree. All constructs employed this scale, except the 
organisational performance construct. For this construct, the study asked participants 
to express their opinion of the degree their organisation needed to improve in the 8 
dimensions. Here, the six-point Likert scale ranged from (1) Very Little, (2) Little, 
(3) Somewhat Little, (4) Somewhat Much, (5) Much, and (6) Very Much. The 
utilisation of a six-point scale instead of a five- or seven-point scale was based on the 
argument advanced by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997), who provided 
empirical evidence that some Asian countries, including Indonesia, ranked high in 
the neutrality dimension. Consequently, the middle response, namely ‘neutral’ and 
‘neither agree or disagree’ was excluded. It was believed that such a response would 
have contributed to central tendency error (Cooper and Schindler 2003).  
Considering the length of questionnaire administered for this study and the 
effort of increasing participation, the ‘respondent approach’ (Quirk’s Marketing 
Research Review cited in Cooper & Schindler (2003)) which emphasised ‘what’s the 
study about’ and ‘what’s in it for me if I participate’ was written in the introductory 
page, and  the sequence of questions started with organisational culture questions, 
followed by internal corporate governance questions and organisational performance 
questions. Demographics and classification questions were placed at the end of the 
questionnaire. A full set of questionnaires is shown in Appendix 2 (English version) 
and Appendix 3 (Bahasa Indonesia version).  
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4.3.1 Organisational Culture 
Organisational culture as second-order construct is reflected by five first-order 
constructs. The description of each construct and corresponding items are provided 
in the following section. 
 
4.3.1.1 Autonomy (Auto) 
Six items were adapted and modified from studies of Wilderom and Van den Berg  
(1998; 2000); Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski (2000); and Van den Berg and 
Wilderom (2004), which reflect the decision latitude possessed by employees in the 
company. Unless employees have freedom to contribute their skills to advancing the 
company, it is unlikely progress can be made. The items used to measure autonomy 
are printed in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Autonomy Construct and References 
No. Construct Items References 
1 Autonomy 1. There is room for non-managerial employees 
to make their own decisions 
2. There is freedom for employees to depart 
from rules 
3. There is freedom for employees to implement 
decisions according to their own views 
4. Employees influence important decisions 
concerning work 
5. There is freedom for employees to plan their 
own work 
6. There is an opportunity for employees to 
bring forward ideas before decisions are made 
Wilderom and 





(2000); and Van 
den Berg and 
Wilderom (2004) 
 
4.3.1.2 External Orientation (EO) 
External orientation was operationalised using scales adapted from the studies of 
Wilderom and Van den Berg (1998; 2000; 2005); Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski 
(2000); and Nahm, Vonderembse, and Koufteros (2004). This dimension reflects the 
willingness and effort made to anticipate and respond to customers’ demands. The 





Table 4.2: External Orientation Construct and References 
No. Construct Items References 
2 External 
Orientation 
1. There is a quick reaction to developments in 
the market 
2. There is an investigation of the wishes and 
needs of customers 
3. There is active canvassing of new customers 
4. Company is working to improve the local 
market position 
5. There is a thorough training of employees in 
systematically gathering information on what 
customers want to see improved 
6. Company has an edge over local competitors 
Wilderom and 












4.3.1.3 Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 
Since modern organisations are characterised by the division of work, which 
subsequently demands the flow of work and information across functions, the inter-
departmental coordination construct was employed in this study. The items of this 
dimension were adapted and modified from the studies of Denison (1990); Nahm, 
Vonderembse and Koufteros (2004); Wilderom and Van den Berg (1998; 2000); Van 
den Berg and Wilderom (2004); and Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski (2000). The 
seven items used in this dimension are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Inter-departmental Coordination Construct and References 




1. There is useful cooperation between 
departments 
2. There is exchange of useful information 
between departments 
3. Departments support one another in the 
resolution of problems 
4. There is mutual communication between 
heads of departments 
5. Working with someone from another part of 
this organisation is like working with 
someone from a different organisation 
6. Work is organised so that each person can see 
the relationship between his or her job and the 
goals of the organisation 
7. Cooperation across different parts of the 






Wilderom & Van 
den Berg (1998; 












4.3.1.4 Human Resource Management (HRM) 
To measure the dimension of human resource management, the study adapted and 
modified the research instruments of previous studies by Wilderom and Van den 
Berg (1998; 2000); Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski (2000); Van den Berg and 
Wilderom (2004); and Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohavy and Sanders (1990). Out of seven 
items, the four items derived from the studies of Wilderom and Van den Berg (1998; 
2000), and Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski (2000), while the last three items 
originated from the research of Hofstede et al. (1990). In essence, this dimension 
covered employees’ selection process, the employees’ functioning support, and the 
performance appraisal of employees. The seven items are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: Human Resource Management Construct and References 




1. Performance appraisals are taken seriously 
2. Employees obtain useful information about 
their functioning 
3. There is careful selection of new personnel 
4. Job competency is the only criterion in hiring 
people 
5. Employees are told when a good job is done 
6. Managers help good people to advance 
7. There is little concern for personal problems 
of employees 
Wilderom and 














4.3.1.5 Improvement Orientation (IO) 
Similar to the previous construct, the works of Wilderom and Van den Berg (1998; 
2000); Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski (2000); Van den Berg and Wilderom 
(2004); Hofstede (1990), and Denison (1990) contributed to the design of 
improvement orientation dimension. Adapted and modified form those above studies, 
this dimension captured the ambition of the members of organisation. 






Table 4.5: Improvement Orientation Construct and References 
No. Construct Items References 
5 Improvement 
Orientation 
1. Employees closely monitor their own way of 
working 
2. Employees search for possibilities to improve 
the organisation 
3. There are initiatives taken by employees to 
improve the way in which the work is done 
4. New and improved ways to do work are 
continually adopted 
5. Employees try to be pioneers 
6. People put in maximal effort 
7. Think three years or more ahead  
Wilderom and 












4.3.2 Internal Corporate Governance Construct 
Internal corporate governance is a second-order construct that is reflected by six 
first-order constructs. The items of each first-order construct are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
4.3.2.1 Duties of Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
For the purpose of this study, the early version of the dimension of duties of board of 
commissioners was developed from the work by Banks (2004) and through 
interviews. However, the work of Banks was derived from the context of the 
corporate governance systems in western countries, most of which are one-tier 
systems. To measure the duties of boards of commissioners in Indonesia, which uses 
a two-tier system, adjustments had to be performed. Having performed the first stage 
of the fieldwork, which involved interviews and a literature review of the Indonesian 
corporate governance system, the study came up with eleven items that captured the 
duties of boards of commissioners. The main references for this dimension were the 
Indonesian Company Law (Tabalujan 1997) and the Code for Good Corporate 
Governance Ref. 4.0 (NCCG 2001). This dimension represented the interests of 
shareholders and stakeholders by overseeing the fulfilment of the duties of board of 
directors and by implementing internal controls. The eleven items of these duties are 





Table 4.6: Board of Commissioners Construct and References 
No. Construct Items References 




1. BOC supervises the actions of BOD 
2. BOC gives advice to BOD when required 
3. BOC ensures that BOD complies with 
Articles of Association 
4. BOC ensures that BOD complies with 
regulations having the force of law 
5. BOC draws-up minutes of each BOC 
meeting 
6. BOC ensures that BOD reads minutes from 
each BOC meeting 
7. BOC creates an ethical environment 
8. BOC ensures that BOD protects the 
interests of shareholders 
9. BOC ensures that BOD protects the 
interests of stakeholders 
10. BOC ensures that BOD applies a 
transparent system for the recruitment of 
executives other than members of  the BOD 
11. BOC establishes certain committees as 
needed (e.g. audit, compensation, 









4.3.2.2 Duties of Independent Commissioners (IC) 
The National Committee for Corporate Governance (2004) set up guidelines for the 
duties of independent commissioners. The independency of commissioners is shown 
by the selection of criteria which state that the independent commissioners are people 
that have no affiliation with the company, other commissioners, the board of 
directors, or controlling shareholders of the company, and do not have a business 
relationship with the company’s ultimate business. In developing duties of 
independent commissioners, the study interviewed several experts of corporate 
governance in Indonesia during the initial stage of the fieldwork. A review of 
literature on the Indonesian corporate governance system was also conducted, in 
order to capture the domain of the independent commissioners’ construct. Along 
with the guidelines of the National Committee for Corporate Governance in 
Indonesia (2004) and the Jakarta Stock Exchange Directors’ decree No. Kep-
315/Bursa Efek Jakarta/06-2000 the study produced eleven items for this construct. 





Table 4.7: Independent Commissioners’ Construct and References 
No. Construct Items References 




1. IC ensures that BOD defines business 
strategy of the company 
2. IC ensures that company hires professional 
managers 
3. IC ensures that company establishes 
communication reporting link 
4. IC ensures that company establishes control 
system 
5. IC ensures that company establishes audit 
system 
6. IC ensures that company complies with 
regulations 
7. IC ensures that company manages risk 
8. IC ensures that company provides 
transparent financial reporting 
9. IC ensures that company treats minority 
shareholders fairly and honestly 
10. IC ensures that company discloses 
transactions that have conflicting interests 
11. IC ensures that company organs are 
accountable 
NCCG (2004) 











4.3.2.3 Duties of Audit Committee (AC) 
As one organ of the corporate governance structure in Indonesia, the existence and 
function of the audit committee were strengthened with The Stock Exchange 
Supervisory Body’s circular letter No. SE-03/PM/2000 and the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange Director’s decree No. Kep-315/BEJ/06-2000. In this regard, the National 
Committee for Corporate Governance (2004) established guidelines for developing 
an effective audit committee. To derive the thirteen items of this dimension the study 
conducted interviews and a literature review in its earlier stages. The items derived 











Table 4.8: Audit Committee Construct and References 
No. Construct Items References 
8 Duties of Audit 
Committee (AC) 
1. AC oversees financial reports, ensuring 
they follow the Indonesian Accounting 
standard 
2. AC monitors the external auditor’s audit 
of financial report  
3. AC monitors the process of managing risk 
4. AC ensures that the report of internal 
auditor considers risk management 
5. AC ensures that BOD complies with 
recommendations relating to risk 
management 
6. AC creates disciplines and control which 
lessen the possibility the company being 
jeopardised 
7. AC empowers internal audit 
8. AC promotes adequate structures of 
internal control 
9. AC improves the quality of financial 
disclosure and reporting 
10. AC reviews the scope, accuracy, and cost-
effectiveness of external audit 
11. AC reviews the independence and 
objectivity of external auditor 
12. AC acts as communication channel 
between external auditors and BOC 


















4.3.2.4 Duties of Board of Directors (BOD) 
The early version of the duties of the board of directors or iginated from the work of 
Banks (2004) and through interviews with several experts on corporate governance 
in Indonesia. Since the study was carried out in Indonesia, a thorough understanding 
of the duties of boards of directors needed to be based on law, the rules and 
guidelines which have been established in Indonesia. Indonesian Company Law, 
Law No 1 of 1995 is the main reference for such duties. However, this law provided 
only general duties of boards, essentially stating that boards of directors were 
responsible for the management of the company. Consequently, the amendments to 
these duties needed to be made. Based on the interviews and the guidelines published 
by the National Committee for Corporate Governance (2001) the study obtained 
seventeen duties of boards of directors. In sum, this dimension represented the tone 
of the board of directors in advancing the company, protecting interested parties, 
being accountable for the company’s decisions, and providing full and accurate 
information. The seventeen items of this dimension are presented in Table 4.9.  
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Table 4.9: Board of Directors Construct and References 
No. Construct Items References 




1. BOD defines strategy of the company 
2. BOD manages the implementation of 
strategy of the company 
3. BOD protects the interests of shareholders 
4. BOD protects the interests of stakeholders 
5. BOD complies with the Articles of 
Association of the Company 
6. BOD complies with regulations having the 
force of law 
7. BOD creates an ethical environment 
8. BOD creates a proper human resource 
management function 
9. BOD enforces codes of conduct 
10. BOD establishes internal control systems to 
safeguard company assets 
11. BOD draws-up minutes for each BOD 
meeting 
12. BOD ensures that BOC reads minutes of 
BOD meetings 
13. BOD advises the audit committee when to 
seek a second opinion on an accounting 
issue 
14. BOD ensures that BOC has access to 
information about the company 
15. BOD provides shareholders with full and 
accurate information about the company 
16. BOD communicates with internal parties on 
items of corporate importance 
17. BOD ensures transparency in the financial 








4.3.2.5 Duties of Internal Control Group (ICG) 
Unless the internal control group is in place, it will be very difficult for the board of 
commissioners and the board of directors to perform effectively. The Internal 
Control Group is a group of technical experts that provides review, assessment, and 
control of a company’s operations. In this regard, the internal control group plays 
significant role in bridging the daily business activities of the company and policies 
launched by higher levels of the corporate structure. Accordingly, such an important 
role needs to be assessed if internal corporate governance is to take place. To 
measure the duties of the internal control group the study undertook a literature 
review of corporate governance system in Indonesia. Derived from the conceptual 
development of Daniri (2005) and the guidelines of the National Committee for 
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Corporate Governance (2001)  the research produced five items for this dimension, 
as shown in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10: Internal Control Group Construct and References 
No. Construct Items References 




1. ICG creates policies to secure the assets of 
the company 
2. ICG creates policies to increase the 
operational efficiency and effectiveness of 
the company 
3. ICG develops the reliability and the 
comprehensiveness of accounting/financial 
information 
4. ICG ensures compliance with applicable 
policies and regulatory requirements 
5. ICG ensures substantive audit findings are 





4.3.2.6 Codes of Conduct (COC) 
The early versions of codes of conducts originated from the conceptual framework of 
Banks, who highlighted the importance of them as ‘the standards for behaviour and 
action when dealing with those inside and outside of the firm’ (2004 p. 47). Looking 
at Indonesian corporate governance literature, the National Committee for Corporate 
Governance (2004) has established codes of conduct that became the items of this 
dimension in this study. The seven items of the codes of conduct are shown in Table 
4.11. 
Table 4.11: Codes of Conduct Construct and References 
No. Construct Items References 
11 Codes of 
Conduct 
(COC) 
My company has codes of conduct which: 
1. … create an environment where conflicts of 
interest are avoided or eliminated 
2. … create an environment where people do 
not engage in insider trading for the benefit 
of individual interest 
3. … make certain that no one engages in 
corrupt practices 
4. … make certain that no one engages in 
activities that jeopardise the company’s 
reputation 
5. … treat all stakeholders fairly and honestly 
6. … develop mechanisms where violations of 
company policy can be reported without 
fear of retribution 
7. … create an environment in which the 





4.3.3 Organisational Performance (OP) 
Eight items of perceived organisational performance were adapted from Wilderom 
and Van den Berg (1998), and Wilderom, Glunk and Maslowski (2000). The 
inclusion of the items is based on the multiple-stakeholder approach, which 
acknowledges that organisations are faced with competing goals that should be 
balanced to warrant organisations’ continuing operations (Wilderom and Van den 
Berg 2000). The items are shown in Table 4.12.  
 
Table 4.12: Organisational Performance Construct and References 




In your opinion, to what degree does your 
organisation need to improve on the 
following performance criteria? 
1. Efficiency 
2. Customer satisfaction 
3. Managerial behaviour 
4. Professional behaviour 
5. Service quality 
6. Contact with clients 
7. Position on the market 
8. Reputation 
Wilderom and 






4.4 Instruments Validation and Data Collection Procedure 
In an effort to build valid and reliable research instruments the study followed the 
flowchart developed by Cooper and Schindler (2003). This flowchart consists of the 
following sequences: preparing a preliminary analysis plan, pretesting individual 
questions (first test), pretesting individual questions (second test), and finally coming 
up with an instrument ready for data collection.  
In the first phase, having research questions, the study proceeded with the 
selection of the data type, a communication approach, and a process structure. In 
terms of data type, interval data was used; and considering Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner (1997), six alternative answers for each item of the Likert’s scale 
were operationalised. Relating to the communication approach, a combination of 
interview and a self-administered distribution of questionnaires were used. The 
interview process that was carried out was intended to develop an understanding of 
the constructs, and to adjust the constructs in accordance with the law and 
regulations implemented in Indonesia. Later on, when research items were finalised, 
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the questionnaire was to be distributed directly from researcher to respondents. In 
regard to question structure, semi-structured questions were used as guidelines in 
interviewing several experts in Indonesia, while structured questions in the research 
instrument sought to gather information from respondents.  
In the second phase, measurement questions that were built upon the 
literature review and interviews were summarised. As the study was conducted in 
Indonesia the selection of experts17 who possessed knowledge of the constructs 
being studied, namely organisational culture, the corporate governance system in 
Indonesia, and organisational performance was of utmost importance. Overall, six 
experts were interviewed during this stage. It was important to evaluate whether the 
items in the first draft of the questionnaire belonged to the constructs being studied, 
therefore feedback given by the above participants was incorporated into the draft 
questionnaire. 
The above qualitative validation was followed by quantitative validation by 
administering a draft of the research instrument to surrogate respondents in phase 
three.  The test of individual questions, or in this case pilot study 1, was intended to 
refine the measurement questions. Zikmund described a pilot study as ‘trial runs with 
a group of respondents for the purpose of detecting problems in a questionnaire’s 
instructions or design’ (2003 p. 229). The respondents of pilot study 1 were 
employees of a State Owned Company and comprised 30 middle-level managers in 
this firm. This number was deemed sufficient (Cooper and Schindler 2003). The 
study also performed reliability tests to reveal statistical proof of the weaknesses of 
research instruments. Results indicated that refinement in terms of rewording two 
items and changing the general instructions was needed, as shown by the low 
Cronbach’s alpha. Details are presented in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
17 In this study, interviewees’ expertise was acknowledged due to the qualifications they hold. The 
first two persons graduated with doctoral degree from foreign universities, are researchers, and 
supervise research of PhD students in Indonesia. One of these two persons is independent 
commissioner of two companies in Indonesia. The third person is one of director of Capital Market 
Supervisory Agency Minister of Finance The Republic of Indonesia, and member of the National 
Committee on Governance. The fourth person is researcher of Non-Government Organisation 
focusing on the practices of corporate governance of Indonesia. The fifth person is author of book on 
good corporate governance in Indonesia, a vice-director of one of biggest electronic company in 
Indonesia, member of the National Committee on Governance, and was former director of Jakarta 
Stock Exchange. The sixth person is PhD graduate of foreign university, an academic staff, and 




Following the amendments of the research instrument used in pilot study 1, 
the study tested individual questions for the second time, known as pilot study 2 in 
this study. As with pilot study 1, pilot study 2 was utilised to further detect any 
ambiguous and misunderstanding questions, and to revise the questionnaire’s design 
if necessary. As expected, no more vague and confusing items were detected, as was 
shown by the increase in the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Suggestions accepted 
from pilot study 2 included limiting the separation of items within one construct into 
two different pages, and changing the font to make the space between lines wider.  
Finalising, the readiness of the research instrument for data collection is the 
final phase of the flowchart suggested by Cooper and Schindler (2003). In this study, 
the questionnaire was self-administered to a targeted population. Choosing this 
method was based on several advantages, such as low cost, perceived anonymity, 
thinking time about questions allowed and convenience for respondents (Cooper and 
Schindler 2003; Zikmund 2003). Nonetheless, the major drawback of this method is 
non-response, especially when the questionnaire is poorly designed (Zikmund 2003). 
As such, to increase the response rate, attempts were carried out: (1) to make and 
design the questionnaire so that it was as attractive as possible and to ensure that it 
could be easily understood; (2) Keep the length of the questionnaire as short as 
possible; (3) Write a ‘respondent approach’ section, which included what the study 
was about and ‘what’s in it for me if I participate’; (4) promise confidentiality; (5) 
obtain sponsorship from ‘respected’ people (Zikmund 2003; Quirk's Marketing 
Research Review cited in Cooper and Schindler 2003). Results of the questionnaire 
survey are presented in Chapter 6 and 7. 
 
4.5 Sample 
This study implicitly demanded that respondents were familiar with the topics of 
organisational culture, internal corporate governance, and performance. Specifically, 
the subject of internal corporate governance has traditionally been the interest of 
middle and upper levels of the management hierarchy. It is not an area of daily 
discussion for blue-collar workers. Managers as respondents in research relating to 
culture and organisational phenomena had been common in several previous studies 
(as examples see Heuer, Cummings, and Hutabarat 1999; Schneider and DeMeyer 
1991). Those who occupied middle- and upper-level position were believed to have 
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higher levels of education compared to those that were in the lower levels. For that 
reason, the study approached the sample through educational institutions which run 
programs designed for middle- and upper-managers.  
It is likely to admit that there could be possible bias in selecting these groups 
of managers. Unselected managers who did not engaged in higher degree studies 
could possibly possess the information being targeted by the investigative questions. 
To balance, however, adequate motivation to cooperate in research survey should 
also be weighted, as there were cases of very low response rate in surveying middle- 
and upper-managers. Additionally, the educational institutions in Indonesia played 
important role in disseminating the new concept of internal corporate governance to 
organisations in Indonesia through publications of their research, case studies, and 
discussion forum to media. It is expected that exposure in order to gauge this topic is 
prevalent in selected respondents. 
In regard to the selection of middle- and upper-managers, the questionnaire 
given to the respondents contained two demographical questions related to the 
position of the respondent in the company. 
a. How many hierarchical layers above your current position to top? 
b. How many hierarchical layers below your current position to the lowest 
position? 
Response to the above questions provides researcher a controlling data relating to 
whether the respondent belonged to middle-managers group or upper-managers 
group. 
 The above technique is known as purposive sampling. This technique ‘is 
characterised by the use of judgment and a deliberate effort to obtain representative 
samples by including presumably typical areas or groups in the sample’  (Kerlinger 
and Lee 2000, p. 179).  Thus, the use of groups of managers who were taking 
educational programs and/or training sessions in educational institutions in Indonesia 
as a proxy of middle- and upper-level managers in Indonesia was deemed 
appropriate, considering the purposive sampling method. Additionally, this 
nonprobability sampling method was applied in view of the time constraints and to 
ensure cost efficiency, as well as to increase the response rate.  
 In supporting this approach, Denison (1984, p. 8) methodologically used the 
individual respondent in his study of the culture of an organisation by stating that 
‘the study was based on individual perceptions of organisational practices and 
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conditions; these perception were used to characterise the culture of each 
organisation’. Similarly, Denison and Mishra (1995)  and Carmeli and Tishler (2004) 
used individual perception to measure organisational culture in their research. 
Supporting such an approach were Schein, and Van Aken and Strikwerda, cited in 
De Witte and Van Muijen (1999), who highlighted that asking individuals about the 
perception of organisational culture is natural as they are the enablers, the makers of 
the organisation and its culture.  
 Individual response, although applied in many studies of organisational 
culture, is not immune from deficiencies as acknowledged by Calori and Sarnin 
(1991). Nonetheless, they deemed this approach appropriate, stating: ‘There is bias in 
asking individuals to respond to questions concerning the whole company. However, 
it seemed to be a better solution than aggregating specific work group practices and 
values, mainly because the surveys do not cover the whole population of the 
company’ (1991 p. 61). Pointing to the aggregation technique, Hofmann (1997) 
claimed that the shortcoming of this approach is that potentially meaningful 
individual level variance in the items or construct is neglected.  
 
4.6 Data Analysis 
4.6.1 Missing Values 
It is very likely that any study will have missing values. The important issue is not 
the missing values themselves, rather it is the causes underlying the missing values. 
Unless the reasons behind the missing values are analysed, any attempt to replace 
such values will undeniably distort the conclusion of the study, due to the potential 
‘hidden’ biases of the results (Hair et al. 1998). As such it is very important to 
ascertain the randomness of the missing values. For this reason, Little and Rubin 
(2002) introduced this concept and a test for randomness. 
To date, computer packages have been able to assess the degree of 
randomness of missing values. SPSS version 13, for example, provides users the 
estimated statistics of Little’s MCAR, indicating whether the missing values can be 
classified as missing completely at random or not. Having determined randomness, a 
study then can choose two approaches of imputation, namely the all-available 
approach or the replacement approach. The first approach is using all available 
information as the imputation technique. This method does not actually replace the 
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missing values, but instead imputes the distribution characteristics (e.g., means or 
standard deviations) or relationship (e.g., correlations) from all available valid values 
(Hair et al. 1998). The second approach replaces the missing values with estimated 
values derived from available information about the sample. In this regard, the 
estimated values can be derived from various methods, namely case substitution, 
mean substitution, cold deck imputation, regression imputation, and multiple 
imputations (Hair et al. 1998). 
For this study, based on SPSS missing values analysis, EM (Expectation-
Maximisation) estimated statistics revealed that the significant level of Little’s 
MCAR was .035, indicating that the missing values could be considered to be 
missing completely at random (Little and Rubin 2002). The subsequent procedure to 
deal with these missing values is to replace them using available methods. Given that 
each method listed above has advantages and disadvantages (see Hair et al. 1998 for 
details), this study used series means to substitute the missing values, for the 
following reasons: 
a. The percentage of missing values for each variable was less than 5%, with the 
highest percentage of 2.0% on item 4 the External Orientation (EO4) 
dimension. Whatever method used would not have significantly influenced 
the results of the study. 
b. More than 56% of the missing values had no different estimated means, 
calculated using four different methods (series means, regression means, EM 
means, and MI (Multiple Imputation) means. This percentage would have 
been even higher if decimal places were reduced to 2 from the SPSS default 
program of 4 decimal places, which accounted for 98%. 
c. The series means method is most common (Schwab 2005) and has been 
widely used in many studies (Raaijmakers 1999). 
 
4.6.2 Factor Analysis 
Once missing data had been replaced using series means, factor analysis was 
undertaken. The purpose of factor analysis is to reduce the number of observed 
variables into a representative subset of variables (factor) while retaining the original 
character of the sample. It offers researchers a multivariate statistical technique for 
achieving a better understanding of the structure of the data by effectively extracting 
information from a large database (Hair et al. 1998). Too large a number of variables 
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can be a disadvantage, as ‘increasing the number of variables also increases the 
possibility that the variables are not all uncorrelated and representative of distinct 
concepts’ (Hair et al. 1998, p. 91), and it causes computation problems18. This 
analysis was particularly important in this research, as the subsequent analysis using 
structural equation modelling demanded an appropriate sample size given the 
number of variables. As claimed by Holmes-Smith (2001) the requirement of sample 
size increases almost exponentially as the number of variables is increased. 
 In this study exploratory factor analysis, which searches for structure among 
a set of variables or is employed as a data reduction method, was used. In this regard, 
a maximum of 4 variables for each construct was decided on in advance, considering 
the sample size requirement for structural equation modelling in the subsequent part 
of the data analysis. In extracting the variables this study applied the principal 
component rather than the common factor. This choice was made for empirical and 
practical reasons. Firstly, Mulaik and McDonald  (1978) claimed that the latter 
approach suffers from factor indeterminancy as no single unique solution can be 
derived from any individual respondent. Secondly, Hair et al. (1998) stated that 
computationally it takes substantial computer time and resources to calculate the 
estimated communalities used to represent the shared variance, especially for larger-
size variables. Thirdly, as a result of this complication, the component factor is 
widely used in many behavioral and social studies. 
 A number of stages comprise a factor analytic process (Coakes and Steed 
1999). First, there should be enough evidence of correlation between variables to 
appropriately apply factor analysis. The second stage is determining the number of 
factors necessary to represent the data. In this regard, communalities, total variance 
explained-Eigenvalues, scree plot, and component matrix are required. The last stage 
is making rotation to make the factor structure more interpretable. In doing so, 
orthogonal rotation was selected and was followed by the varimax method of 
rotation.  
 Assessing the degree of consistency between multiple measurements of 
indicators was then carried out. Within this stage, the number of variables was 
reduced. A maximum of 4 indicators for each individual construct was decided upon, 
                                                 
18 Jöreskog and Sörbom (1990) stated (1) the computation of asymptotic covariance matrices demands 
a large amount of computer memory when the number of variables is at all large, (2) reasonable 
precision requires a very large sample, and (3) the missing observations can not easily be solved. 
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to allow the subsequent structural equation modelling analysis to be carried out 
without the problem of sample size (Holmes-Smith 2001). To ensure that the scale or 
set of measures accurately represented the concept of interest, the factor analysis 
proceeded with a construct validity test. In this regard, the Spearman correlation 
coefficient was utilised as it is appropriate for ordinal data, or for interval data that 
do not satisfy the non-normality assumption (SPSS 2004). To satisfy the requirement 
of validity the coefficient needed to be significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). The 
results of factor analysis are presented in Chapter 6 of this study. 
 
4.6.3 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
Following the completion of the factor analysis, the subsequent data analysis of this 
study was performed using structural equation modelling (SEM). This is a method 
for representing, estimating, and testing a theoretical network of relationships 
between variables or constructs (Rigdon 1998). SEM, as one of the ‘second 
generation of multivariate analysis’ (Fornell 1987, p. 408), is superior to the first 
generation techniques (e.g. multiple regression, principal component analysis, cluster 
analysis) in advancing understanding of the merging of theories and empirical data. 
This is due to its ability to deal with many dependent constructs and to treat error 
terms.  
SEM assesses whether a sample covariance/variance or correlation matrix is 
consistent with the hypothetical matrix of the research model proposed by the 
researcher. SEM follows these procedures (Kelloway 1998; Hair et al. 1998): 
a. Model specification, where the research model is developed from a 
theoretical perspective that links every variable or construct in the model. 
b. Identification, which shows the degree to which there is a sufficient number 
of equations to ‘solve’ for each of the coefficients (unknowns) to be 
estimated. 
c. Estimation, which solves the equations by using numerical methods to 
estimate parameters. 
d. Testing-fit, which is based on the number of goodness-of-fit indices. 
e. Re-specification, which is intended to improve the fit of the model. 
 
In judging model fit, users of SEM can analyse its outputs, namely the 
estimates of the designated model parameters, the estimates of the standard errors for 
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the estimated parameters, the estimates of the proportion of variance explained (for 
the dependent variables), the goodness-of-fit statistics, and diagnostic statistics which 
indicate the source of misfit  (Rigdon 1998). 
 
4.6.3.1 Covariance-Based and Variance-Based Structural Equation Modelling 
SEM can be differentiated into two types – one based on covariance and the other 
based on variance. In this regard, Chin and Newsteed (1999) thoroughly compared 
and discussed these two types of SEM; their findings are reproduced and adapted in 
Table 4.13.  
 
Table 4.13: Comparison of Covariance-Based and Variance-Based Structural 
Equation Modelling 
Criterion Covariance-Based SEM 
(CBSEM) 
Variance-Based SEM (VBSEM) 
Approach Covariance based Variance based 
Objective Parameter oriented Prediction oriented 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Consistent Consistent as indicators and sample size 
increases (i.e., consistency at large) 
Assumptions Typically multivariate normal 
distribution and independent 
observations (parametric) 
Predictor specification (non-parametric) 
Implications Optimal for parameter accuracy Optimal for prediction accuracy 
Sample size Ideally based on power 
analysis of specific model—
minimal recommendations 
range between 200 to 800. 
Power analysis based on the portion of the 
model with the largest number of 
predictors. 
Minimal recommendations range from 30 
to 100 cases. 
Software e.g. LISREL, EQS, AMOS e.g. PLS-PC, PLS-Graph, SmartPLS 
Reproduced and adapted from Chin and Newsteed (1999) 
 
CBSEM is ‘theory oriented, and emphasises the transition from exploratory to 
confirmatory analysis’ (Jöreskog and Wold cited in Barclay, Higgins and Thompson 
(1995, p. 287)). In other words, it is best used for theory testing and development. In 
performing these roles, it requires data to follow a multivariate normal distribution 
(therefore being parametric), and sample size to be large. As an alternative of 
CBSEM, VBSEM is available. It ‘is primarily intended for causal-predictive analysis 
in situations of high complexity but low theoretical information (Jöreskog and Wold 
cited in Barclay, Higgins and Thompson (1995, p. 288). Therefore, VBSEM is 
prediction-oriented modelling. As for other characteristics of VBSEM, it is 
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acknowledged that this second type of SEM is not as restrictive as CBSEM (e.g. 
smaller sample size, and no normality assumption). The most popular software 
programmes for CBSEM and VBSEM are LISREL and PLS, respectively. 
Notwithstanding the ease-of-use and strengths of VBSEM, its limitations are 
worth considering. In particular, Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau  (2000) highlighted the 
capabilities of both approaches and reported that despite its capabilities, PLS (the 
software used for VBSEM) experienced the following deficiencies: (a) PLS does not 
support rigorous analysis of all the variance components of each observed variable 
(common, specific, and error) as an integral part of assessing the structural model; 
(b) PLS does not allow the non-common variance of an observed variable to be set to 
a given value in the research model; and (c) PLS does not provide a statistic to 
compare alternative confirmatory factor analyses models. These caveats are not 
intended to penalise the PLS approach, but are given as a reminder that there are 
particular conditions that make PLS appropriate, as there are also requirements 
which make LISREL best applied. Over the past two decades, researchers have 
examined this issue, and advised that PLS is preferred over LISREL when (1) 
violation of multivariate normality assumption is present, (2) sample size is small, 
and (3) non-convergent or improper solutions are likely to occur (Bagozzi, Yi, and 
Singh 1991; Fornell and Bookstein 1982). It is fortunate that these requirements no 
longer hold in latter versions of LISREL, as a new estimation method has allowed 
non-normal multivariate distribution, and not large sample sizes to be executed19. 
Furthermore, since the research model of this study was conceptually developed as a 
second-order construct, using LISREL was much easier for dealing with this 
construct than using PLS software.  
 
4.6.3.2 LISREL Estimation Methods 
Considering the discussion relating to PLS and LISREL in subsection 4.6.3.1 above, 
this study utilises LISREL software for subsequent analysis of the data. The 
objective of LISREL is to demonstrate that the operationalisation of the theory being 
observed is validated and not disconfirmed by the data (Hair et al. 1998; Gefen, 
Straub, and Boudreau 2000). In doing so, LISREL provides a number of estimation 
methods, such as Generalised Least Square (GLS), Maximum Likelihood (ML), 
                                                 
19 See the Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML) method of estimation of LISREL version 8 for a 
detailed discussion. 
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Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML), among many 
others. The main difference between most estimation methods is the way they 
minimise the discrepancy between the implied covariance matrix and the actual 
covariance matrix  (Holmes-Smith 2001). 
Choosing among the available methods of estimation is neither 
straightforward nor arbitrary. Several factors are to be considered, such as 
multivariate distribution of the data, sample size, type of data, and model 
complexities. Given these factors, this study employed the Robust Maximum 
Likelihood (RML) method, the reasons for this choice being highlighted in detail in 
Chapter 7. 
 
4.6.3.3 Model Assessment 
Anderson and Gerbing  (1988) recommended that SEM researchers approach the 
analysis of data using two-step modelling, namely that they employ a measurement 
part and a structural part. Following this advice, assessment of the model can be 
divided into two sequences. The first is assessing the measurement part of SEM, and 
the second part is evaluating its structural part.  
 Assessment of measurement properties adheres to the following procedures: 
a. Assessment of unidimensionality (and convergent validity) of each latent 
variable, in which parameter estimates, squared multiple correlations, overall 
model fit are examined. 
b. Model re-specification/modification to examine whether the results indicate 
goodness-of-fit indexes (or indices) or not of the particular model. The tools 
that are available are residuals and a standardised residual, the modification 
indices, and the expected change. 
c. Test of reliability and validity of measurement properties in which squared 
multiple correlations are again examined, and measurement of construct 
reliability, variance extracted estimate, convergent validity, and discriminant 
validity is performed. 
 
 Considering that this study employed higher-order constructs, the two-step 
modelling was intervened by confirmatory factor analysis of second-order constructs; 
this take place before the structural part of SEM (Gerbing, Hamilton, and Freeman 
1994). Thus the results of the measurement part of first-order constructs were used as 
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inputs for confirmatory second-order constructs. These constructs consisted of 
several first-order constructs (see research model in section 3). The first-order 
constructs, in turn, were measured with reflective indicators. In this study, 
organisational culture and internal corporate governance were second-order 
constructs which were measured by several first-order constructs. For the former, 
organisational culture, the first-order constructs were autonomy, external orientation, 
inter-departmental coordination, human resource management, and improvement 
orientation. For the latter, internal corporate governance, the first-order constructs 
were duties of board of commissioners, duties of independent commissioners, duties 
of audit committee, duties of board of directors, duties of internal control group, and 
codes of conduct. In evaluating model fit of the second-order constructs, the 
goodness-of-fit indices were applied, including CFI (Comparative Fit Index) 
(Gerbing, Hamilton, and Freeman 1994). This index is similar to the RNI (Relative 
Non-centrality Index) of Marsh  (Marsh 1994). The benchmarks of such indices are 
equal to those that were applied to the first-order constructs.  
The structural part permits relationships between constructs to be examined. 
It is also possible and often desirable to include observed variables as part of the 
structural model. As the objective of SEM is to show that the paths of the model are 
plausible given the sample data (Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau 2000), the goodness-
of-fit indices were again applied. Among many others, the χ2, p-value, Goodness-of-
Fit Index (GFI), Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) were used to indicate 
that the operationalisation of the theory being observed was verified and not 
disconfirmed by the data collected for this study. 
 
4.7 Back-translation Process  
The research instrument of this study was initially developed from organisational 
studies conducted in western countries, while this research was conducted in 
Indonesia. Consequently, the instrument needed to be translated from English to 
Bahasa Indonesia. Several techniques were available for translation, such as direct 
translation, back-translation, parallel translation and a mixed technique (Usunier 
1998); each has advantages and disadvantages. This study chose the back-translation 
technique as it is widely used to reach lexical and idiomatic equivalence. Under this 
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procedure, two translators were invited, one a native speaker of the source language 
and the other a native speaker of the target language20. One translator translates from 
the source (English) language into a target (Bahasa Indonesia) language. Another 
translator translates the first translator’s target language back into the source 
language. The results then are compared. The researcher of this study then invited the 
two translators to discuss and prepare the instrument into the final target-language. 
As back-translation is not a perfect method, the study proceeded with pre-test or pilot 
studying to reach a satisfactory level of reliability on conceptual and measurement 
equivalence (Sin, Cheung, and Lee 1999; Usunier 1998). 
 
4.8 Other Methodological Issues 
4.8.1 Common Method Variance 
As stated in section 4.5, the study collected the data concerning multiple constructs 
from a single source using a questionnaire. As a result, a common method variance, 
which is defined as ‘variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather 
than to the constructs the measure represent’ (Podsakoff et al. 2003, p. 879), was 
likely to emerge. Self-report bias is not the only form of common method bias; other 
biases may emerge such as item characteristics effects, item context effects, and 
measurement context effects (Podsakoff et al. 2003) as a result of using a 
questionnaire in collecting the data. Despite many studies having revealed the 
dilemma of doing research with common method variance and self-report data 
(Avolio, Yammarino, and Bass 1991; Podsakoff and Organ 1986; Podsakoff et al. 
2003), organisational researchers believe that self-report was and still is a method to 
collect the data. In dealing with common method biases and self-report problems, 
assessment of the research procedure is without doubt needed. Thus, it is reasonable 
that this study used approaches that mitigate the magnitude of the problem inherent 
with such data as much as possible.  
To overcome the bias, the study followed the advice of Podsakoff et al. (2003) 
by allowing respondents not to write their details, making sure respondents knew that 
there were no right and wrong answers, and asking them to respond as honestly as 
                                                 
20 The native speaker of the source language was an Australian student of the Linguistics Department 
in the Faculty of Cultural Sciences of Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia. The native speaker of the 
target language was an Indonesian who lectures at the English Department in the Faculty of Cultural 
Sciences of Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia; he holds a Graduate Diploma and Master of Arts 
TESOL from a university in Australia. 
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possible. Further, to diminish method biases, the study employed different scale 
format predictors and criterion measures. Additionally, this study pursued the 
recommendations of Tourangeau et al., cited in Podsakoff et al. (2003, p. 888), who 
suggest that the researcher: 
(a) define ambiguous or unfamiliar terms; (b) avoid vague concepts and provide 
examples when such concepts must be used; (c) keep questions simple, specific, and 
concise; (d) avoid double-barreled questions; (e) decompose questions relating to more 
than one possibility into simpler, more focused questions; and (f) avoid complicated 
syntax. 
 
To complete the efforts to diminish method biases, it is possible to use 
statistical remedies, such as Harman’s single-factor test, partial correlation 
procedure, controlling for the effects of a directly measured latent methods factor, 
controlling for the effects of an unmeasured latent methods factor, and multiple 
method factors (Podsakoff et al. 2003). However, each of these techniques has 
particular potential problems, which means there is no single best method for 
overcoming common method variance problems. It is for this reason that Nathan P. 
Podsakoff and Organ (1986, p. 540)  argued, ‘…we strongly recommend the use of 
procedural or design remedies for dealing with common method variance problem as 
opposed to the use of statistical remedies or post-hoc patching up’. Further, if placed 
in the continuum of single-source effects, this study, with its characteristics of 
identical source, single instruments and different constructs, can not be positioned at 
the end of the continuum where it is most likely that the covariation deviates from 
the true score correlation (Avolio, Yammarino, and Bass 1991). In sum, as ‘there is 
no substitute for careful research design’ (Kline, Sulsky, and Rever-Moriyama 2000, 
p. 418), the current study sought to ensure that common method variance did not 
appear in the first place by implementing the above procedural recommendations. 
 
4.8.2 Wording and Ordering the Questions 
As the longer the list of items, the more likely respondents will experience fatigue 
(Alreck and Settle 1995), the wording and ordering of the questions be carefully 
planned. Fatigue in the form of responding carefully to the earlier items and 
carelessly to later ones can be minimised by writing questions that are as short and 
simple as possible, and positioning the relatively less important questions in the later 
part of research instrument. For this reason, the longest question in the research 
instrument used by this study was 18 words, which is less than Sekaran’s (2000) 
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recommendation of 20 words. Further, the demographics questions were asked in the 
last part of the research instrument. 
 
4.9 Summary  
This chapter discussed the research procedures applied in this research. Firstly, the 
instrument development section presents the reasoning behind the utilisation of a six-
point scale and the structure of the questionnaire, followed by a discussion of the 
constructs used in this study and their treatment in past literature. A combination of 
several indicators from past research was used to build the organisational construct. 
In regard to the internal corporate governance construct, this construct is considered 
to be new. A literature review of this construct was supplemented with the results of 
interviews that were carried out with several experts of on governance in Indonesia. 
Meanwhile, the organisational performance construct, which is perceptual in nature, 
was adapted from previous studies. 
 Secondly, with regard to instrument validation, qualitative and quantitative 
validations were carried out. Two pilot studies were performed and feedback was 
utilised to improve the research instruments. The sample selection process took 
account of the fact that the topic of research has been of interest to middle- and 
upper-levels of management. Hence, using the purposive sampling technique, the 
research approached institutions which run training and masters degree programs for 
middle- and upper-levels managers. 
 Thirdly, data analysis, including the treatment of missing values, the 
procedure for performing factor analysis, and the procedure for performing SEM 
analysis were also presented. Two types of SEM – variance and covariance based – 
were discussed, as was the LISREL software used in this research. Other research 
design and methodological issues such as the back-translation process, common 




Chapter 5: Pilot Study 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study employed a questionnaire as a means of collecting data. As a research 
instrument, a questionnaire needs to be verified before it is brought to the actual 
survey. Chapter 5 describes the pilot study and therefore is designed to show the 
processes of validating the research instrument, which included pre-test and pilot 
study. A discussion of how the research instrument was developed, including a 
review of the literature that emphasises the content of this study’s constructs, has 
been presented in Chapter 4. In the pre-test stage, this process was followed by the 
interview of several experts on organisational behaviour and corporate governance in 
Indonesia, as the study was carried out there. The pre-test is the qualitative validation 
procedure in which experts and practitioners are invited to give feedback upon 
whether items in the questionnaire belong to the constructs being studied. The 
feedback obtained and the revisions carried out during the pre-test stage are 
presented in this chapter. Next, the pilot study is presented in this chapter. The pilot 
study is the quantitative validation in which two pilot studies were conducted upon 
surrogate respondents. Discussion relating to the revision of the research instrument 
is included in this section. This section also presents the demographic characteristics 
of participants in the pilot studies. Lastly, the results of the reliability tests and the 
procedures for improving the item reliability are discussed.  
 
5.2 Pre-Test 
One procedure to improve a research instrument is pre-test or qualitative validation. 
During the pre-test stage, the draft of the research instrument was sent to four experts 
in the fields of organisational behaviour and corporate governance in Indonesia. In 
particular, the internal corporate governance research instrument needed major 
adjustments as a consequence of its observing two-tier board systems. By contrast, 
the organisational culture and organisational performance research instruments did 
not need any modification at this stage. The involvement of these scholars was based 
on the fact that the Indonesian corporate governance system is different compared to 
western systems, and therefore the initial questionnaire, which was based mostly on 
literature about corporate governance systems in western countries, needed to be 
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adjusted. These experts were given ten days to review the draft of the research 
instruments.  
To obtain thorough feedback relating to the research instruments, interviews 
were then scheduled. In the interview stage, two other experts in corporate 
governance were invited. The direct interviews were all conducted in Indonesia 
during the fieldwork for this study. Each of the experts was interviewed for 
approximately 40 to 60 minutes, and the researcher verbally asked (semi-structured) 
questions and wrote the answers on paper (See Appendix 1 for Interview Guide). A 
week after the interviews were carried out, a researcher sent notes from the 
interviews to the six experts in organisational behaviour and corporate governance, 
allowing them to give feedback before the notes were incorporated into the draft of 
research instruments. After incorporating the notes into draft of the research 
instruments, the questionnaire was finally delivered to respondents for pilot study 1.   
Feedback given by the six experts in organisational behaviour and corporate 
governance indicated that the items of western countries’ internal corporate 
governance drawn from western literature did not exactly match Indonesia’s internal 
corporate governance system. In particular, the experts pointed out that the codes of 
corporate governance (NCCG 2001, 2004), and the Law on Limited Liability 
Company, Law No 1 of 1995, were the main literature relating to Indonesian 
corporate governance. Therefore, item adjustments were performed, and they were 
changed to reflect the domain of internal corporate governance within Indonesia. 
Further, the layout of the questionnaire was improved based on the feedback of these 
experts. 
Significant changes were carried on the Board of Directors and Executive 
Management subconstructs. First, the name Board of Directors (BOD), with 
reference to a governance structure or an organ of a corporation that is tasked to 
supervise and give advice to executive management of the company, is not 
recognised by Indonesian corporate governance literature. Second, the name 
Executive Management (EM) refering to a governance structure or an organ of a 
corporation, is also not officially used by the Indonesian corporate governance 
literature. The main literature sources, Indonesian Company Law 1995 and the Code 
for Good Corporate Governance, officially used the terms Board of Commissioners 
(BOC) instead of Board of Directors (BOD) and Board of Directors (BOD) instead 
of Executive Management (EM) in naming the governance structures or organs of 
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Indonesian companies. As a result, the name Board of Directors (BOD) was replaced 
with Board of Commissioners (BOC), and the name Executive Management (EM) is 
replaced with Board of Directors (BOD). Third, the tasks of this BOD needed to be 
adjusted to represent the actual tasks of BOC in Indonesia. The initial BOD items, 
based on literature of internal corporate governance from western countries, are 
presented in table 5.1 below.  
 
Table 5.1: Initial of Board of Directors (BOD) items based on Western 
Corporate Governance Literature 
No. Items Notes 
1 BOD protects the interests of shareholders • Partly observed by items 1 and 
2 of revised version. 
2 BOD protects the interests of stakeholders • As for item 1 
3 BOD creates an ethical environment • Maintained in item number 7 
of revised version. 
4 BOD establishes specialised committees as 
needed (e.g. audit, compensation, nomination) 
• Maintained in item 11 of 
revised version. 
5 BOD runs specialised committees as needed to 
provide additional support and expertise 
• Partly observed by item 11 of 
revised version. 
6 BOD monitors specific controls and their 
efficacy on an ongoing basis 
• Captured by items 5 and 6 of 
revised version. 
7 BOD develops communications reporting links 
with internal control groups 
• Captured by items 8 and 9 of 
revised version. 
8 BOD oversees the general commercial affairs of 
the corporation 
• Captured by items number 1, 8 
and 9 of revised version. 
9 BOD oversees the strategic performance goals of 
the corporation 
• As for item 8 
10 BOD oversees the business performance goals of 
the corporation 
• As for item 8 
11 BOD defines strategy as related to corporate 
goals 
• Partly observed by item 2 of 
revised version. 
12 BOD defines strategy as related to business and 
financial targets 
• As for item 11 
13 BOD defines strategy as related to financial and 
operating risk tolerance 
• As for item 11 
14 BOD provides for appropriate crisis management 
planning 
• As for item 11 
15 BOD develops director succession plans • Partly observed by item 11 of 
revised version. 
16 BOD develops executive management 
succession plan 
• Partly observed by items 10 
and 11 of revised version. 
17 BOD implements director succession plans • Partly observed by item 11 of 
revised version. 
18 BOD implements executive management 
succession plan 
• Partly observed by items 10 
and 11 of revised version. 
19 BOD develops executive compensation plan • As for item 18 
20 BOD implements executive compensation plan • As for item 18 
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21 BOD considers in detail all corporate control 
activity (e.g. potential mergers, acquisitions, or 
buyouts) 
• Partly observed by item 3 of 
revised version. 
22 BOD considers in detail all possible defences • As for item 21 
23 BOD monitors the performance of management • Partly observed by items 1, 2, 
3, 6, 8, and 9 of revised 
version. 
24 BOD effects changes when necessary • Not observed 
25 BOD ensures financial disclosure accurately 
represents the company’s position 
• Partly observed by item 4 of 
revised version. 
26 BOD communicates regularly with key 
shareholders 
• Not observed 
27 BOD communicate regularly with regulators • Not observed 
 
Replacements were made to incorporate references that represented internal 
corporate governance within Indonesia. As table 5.1 shows, the number of items of 
the initial version was 27, while in table 5.2, which was developed based on literature 
addressing Indonesian internal corporate governance, the number of items was only 
11. The nature of the tasks of Boards of Commissioners in Indonesia is relatively 
different to those operating in western systems of corporate governance. In 
Indonesia, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) plays a relatively passive role as 
stated in Indonesian Company Law 1995. Since the study was conducted in 
Indonesia, the use of words derived from Indonesian corporate governance literature 
and familiar to respondents was very important. Accordingly, major revisions were 
carried out based on the references shown in Chapter 4 section 4.3 (Development of 
Instruments).  
 
Table 5.2: Revised Board of Commissioners’ (BOC) items based on Indonesian 
Corporate Governance Literature 
No. Items 
1 BOC supervises the action of BOD 
2 BOC gives advice to BOD when required 
3 BOC ensures that BOD complies with Articles of Association 
4 BOC ensures that BOD complies with regulations having the force of law 
5 BOC draws-up minutes of each BOC meeting 
6 BOC ensures that BOD reads minutes of each BOC meeting  
7 BOC creates an ethical environment 
8 BOC ensures that BOD protects the interests of shareholders 
9 BOC ensures that BOD protects the interests of stakeholders 
10 BOC ensures that BOD applies a transparent system for the recruitment of 
executives other than members of BOD  
11 BOC establishes certain committees as needed (e.g. audit, compensation, 
nomination, renumeration, risk, etc.) 
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For the same reasons, a similar revision was performed to the items within 
the domain of Executive Management.  The name was changed from Executive 
Management to Board of Directors (BOD), and the items that characterise the tasks 
of Boards of Directors in Indonesia were used. The initial Executive Mangement 
items that were developed prior to fieldwork are shown in table 5.3 below. 
 
Table 5.3: Initial Executive Management items based on Western Corporate 
Governance Literature 
No. Items Notes 
1 EM manages the firm’s operating activities on a 
daily basis 
• Captured by item 2 in revised 
version. 
2 EM manages the firm’s financing activities on a 
daily basis 
• As for item 1 
3 EM manages the firm’s corporate activities on a 
daily basis 
• As for item 1 
4 EM is accountable to BOD for progress and 
performance 
• Captured by item 12 in revised 
version. 
5 EM creates tactical business plans in 
conjunction with BOD 
• As for item 4 
6 EM creates operating strategy in conjunction 
with BOD 
• As for item 4 
7 EM manages the results and adjusts them as 
necessary 
• Captured by items 2, 3 and 4 
in revised version. 
8 EM defines the firm’s short-term financial goals • Captured by items 1, 2, 3 and 
4 in revised version. 
9 EM defines the firm’s long-term financial goals • As for item 8  
10 EM manages the firm’s short-term financial 
goals 
• As for item 8 
11 EM manages the firm’s long-term financial 
goals 
• As for item 8 
12 EM defines financial and operating risk 
exposure in conjunction with BOD 
• Captured by items 3, 4 and 10 
in revised version. 
13 EM monitors financial risk exposure in 
conjunction with BOD 
• As for item 12 
14 EM monitors operating risk exposure in 
conjunction with BOD 
• As As for item 12 
15 EM endures internal controls are in place and 
functioning properly 
• Captured by item 10 in revised 
version. 
16 EM ensures all such controls are independent of 
business units 
• Partly observed by item 13 in 
revised version. 
17 EM provides the BOD with timely financial data 
and any other information directors deem 
necessary 
• Captured by item 14 in revised 
version. 
18 EM provides the BOD with useful financial data 
and any other information directors deem 
necessary 
• As for item 17 
19 EM communicates regularly with internal 
parties on items of corporate importance 
• Captured by item 16 in revised 
version. 
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20 EM communicates regularly with external 
parties on items of corporate importance 
• Not observed 
21 EM ensures transparency in the financial 
frameworks of the firm 
• Captured by item 17 in revised 
version. 
22 EM ensures transparency in the operating 
frameworks of the firm 
• Not observed 
23 EM creates a proper human resource 
management function and framework 
• Captured by item 8 in revised 
version. 
24 EM delegates authority internally to hire and fire 
workers 
• Captured by item 8 in revised 
version. 
25 EM promulgates a code of conduct and other 
board directives/policies  
• Captured by item 9 in revised 
version. 
26 EM enforces a code of conduct and other board 
directives/policies vigorously 
• As for item 25 
 
Among the 26 items of the early version of the internal corporate governance 
itemas as shown in table 5.3, in principle, these were not significantly different to the 
17 items of Indonesian internal corporate governance presented in table 5.4. 
However, as the latter are recognisable to the respondents of this study, and 
considering the regulatory references cited in detail in Chapter 4 section 4.3 
(Development of Instruments), the first version was adjusted and changed; the latter 
version is shown in the following table. 
 
Table 5.4: Revised Board of Directors (BOD) items based on Indonesian 
Corporate Governance Literatures 
No. Items 
1 BOD defines strategy of the company 
2 BOD manages the implementation of strategy of the company 
3 BOD protects the interests of shareholders 
4 BOD protects the interests of stakeholders 
5 BOD complies with the Articles of Association of the Company 
6 BOD complies with regulations having the force of law 
7 BOD creates an ethical environment 
8 BOD creates a proper human resource management function 
9 BOD enforces codes of conduct 
10 BOD establishes internal control system to safeguard the company assets 
11 BOD draws-up minutes of each of BOD meeting 
12 BOD ensures that BOC reads minutes of BOD meeting 
13 BOD advises the audit committee when it seeks a second opinion on an accounting 
issue 
14 BOD ensures that BOC has access to information about the company 
15 BOD provides shareholders with full and accurate information about the company 
16 BOD communicates with internal parties on items of corporate importance 
17 BOD ensures transparency in the financial framework of the company 
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Based on the Code of Good Corporate Governance Ref. 4.0 published by 
NCCG in 2001 and the other sources of Indonesian corporate governance (e.g. Daniri 
2005), the alteration of items pertaining to internal control groups was conducted. 
The initial version, developed before fieldwork commenced, was solely based on 
western literature. This version is presented in table 5.5 below. 
 
Table 5.5: Initial Internal Control Group items based on Western Corporate 
Governance Literatures 
No. Items Notes 
1 ICG create policies to support independent 
control of finance, audit, risk management, 
operations, and compliance 
• Complex question.  
• Needs to be simplified.  
• Replaced with item 4 of 
revised version. 
2 ICG creates procedures to support independent 
control of finance, audit, risk management, 
operations, and compliance 
• As for item 1 
3 ICG updates regularly the board of directors on 
the status of, and substantive changes in, all 
control issues 
• Replaced with items 2 of 
revised version. 
4 ICGs update regularly the board of committees 
on the status of, and substantive changes in, all 
control issues 
• As for item 3 
5 ICG reviews all aspects of the company’s 
business and control process and infrastructure 
on a continuous basis, with a special focus on 
potential weaknesses that could create losses or 
problems 
• Complex question.  
• Needs to be simplified. 
• Replaced with item 1 of 
revised version. 
6 ICG audits all aspects of the company’s business 
and control process and infrastructure on a 
continuous basis, with a special focus on 
potential weaknesses that could create losses or 
problems 
• As for item 5 
7 ICG ensures substantive audit findings are 
elevated and resolved 
• Maintained. 
• In line with NCCG (2001) 
8 ICG prepares all relevant corporate information 
(such as financial statements and risk profile) for 
internal parties 
• Complex questions.  
• Needs to be simplified 
• Replaced with item 3 of 
revised version. 
9 ICG disseminates all relevant corporate 
information (such as financial statements and 
risk profile) to internal parties 
• As for item 8 
10 ICG prepares all relevant corporate information 
(such as financial statements and risk profile) for 
external parties 
• As for item 8 
11 ICG disseminates all relevant corporate 
information (such as financial statements and 
risk profile) for external parties 





12 ICG prepares, tests, and implements crisis 
management plans related to business 
interruption/disaster recovery 
• Replaced with item 1 of 
revised version. 
13 ICG ensures compliance with applicable 
regulatory requirements and reporting 
• Maintained. 
• In line with NCCG (2001) 
14 ICG works with external auditors on continually 
reviewing and strengthening controls 
• Replaced with item 1 of 
revised version. 
 
Having analysed the feedback from the pre-test stage and the literature review 
of Indonesian corporate governance (chapter 4 section 4.3), amendments were made. 
The fourteen items that were the questions in the early version, as illustrated in table 
5.5, were reduced to 5 items derived from Indonesian corporate governance 
literature, as demonstrated in table 5.6. In essence, both versions were directed to the 
control processes of managing and supervising the company; however, the new 
version had regulatory support and and was more recognisable to Indonesian 
companies.  
Table 5.6: Revised Internal Control Group items based on Indonesian Corporate 
Governance Literatures 
No. Items 
1 ICG creates policies to secure the assets of the company 
2 ICG creates policies to increase the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the 
company 
3 ICG develops the reliability and the comprehensiveness of accounting/financial 
information 
4 ICG ensures the compliance with applicable policies and regulatory requirements 
5 ICG ensures substantive audit findings are elevated and resolved 
 
Relating to codes of conduct, revisions were performed to avoid complexity 
and to avoid double-barreled items (Zikmund 2003) and to add one item that was 
emphasised by the Code of Good Corporate Governance in Indonesia (NCCG 2004). 
The initial version is presented in table 5.7 below.  
 
Table 5.7: Initial items of Codes of Conduct based on Western Corporate 
Governance Literatures 
No Items Notes 
1 My company has codes of conduct which create 
an environment, policies, and procedures where 
internal conflicts of interest are avoided or 
eliminated 
• Complex question 
(environment, policies, and 
procedures).  
• Needs to be simplified. 
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2 My company has codes of conduct which create 
an environment, policies, and procedures where 
external conflicts of interest are avoided or 
eliminated 
• Complex question 
(environment, policies, and 
procedures). 
• Needs to be simplified. 
3 My company has codes of conduct which make 
certain that employees do not engage in corrupt 
practices or other activities that might prejudice 
or jeopardise the firm’s reputation 
• Double-barreled items: 
1. corrupt practices 
2. other activities 
• Split into two items 
4 My company has codes of conduct which treat 
all stakeholders, including suppliers, clients, 
employees, and others, fairly and honestly 
• Complex question (suppliers, 
clients, employees, and 
others). 
• Needs to be simplified. 
5 My company has codes of conduct which 
develop mechanisms where violations of 
company policy can be reported without fear of 
retribution 
• Maintained in the revised 
version. 
• In line with NCCG (2004) 
 
In terms of complexity, items that contained the words ‘environment, policies, and 
procedures’ were simplified, with these three words being replaced with the word 
‘environment’. In terms of double-barreled items, item number three was split into 
two different questions: one was an item relating to corrupt practices and the other 
was concerned with activities that prejudice the firm’s reputation. Lastly, one item 
was added concerning obeying the decisions of company organs (items 7 of table 
5.8). The revised items are shown in table 5.8 below. 
 
Table 5.8: Revised items of Codes of Conduct based on Indonesian Corporate 
Governance Literatures 
No. Items 
1 My company has codes of conduct which create an environment where conflicts of 
interest are avoided or eliminated 
2 My company has codes of conduct where people do not engage in insider trading 
for the benefit of individual interest 
3 My company has codes of conduct which make certain that no one engages in 
corrupt practices 
4 My company has codes of conduct which make certain that no one engages in 
activities that jeopardise the company’s reputation 
5 My company has codes of conduct which treat all stakeholders fairly and honestly 
6 My company has codes of conduct which develop mechanisms where violations of 
company policy can be reported without fear of retribution 
7 My company has codes of conduct which create an environment in which the 
decisions of companys organs are obeyed 
 
Other constructs that are part of the Indonesian governance structures or 
organs, namely audit committees and independent commissioners were investigated. 
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Both are highlighted by the NCCG as important governance structures of internal 
corporate governance in Indonesia, as regulated by the Bapepam (The Stock 
Exchange Supervisory Body) circular letter No: SE-03/PM/2000 and the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange Director’s decree No. Kep-315/BEJ/06-2000 (relating to audit 
committees), and the Jakarta Stock Exchange Director’s decree No. Kep-315/Bursa 
Efek Jakarta/ 06-2000 (relating to independent commissioners). The audit committee 
items are presented in table 5.9 and the independent commissioners items are shown 
in table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.9: Items of Audit Committee Construct based on Indonesian Corporate 
Governance Literature 
No. Items 
1 AC oversees financial reports, ensuring they follow the Indonesian Accounting 
standard 
2 AC monitors the external auditor’s audit of financial report  
3 AC monitors the process of managing risk 
4 AC ensures that the report of internal auditor considers risk management 
5 AC ensures that BOD complies with recommendations relating to risk 
management 
6 AC creates disciplines and control which lessen the possibility the company being 
jeopardised 
7 AC empowers internal audit 
8 AC promotes adequate structures of internal control 
9 AC improves the quality of financial disclosure and reporting 
10 AC reviews the scope, accuracy, and cost-effectiveness of external audit 
11 AC reviews the independence and objectivity of external auditor 
12 AC acts as communication channel between external auditors and BOC 
13 AC reviews the results of external audit 
 
Table 5.10: Items of Independent Commissioners (IC) Construct based on 
Indonesian Corporate Governance Literature 
No. Items 
1 IC ensures that BOD defines business strategy of the company 
2 IC ensures that company hires professional managers 
3 IC ensures that company establishes communication reporting link 
4 IC ensures that company establishes control system 
5 IC ensures that company establishes audit system 
6 IC ensures that company complies with regulations 
7 IC ensures that company manages risk 
8 IC ensures that company provides transparent financial reporting 
9 IC ensures that company treats minority shareholders fairly and honestly 
10 IC ensures that company discloses transactions that have conflicting interests 
11 IC ensures that company organs are accountable 
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5.3 Pilot study 
The pilot testing is carried out to improve the internal validity of a questionnaire – 
the ability of a research instrument to measure what it is purported to measure. 
Cooper and Schindler (2008, p.91) claimed that 'this important activity has saved 
countless surveys studies from disaster by using the suggestions of the respondents to 
identify and changing confusing, awkward, or offensive questions and techniques'. 
Further, the pilot testing help researcher in deciding whether the time taken to 
complete the questionnaire is reasonable, whether each question gives an adequate 
range of responses, and whether the questions need to be re-worded or re-scaled, 
shortened and revised. 
 
5.3.1 Pilot study 1 
Subsequent to the pre-test, another procedure for validating the research instrument 
was performed, this was the pilot study. Colleagues, respondent surrogates, or actual 
respondents can be used to identify weaknesses in the research instrument. In this 
case, the pilot study was conducted twice. In pilot study 1, questionnaires were 
distributed to 30 surrogate respondents who were employees of the State Owned 
Company participating in two-month training programs delivered by the Centre for 
Management Research and Development in the Faculty of Economics at Gadjah 
Mada University in Indonesia. They came from different branches of this company in 
Indonesia. Participation was voluntary and respondents were assured that a summary 
of the study would be given to those who requested one. To facilitate respondents to 
answer the questions, a free Curtin-marked ballpoint pen was offered to them. The 
respondents filled in the questionnaire in approximately 20 to 30 minutes. One-
hundred per cent of the responses were collected during this pilot study.  
In terms of instrument validation, the respondents of Pilot Study 1 revealed 
that item 2 of the autonomy construct (a subconstruct of the organisational culture 
construct) was perceived as having negative connotations. They believed the words 
‘there is freedom for employees to depart from rules’ when translated to Bahasa 
Indonesia would be associated with disobedience or rebelliousness. An amendment 
was conducted accordingly. The second revision was made to item 4 of the human 
resource management construct (a subconstruct of corporate culture construct). 
According to respondents, the translation of the word ‘competency’ in the sentence 
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‘job competency is the only criterion in hiring people’ to ‘ability to perform the job’ 
undermined the meaning of the item. Consequently, and based on the fact that the 
word ‘competency’ was common in business terminology in Indonesian language, 
‘competency’ was not translated to another word. Other revisions included changing 
the general instruction from ‘giving a thick to the box’ to ‘giving a circle to correct 
answer’. 
 
5.3.2 The Demographic Characteristics of Pilot study 1 
Table 5.11 below shows the demographic composition of respondents. Relating to 
gender of respondents, 36.7 per cent were female and 63.3 per cent were male. Of the 
respondents, none were under 30 years of age, 80 per cent were between 30 and 40, 
16.7 per cent were between 40+ and 50, 3.3 per cent were between 50+ and 60, and 
none were above 60 years old. Further, most of the respondents (56.7 per cent) had 
worked for their company for 10+ to 15 years. Twenty per cent of them had been in 
the company for 15+ to 20 years, 16.7 per cent for 5+ to 10 years, and those who had 
been in the company for less than 1 year and more than 20 years shared the same 
percentage of 3.3 per cent. One conclusion from these two last features is that 
respondents were mature enough to be asked about questionnaire items which related 
to their knowledge about their company. Since the respondents were from the same 
company it is not surprising that the type of business and type of ownership were 100 
per cent service business and 100 per cent owned by the state. In terms of the 
department in which respondents were working, 40 per cent were in the 
finance/accounting department, 3.3 per cent in the marketing department, 36.7 per 
cent in the production/operation department, 0 per cent in the human resource 
department, and 20 per cent came from departments other than those mentioned in 










Table 5.11: Demographic Characteristics of Pilot study 1 Respondents 








 Under 30 
 30+ to 40 
 40+ to 50 








How long have you worked in the current company? 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 to 5 years 
 5+ to 10 years 
 10+ to 15 years 
 15+ to 20 years 








What type of business is your company in? 
 Service Business 






Under what type of ownership is your company classified? 
 Private Business 








 Human Resource 









5.3.3 Reliability Pilot study 1 
The draft of the research instrument was subject to tests in order to have them free 
from error measures and therefore obtain consistent results. In this study, the main 
concern was the homogeneity of the measure, as reflected by the Cronbach’s alpha in 
tests using SPSS Software. This alpha shows the degree to which instruments’ items 
are homogeneous and reflect the same underlying construct(s) (Zikmund 2003). In 
this section, all constructs were examined and the procedure of improving the 
reliability was performed.  The results presented in table 5.12 illustrate that all but 
three constructs had an alpha higher than 0.7. Generally, the lower acceptance limit 
of Cronbach’s alpha is .60 to .70 (Hair et al. 1998). The three constructs which had 
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alphas less than .70 were Autonomy, Human Resource Management and Audit 
Committee, with scores of .676, .654 and .389 respectively. These scores indicated 
some problems in the items of the three constructs above.  
 
Table 5.12: Reliability Analysis Results – Pilot study 1 
Organisational Culture 
No. Construct Alpha 
1 Autonomy (Auto) .676 
2 External Orientation (EO) .708 
3 Inter-Departmental Coordination (IDC) .769 
4 Human Resource Management (HRM) .654 
5 Improvement Orientation (IO) .795 
Internal Corporate Governance 
No. Construct Alpha 
1 Board of Commissioners (BOC) .920 
2 Independent Commissioners (IC) .925 
3 Audit Committee (AC) .389 
4 Board of Directors (BOD) .941 
5 Internal Control Group (ICG) .804 
6 Codes of Conduct (COC) .860 
Organisational Performance 
No. Construct Alpha 
1 Organisational Performance (OP) .854 
 
The SPSS output shown in table 5.13 revealed that deleting item auto2 would have 
increased the alpha to .766. By deleting item hrm4 the alpha would have been .771. 
Both exceeded the benchmark of .7. There were other scenarios of deleting other 
items, but overall only deleting auto2 and hrm4 would have brought higher alphas. 
As ‘a poorly worded item’ (Hulland 1999, p. 198) may produce low loading, rather 
than deleting these items, it is worth examining them closely, to discover whether 










Table 5.13: Reliability Analysis AUTO and HRM 
 
Item-Total Statistics (AUTO) 
  









Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
auto1 16.9000 14.921 .502 .597 
auto2 18.3000 23.390 -.189 .766 
auto3 16.7000 15.459 .525 .591 
auto4 16.1000 14.162 .676 .532 
auto5 16.0667 14.892 .480 .606 
auto6 15.1000 17.266 .402 .636 
 
Item-Total Statistics (HRM) 
  









Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
hrm1 25.5667 15.909 .582 .559 
hrm2 25.6333 15.275 .689 .529 
hrm3 25.5000 13.017 .790 .463 
hrm4 27.3333 22.161 -.162 .771 
hrm5 25.8667 17.292 .318 .633 
hrm6 25.3333 17.540 .447 .602 
hrm7 26.5667 17.771 .195 .677 
 
 
The process of translating the research instrument was performed carefully; however, 
it was still possible to have had an unsuitable translation, particularly if the research 
was being carried out in a different context to that of the translator.  Having analysed 
the item closely it was acknowledged that there was translation ambiguity. This was 
also the feedback from respondents, who asked what the true meaning of this item 
was, as described in the first part of the pilot study above. Since one of the purposes 
of the pilot study was to refine the research instrument and take into account the 
suggestions of experts in organisational behaviour in Indonesia, rewording the item 






Table 5.14: Revision Procedure for Items AUTO and HRM 
Revision for item auto2 
 
Original (English) 
• There is freedom for employees to depart from rules 
 
Initial Translation (Bahasa Indonesia) 
• Ada kebebasan bagi karyawan untuk menyimpang dari peraturan 
 
Revised Translation (Bahasa Indonesia) 
• Untuk kepentingan perusahaan pada saat yang diperlukan, karyawan 
diperbolehkan untuk tidak mengikuti peraturan secara ketat 
 
Revision of item hrm4 
 
Original (English) 
• Job competency is the only criterion in hiring people 
 
Initial Translation (Bahasa Indonesia) 
• Kemampuan melaksanakan pekerjaan adalah satu-satunya ukuran yang dilihat 
dalam pemilihan karyawan baru 
 
Revised Translation (Bahasa Indonesia) 
• Kompetensi melaksanakan pekerjaan adalah satu-satunya criteria dalam 
merekrut karyawan baru 
 
 
In terms of the Internal Corporate Governance construct, one subconstruct had an 
alpha lower than the benchmark, namely Audit Committee, with an alpha of .389. 
Table 5.15 suggested that it was possible to increase the alpha by deleting item ac12 
which gave a new score of .884. Examining the translation to Bahasa Indonesia of 
the original research instrument, which was written in English, there was no 
translation ambiguity. Considering that low reliability may be caused by ‘an 
improper transfer of an item from one context to another’ (Hulland 1999, p. 198), 
which leads to non-generalisability, and regarding it as an important item in 
Indonesian internal corporate governance, pilot study 1 maintained the item to be 
used in pilot study 2. If the problem of low reliability occurred in the second test, 







Table 5.15: Reliability Analysis AC 
 
Item-Total Statistics (AC) 
 
  









Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
ac1 58.1034 149.667 .253 .374 
ac2 58.4483 147.828 .290 .367 
ac3 58.6897 144.793 .273 .357 
ac4 58.7586 146.118 .250 .363 
ac5 58.8621 140.552 .462 .334 
ac6 58.6897 145.293 .373 .355 
ac7 58.6207 146.315 .405 .358 
ac8 58.6207 144.387 .452 .350 
ac9 58.6207 144.815 .458 .351 
ac10 58.7241 144.207 .445 .349 
ac11 58.7586 144.404 .432 .350 
ac12 57.0690 50.852 .105 .884 
ac13 58.5862 144.680 .509 .350  
 
5.3.4 Pilot study 2 
The respondents of pilot study 2 were employees or manager or executives of 
companies who had enrolled in the Magister Management Program at Gadjah Mada 
University21. Again, participation in this pilot study was voluntary. The reward 
offered to respondents was a summary of the study for those who requested one. A 
free Curtin-marked ballpoint pen was offered to respondents to spur them answer the 
questions. The respondents filled out the questionnaire in approximately 20 to 30 
minutes. Forty-five respondents were invited, and 42 responses were collected, 
which accounted for a 93.3 per cent effective response rate. Based on feedback given 
in the second pilot study, amendments made were to change the layout of the 
questionnaire by limiting the breaking of items in one subconstruct into two different 
pages, and to change the font type from Times New Roman to Arial to create more 
space between lines.  
 
                                                 
21 Magister Management Program in Indonesia is similar to Master of Business Administration in 
many western countries. 
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5.3.5 The Demographic Characteristics of Pilot study 2 
The results of pilot study 2 are shown in table 5.16. Compared to pilot study 1, 
respondents were more heterogeneous, since they came from different organisations. 
As table 5.16 shows, 35 per cent of respondents were female and 64.3 per cent were 
male. Relating to age, more than half (57.1%) were under 30 years of age, 35.7 per 
cent were between 30 and 40, 4.8 per cent were between 40+ and 50, and only 2.4 
per cent were between 50+ and 60, none are above 60 years old. Further, most 
(57.1%) had worked for their current company for 1 to 5 years, 16.7 per cent of 
respondents had been in their current company for less than 1 year, 11.9 per cent for 
5+ to 10 years, and 9.5 per cent for 10+ to 15 years. Those who had been in their 
current company for 15+ to 20 years and more than 20 years shared the same 
percentage of 2.4 per cent. When the two last features are analysed it can be seen that 
respondents were mostly young employees, or managers or executives and none of 
them had been in their company for less than 1 year. It was deduced therefore that 
they could be asked about their understanding of their company, which the 
questionnaire sought to do. Of the 42 respondents, 29 or 67.4 per cent were working 
in service businesses and 6 or 14 per cent had been in manufacturing businesses, and 
the remaining 7 or 16.3 per cent were in businesses other than these. In contrast to 
pilot study 1, 57.5 per cent of respondents in pilot study 2 worked for the private 
sector and only 42.5 per cent had been in public or state-owned enterprises. In terms 
of department in which they were working, 20 per cent of respondents were in 
finance/accounting, 22.5 per cent were in marketing, 20 per cent were in 
production/operation, and only 2 per cent were in human resource, Thirty-two per 
cent were in a department other than those mentioned in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 5.16: Demographic Characteristics of Pilot Study 2 Respondents 








 Under 30 
 30+ to 40 
 40+ to 50 









How long have you worked in the current company? 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 to 5 years 
 5+ to 10 years 
 10+ to 15 years 
 15+ to 20 years 








What type of business is your company in? 
 Service Business 






Under what type of ownership is your company classified? 
 Private Business 








 Human Resources 










5.3.6 Reliability Test Pilot Study 2 
The results of the reliability tests for pilot study 2 are presented in the following 
table. It can be seen from the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients that all constructs 
surpassed the point of reference of 0.7. The conclusion of these findings was that the 
research instrument was sufficient to be used for the final survey.  
 
Table 5.17: Reliability Analysis Results – Pilot study 2 
Organisational Culture 
No Construct Alpha 
1 Autonomy (Auto) .738 
2 External Orientation (EO) .794 
3 Inter-Departmental Coordination (IDC) .757 
4 Human Resource Management (HRM) .881 
5 Improvement Orientation (IO) .919 
Internal Corporate Governance 
No Construct Alpha 
1 Board of Commissioners (BOC) .888 
2 Independent Commissioners (IC) .929 
3 Audit Committee (AC) .939 
4 Board of Directors (BOD) .915 
5 Internal Control Group (ICG) .859 
6 Codes of Conduct (COC) .911 
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Organisational Performance 
No Construct Alpha 
1 Organisational Performance (OP) .890 
 
5.4 Summary 
The importance of pilot studies has been highlighted by Cooper and Schindler 
(2003). Following their recommendations, this study performed two tests in pilot 
studies, namely a pre-test and pilot study, to detect weaknesses in design and 
instrumentation prior to the actual survey. The pre-test was a qualitative validation 
test in which feedback from experts was taken into account to improve the research 
instrument. In particular, changes to the internal corporate governance construct were 
carried out, referring to the most recent regulations and practices of corporate 
governance in Indonesia. The next phase was quantitative validation, which was 
performed twice: respondent from one company and Magister Management 
executive classes were invited to participate in pilot study 1 and pilot study 2 
respectively. The pilot study 1 revealed that three out of 12 constructs had a problem 
of low reliability. As a consequence, amendments were made. In this regard, firstly, 
instead of deleting the items, the study preferred to rephrase the items (auto2 and 
hrm4) as inappropriate wording may contribute to lower loading. Secondly, the low 
reliability of one of the audit committee items (ac12) may have been the result of 
inappropriate language transfer. However, there was no evidence of translation 
ambiguity. Thus, the study maintained item ac12 while setting the requirement that 
the item would be deleted if it failed in the subsequent pilot study 2. The revised 
version of the research instruments was utilised for pilot study 2. The results showed 
that all constructs surpassed the thresholds of reliability values, and thus the research 
instrument was ready for use in the actual survey.  
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Chapter 6: Analysis of Results (Stage 1) – Survey 
Results and Factor Analysis∗†
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the questionnaire survey results and to 
analyse the results of the survey using factor analysis. The first section provides the 
response rate and a general descriptive information of the survey respondents. The 
second section uses factor analysis as a data reduction technique to summarise the 
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6.2 Questionnaire Survey Results 
6.2.1 Response Rate 
Of the 1000 surveys sent to managers and executives, 669 were collected. This was 
equivalent to 66.9 per cent of initial response rate. However, of the 669 questionnaire 
returned, 173 were ineligible because of the incomplete response in more than three 
items in every construct’s list of questions, and thus discarded. This resulted in 496 
usable responses or 49.6 per cent effective response rate. According to Cooper and 
Schindler (2003), such figure was deemed satisfactory as it was well above 30 per 
cent. 
 
6.2.2 Demographic Characteristics 
Demographic characteristics of respondents in this study are summarised in Table 
6.1 below. As the table shows, 21.8 per cent of respondents were female and 78.2 per 
cent were male. Of the respondents, 13.7 per cent were under 30 years of age, 47.2 
per cent were between 30 and 40, 28 per cent were between 40+ and 50, 10.7 per 
cent were between 50+ and 60, and only 0.4 per cent were above 60 years old. 
Table 6.1: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
 











 Under 30 
 30+ to 40 
 40+ to 50 














 Less than 1 year 
 1 to 5 years 
 5+ to 10 years 
 10+ to 15 years 
 15+ to 20 years 
















 Service Business 













 Human Resource Management 
 Others (corporate secretary, internal 













Further, many respondents (28.4%) had worked for their current company for 
5+ to 10 years, 24.2 per cent of respondents had been in their current company for 
10+ to 15 years, 12.1 per cent of respondents had been in the current company for 
15+ to 20 years, and 15.1 per cent of respondents had been in the current company 
for more than 20 years. Of those who had been in the company for 1 to 5 years and 
less than 1 year were 18.1 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. When the tenure 
features are analysed it can be seen that respondents were mostly experienced 
managers or executives. Thus, it was deduced that they could be asked about their 
understanding of their company, which the questionnaire sought to do.   
 Of the 496 respondents, 71.2 per cent were working in service business, and 
12.3 per cent had been in manufacturing businesses, and the remaining 16.5 per cent 
were in businesses other than these. In terms of the department in which respondent 
were working, 17.7 per cent were in the finance/accounting department, 12.9 per cent 
in the marketing department, 21 per cent in the production/operation department, 7.3 
per cent in the human resource department, and 41.1 per cent came from departments 
other than those mentioned in the questionnaire. 
 
6.3 Factor Analysis 
Observing the results of pilot study 1 and pilot study 2 there were 105 variables in 
this research. These large numbers of variables could have been a disadvantage of 
the study, as ‘increasing the number of variables also increases the possibility that 
the variables are not all uncorrelated and representative of distinct concepts’ (Hair et 
al. 1998 p. 91), and prohibits the subsequent analysis from being performed 
smoothly22. Gerbing and Hamilton (1996) recommended the use of exploratory 
factor analysis as it can contribute to a useful heuristic strategy for model 
specification prior to confirmatory factor analysis. It is for these reasons that factor 
analysis was carried out in this study. Performing factor analysis assists researchers 
in selecting a representative subset of variables while retaining the variables’ original 
character.  
 Factor analysis ‘is a data reduction technique used to reduce a large number 
of variables to a smaller set of underlying factors that summarise the essential 
                                                 
22 With such large numbers of variables, structural equation modelling demands a huge sample size. 
The requirement of sample size almost exponentially increases as variables are added. For details, see 
Holmes-Smith (2001).  
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information contained in the variables’ (Coakes and Steed 1999 p. 147). As a 
multivariate statistical tool, factor analysis can be used to define the underlying 
structure in a data matrix and to determine whether items are tapping into the same 
construct. While there is the possibility of facing the ‘garbage in, garbage out’ 
phenomenon in factor analysis, this study prevented this from occurring by designing 
and developing the conceptual underpinnings of the variables from the beginning of 
the research (see chapters 4 and 5 for details). An example of previous study that 
utilised this method see Daale (2004). 
 
6.3.1 Method of Analysis 
Several methods of extraction are available for researchers. The SPSS software, for 
instance,  has seven methods of extraction, namely principal component, unweighted 
least squares, generalised least squares, maximum likelihood, principal axis 
factoring, alpha factoring, and image factoring.  
As the most-used methodology, principal component analysis followed by a 
varimax rotation was utilised in this study (Cool and Henderson 1997). This method 
was applied to every construct in this research. The objective of this approach was to 
have valid and reliable items that could be used for subsequent SEM analysis — to 
examine the impact of organisational culture and internal corporate governance on 
organisational performance in Indonesian companies.  
 
6.3.1.1 Factor Analysis of Individual Construct 
To perform factor analysis, the software of choice was SPSS 13.0 for Windows, 
which was released on 1 September 2004 (SPSS 2004). This software is widely used 
by researchers in the social sciences and in the professional arena for statistical 
analysis. Following the recommendation of Coakes and Steed (1999) the factor 
analysis of each construct went through the following steps: 
a. Correlation matrix, to ensure that factor analysis is appropriately applied as 
correlations among items prevail. Inputs for determining the appropriateness 
of factor analysis are the correlation matrix, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA), Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BTS), 
and the Anti-Images Matrix-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) 
matrix. Both KMO-MSA and BTS tests are to determine the factorability of 
the matrix as a whole. The matrix AIM-MSA provides information relating to 
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the negative value of partial correlation (printed on the off-diagonal) and a 
measure of sampling adequacy (printed on the diagonal). The thresholds for 
appropriateness of factor analysis are: 
 
- Correlation matrix: 0.3 
- Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy (KMO-MSA): 
                              
0.6 
- Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BTS): Large and significant 
- Anti-Image Matrix-Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy (AIM-MSA) matrix: 
Small for AIM and 
0.5 for MSA. 
b. Factor extraction, to determine the number of factor(s) needed to represent 
the data. In this process, the computation and information of communalities, 
total variance explained-Eigenvalues, scree plot, and component matrix are 
required. Communalities refer to the total amount of variance an original 
indicator shares with all other indicators included in an analysis. The reason 
for applying total variance explained-Eigenvalues is that each factor should 
account for the variance of at least a single indicator if it is to be retained for 
interpretation (Hair et al. 1998). Scree plot shows the optimum number of 
factors that can be extracted prior to the amount of unique variance starting to 
dominate the common variance structure (Hair et al. 1998). A component 
matrix is a matrix of loadings or correlations between the indicators and a 
factor (Coakes and Steed 1999). 
Requirements for these tests: 
1. Communalities: High communalities are preferred to low ones, as the 
former indicates that the variables analysed have much in common 
with one another. Whilst no particular cut-off was available, the study 
set 0.5 as a lower limit of acceptable communalities. 
2. Total variance explained-Eigenvalues: Select the factors with 
Eigenvalues greater than 1. 
3. Scree plot: Select the factor(s) which lie above the value of 
Eigenvalues 1. 
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4. Component matrix: Select the loading 0.3 or greater. If possible 
choose the pure indicators. Pure indicators have loadings of 0.3 or 
greater on the predominant factor. It is possible that along with pure 
indicators, there will be complex indicators, where there are several 
high loadings on more than one factor. In the when pure and complex 
indicators emerge, the interpretation becomes difficult, and factor 
rotation is necessary.  
c. Factor Rotation refers to the process of adjusting the factor axes to achieve a 
simpler and more meaningful factor solution. Among the two alternatives of 
rotation—oblique and orthogonal—the study applied orthogonal rotation 
based on the following reasons (Hair et al. 1998): 
1. It is more appropriate to be applied in factor analysis in which the 
objective is to reduce the number of indicators. 
2. It is widely used and available, most computer packages contain 
factor analysis. 
3. Oblique rotation procedures are not well developed and subject to 
considerable controversy. 
After choosing factor rotation, deciding upon a method of rotation was 
required. Under the orthogonal rotation approach, there are quartimax, 
varimax, and equmiax methods of rotation. Based on the claims that varimax 
is the method that gives a clearer separation of factors, and that it has proved 
very successful as an analytic approach (Hair et al. 1998), this study applied 
this method for analysing factor analysis. 
  
Benchmark for rotated component matrix: Select the loading 0.3 or greater. If 
possible choose the pure indicators. Pure indicators have loadings of 0.3 or 
greater on predominant factor (component 1). If not, a complex indicator, 
where it has several high loadings on more than one factor, will be used for 
subsequent analyses. 
 
6.3.1.2 Reliability Analysis 
The results of exploratory factor analysis were to be used as inputs for conducting 
reliability analysis. Within this analysis, item-to-total correlations, inter-item 
correlation, and Cronbach’s alpha were applied to assess the degree of consistency 
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between multiple measurements of indicators (Coakes and Steed 1999; Hair et al. 
1998). The following benchmarks were applied (Hair et al. 1998): 
1. Item-to-total correlations: 0.5 
2. Inter-item correlation:  0.3 
3. Cronbach’s alpha:  0.6 
As the objective was to reduce the number of indicators from the original 
indicators to 4 indicators per construct, the process of deleting indicators was applied 
based on the highest possible Cronbach’s alpha if the item was deleted. The decision 
of a maximum of 4 indicators for each individual construct was set up to allow the 
subsequent structural equation modelling analysis to be run without the particular 
problem of sample size (Holmes-Smith 2001).  
 
6.3.1.3 Construct Validity Analysis 
Up to the reliability process above, the study was able to confirm the conceptual 
definition of the constructs utilised in this research, and fulfilled the requirement of 
internal consistency. The following test seeks to ensure that a scale or set of 
measures accurately represents the concept of interest. For this validity purpose, the 
Spearman correlation coefficient was utilised. Spearman correlation coefficient is a 
non-parametric version of the Pearson correlation coefficient based on the ranks of 
the data rather than the actual values. It is appropriate for ordinal data, or for interval 
data that do not satisfy the non-normality assumption (SPSS 2004). To satisfy the 




6.3.2.1 Autonomy Construct (Auto) 
The Autonomy construct originally consisted of 6 variables (Appendix 2). Following 
the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses the number variables of this 
construct were reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential information. A 
complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the summary of the 





There were six pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation matrix 
was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, appropriateness of factor analysis was deduced. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 40.573% of the variance.  
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 2.434, explained 40.573% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As four (4) pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found 
and two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two or more factors 
emerged, rotation was necessary. 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 3 pure indicators with loadings above 0.3 in factor 







As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
All but one of the inter-item correlations were above the threshold of 0.3; two out of 
four item-to-total correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5; and 
Cronbach’s alpha was above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were 
satisfactory. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators Auto3, Auto4, Auto5, and Auto6 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the construct Autonomy, which originally 
consisted of 6 indicators. Auto3 indicates that there is freedom for employees to 
implement decisions according to their own views; Auto4 indicates that employees 
influence important decisions concerning work; Auto5 indicates that there is freedom 
for employees to plan their own work; and Auto6 indicates that there is an 
opportunity for employees to bring forward ideas before decisions are made. It is 
acknowledged that labelling or naming these indicators can be made. However, 
considering that, first, they are sub-construct of a bigger construct organisational 
culture, and; second, these indicators come from a single factor solution with the 
eigenvalue of 2.434 that portrays autonomy construct, then it is considered 
appropriate to leave the construct with its original name (autonomy). 
 
6.3.2.2 External Orientation Construct (EO) 
The External Orientation construct initially comprised 6 variables (Appendix 2). 
Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses, the variables of this 
construct were reduced to a smaller set of 4 variables that summarised the most 
essential information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 
4, and the summary of the factor analysis was described below. 
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Correlation Matrix 
There were fifteen pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analyses.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability is deduced.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and explained 60.867% of variance. 
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue 3.652, explained 60.867% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As four (4) pure indicators with loadings greater than 0.3 were found in factor one 
and two (2) complex indicators with loadings more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there was 1 pure indicator with a loading above 0.3 in factor 
one, 1 pure indicator with a loading above 0.3 in factor two, 1 pure indicator with a 
loading above 0.3 in factor three, 3 complex indicators with loadings of more than 




As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, a 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the items was to be deleted.  
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3; four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5; and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators EO2, EO3, EO4, and EO5 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the External Orientation construct, which 
originally consisted of 6 indicators. EO2 indicates that there is an investigation of the 
wishes and needs of customers; EO3 indicates that there is active canvassing of new 
customers; EO4 indicates that company is working to improve the local market 
position; and EO5 indicates that there is a thorough training of employees in 
systematically gathering information on what customers want to see improved. It is 
acknowledged that labelling or naming these indicators can be made. However, 
considering that, first, they are sub-construct of a bigger construct of organisational 
culture, and; second, these indicators come from a single factor solution with the 
eigenvalue of 3.652 that portrays external orientation construct, then it is considered 
appropriate to leave the construct with its original name (external orientation). 
 
6.3.2.3 Inter-departmental Coordination Construct (IDC) 
The Inter-departmental Coordination construct initially had 7 variables (Appendix 2). 
Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses, the number of 
variables of this construct were reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential 
information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the 




There were fifteen pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis. 
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability is inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 56.979% of the variance.  
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 3.989, explained 56.979% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As four (4) pure indicators with loadings more than 0.3 were found in one factor, and 
two (2) complex indicators with loadings more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 2 pure indicators with loadings above 0.3 in one 






As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
Inter-item correlations were above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total correlations 
had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was above 0.60. 
The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators IDC1, IDC2, IDC3, and IDC4 summarised the 
most essential information contained in the Inter-departmental Coordination 
construct, which originally consisted of 7 indicators. IDC1 indicates that there is 
useful cooperation between departments; IDC2 indicates that there is exchange of 
useful information between departments; IDC3 indicates that departments support 
one another in the resolution of problems; and IDC4 indicates that there is mutual 
communication between heads of departments. It is acknowledged that labelling or 
naming these indicators can be made. However, considering that, first, they are sub-
construct of a bigger construct of organisational culture, and; second, these indicators 
come from a single factor solution with the eigenvalue of 3.989 that portrays inter-
departmental coordination construct, then it is considered appropriate to leave the 
construct with its original name (inter-departmental coordination). 
 
6.3.2.4 Human Resource Management Construct (HRM) 
The Human Resource Management construct initially had 7 variables (Appendix 2). 
Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses the number of 
variables of this construct was reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential 
information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the 




There were fifteen pairs with a correlation above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, factor analysis was deemed appropriate. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0, and this explained 51.866% of variance.  
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue 3.631, explained 51.866% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As six (6) pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found, 
and 1 complex indicator with a loading of more than 0.3 in two factor was revealed, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 5 pure indicators with loadings above 0.3 in one 






As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
  
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators HRM1, HRM2, HRM5, and HRM6 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the Human Resource Management 
construct, which originally consisted of 7 indicators. HRM1 indicates that 
performance appraisals are taken seriously; HRM2 indicates that employees obtain 
useful information about their functioning; HRM5 indicates that employees are told 
when a good job is done; and HRM6 indicates that managers help good people to 
advance. It is acknowledged that labelling or naming these indicators can be made. 
However, considering that, first, they are sub-construct of a bigger construct of 
organisational culture, and; second, these indicators come from a single factor 
solution with the eigenvalue of 3.631 that portrays human resource management 
construct, then it is considered appropriate to leave the construct with its original 
name (human resource management). 
 
6.3.2.5 Improvement Orientation Construct (IO) 
The Improvement Orientation construct initially comprised 7 variables (Appendix 2). 
Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses the number of 
variables of this construct was reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential 
information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the 




There were twenty-one pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the 
correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Thus, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 61.120% of variance.  
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue 4.278, explained 61.120% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As five pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 were found in one factor and 
two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 emerged in two or more 
factor, rotation was necessary. 
  
Rotated Component Matrix 








As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3; four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5; and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators IO3, IO4, IO5, and IO6 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the construct Improvement Orientation, which 
originally consisted of 7 indicators. IO3 indicates that there are initiatives taken by 
employees to improve the way in which the work is done; IO4 indicates that new and 
improved ways to do work are continually adopted; IO5 indicates that employees try 
to be pioneers; and IO6 indicates that people put in maximal effort. It is 
acknowledged that labelling or naming these indicators can be made. However, 
considering that, first, they are a sub-construct of bigger construct of organisational 
culture, and; second, these indicators come from a single factor solution with the 
eigenvalue of 4.278 that portrays improvement orientation construct, then it is 
considered appropriate to leave the construct with its original name (improvement 
orientation). 
 
6.3.2.6 Board of Commissioners Construct (BOC) 
The Board of Commissioners construct initially had 11 variables (Appendix 2). 
Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses the number of 
variables of this construct was reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential 
information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the 




There were fifty-six pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 61.248% of the variance.  
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 6.737, explained 61.248% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As there were seven pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor and 
four (4) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors, rotation 
was necessary. 
  
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 2 pure indicators with loadings of above 0.3 in one 







As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators BOC3, BOC4, BOC8, and BOC9 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the construct Board of Commissioners, 
which originally consisted of 11 indicators. BOC3 indicates that BOC ensures that 
BOD complies with Articles of Association; BOC4 indicates that BOC ensures that 
BOD complies with regulations having the force of law; BOC8 indicates that BOC 
ensures that BOD protects the interests of shareholders; and BOC9 indicates that 
BOC ensures that BOD protects the interests of stakeholders. It is acknowledged that 
labelling or naming these indicators can be made. However, considering that, first, 
they are a sub-construct of bigger construct of internal corporate governance, and; 
second, these indicators come from a single factor solution with the eigenvalue of 
6.737 that portrays board of commissioners construct, then it is considered 
appropriate to leave the construct with its original name (board of commissioners). 
 
6.3.2.7 Independent Commissioners Construct (IC) 
The Independent Commissioners construct initially had 11 variables (Appendix 2). 
Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses the number of 
variables of this construct was reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential 
information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the 




There were fifty-five pairs with a correlation above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. As a result, the appropriateness of the factor analysis was inferred.  
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 74.289% of the variance.  
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 8.172, explained 74.289% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As nine pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found and 
two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 11 complex indicators with loadings of above 0.3 in 







As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators IC4, IC5, IC6 and IC7 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the construct Independent Commissioners, which 
originally consisted of 11 indicators. IC4 indicates that IC ensures that company 
establishes control system; IC5 indicates that IC ensures that company establishes 
audit system; IC6 indicates that IC ensures that company complies with regulations; 
and IC7 indicates that IC ensures that company manages risk. It is acknowledged that 
labelling or naming these indicators can be made. However, considering that, first, 
they are a sub-construct of bigger construct of internal corporate governance, and; 
second, these indicators come from a single factor solution with the eigenvalue of 
8.172 that portrays independent commissioners construct, then it is considered 
appropriate to leave the construct with its original name (independent 
commissioners). 
 
6.3.2.8 Audit Committee Construct (AC) 
The Audit Committee construct originally consisted of 13 variables (Appendix 2). 
Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses the number of 
variables of this construct was reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential 
information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the 




There were seventy-eight pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the 
correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Consequently, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 66.809% of the variance.  
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue 8.685, explained 66.809% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As nine pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found and 
four (4) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 
rotation was necessary. 
  
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were as 1 pure indicator with a loading of more than 0.3 in 







As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
 
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators AC6, AC7, AC8, and AC9 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the construct Audit Committee, which originally 
consisted of 13 indicators. AC6 indicates that AC creates disciplines and control 
which lessen the possibility the company being jeopardised; AC7 indicates that AC 
empowers internal audit; AC8 indicates that AC promotes adequate structures of 
internal control; and AC9 indicates that AC improves the quality of financial 
disclosure and reporting. It is acknowledged that labelling or naming these indicators 
can be made. However, considering that, first, they are sub-construct of a bigger 
construct of internal corporate governance, and; second, these indicators come from a 
single factor solution with the eigenvalue of 8.685 that portrays audit committee 
construct, then it is considered appropriate to leave the construct with its original 
name (audit committee). 
 
6.3.2.9 Board of Directors Construct (BOD) 
The Board of Directors construct originally consisted of 17 variables (Appendix 2). 
Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses the number of 
variables of this construct was reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential 
information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the 




There were one-hundred-and-thirty-six pairs with correlations above 0.3. 
Accordingly, the correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was signifacant. Consequently, 
factorability is inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 




Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 10.325, explained 60.734% of the variance. Factor 2, 
with an Eigenvalues of 1.032 explained 6.073% of the variance 
 
Component Matrix 
As twelve pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found 
and five (5) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two or more factors 
emerged, rotation was necessary. 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were three pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 





As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators BOD7, BOD8, BOD9, and BOD17 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the Board of Directors construct, which 
originally consisted of 17 indicators. BOD7 indicates that BOD creates an ethical 
environment; BOD8 indicates that BOD creates a proper human resource 
management function; BOD9 indicates that BOD enforces codes of conduct; and 
BOD17 indicates that BOD ensures transparency in the financial framework of the 
company. It is acknowledged that labelling or naming these indicators can be made. 
However, considering that, first, they are sub-construct of a bigger construct of 
internal corporate governance, and; second, these indicators mostly come from a 
single factor solution with the eigenvalue of 10.325 that portrays board of directors 
construct, then it is considered appropriate to leave the construct with its original 
name (board of directors). 
 
6.3.2.10 Internal Control Group Construct (ICG) 
The Internal Control Group construct originally consisted of 5 variables (Appendix 
2). Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses, the number of 
variable of this construct was reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential 
information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the 




There were ten pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation matrix 
was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 72.000% of the variance.  
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 3.600, explained 72.000% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As two pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found and 
three (3) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 1 pure indicator with a loading above 0.3 in one 






As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of reliability analysis were very good. 
  
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators ICG1, ICG2, ICG3, and ICG4 summarised the 
most essential information contained in the Internal Control Group construct, which 
originally consisted of 5 indicators. ICG1 indicates that ICG creates policies to 
secure the assets of the company; ICG2 indicates that ICG creates policies to 
increase the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the company; ICG3 indicates 
that ICG develops the reliability and the comprehensiveness of accounting/financial 
information; and ICG4 indicates that ICG ensures compliance with applicable 
policies and regulatory requirements. It is acknowledged that labelling or naming 
these indicators can be made. However, considering that, first, they are sub-construct 
of a bigger construct of internal corporate governance, and; second, these indicators 
come from a single factor solution with the eigenvalue of 3.600 that portrays internal 
control groups construct, then it is considered appropriate to leave the construct with 
its original name (internal control groups). 
 
6.3.2.11 Codes of Conduct Construct (COC) 
The Code of Conducts construct initially consisted of 7 variables (Appendix 2). 
Following the factor, reliability and construct analyses, the number of variables of 
this construct was reduced to 4, which summarised the most essential information. A 
complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 4, and the summary of the 




There were twenty-one pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the 
correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Consequently, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 73.543% of the variance. 
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 5.148, explained 73.543% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As five (5) pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found 
and two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors 
emerged, rotation was necessary. 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 7 complex indicators with loadings above 0.3 in two 





As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators COC4, COC5, COC6, and COC7 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the Code of Conducts construct, which 
originally consisted of 7 indicators. COC4 indicates that company has codes of 
conduct which make certain that no one engages in activities that jeopardise the 
company’s reputation; COC5 indicates that company has codes of conduct which 
treat all stakeholders fairly and honestly; COC6 indicates that company has codes of 
conduct which develop mechanisms where violations of company policy can be 
reported without fear of retribution; and COC7 indicates that company has codes of 
conduct which create an environment in which the decisions of company’s organs 
are obeyed. It is acknowledged that labelling or naming these indicators can be made. 
However, considering that, first, they are sub-construct of a bigger construct of 
internal corporate governance, and; second, these indicators come from a single 
factor solution with the eigenvalue of 5.148 that portrays codes of conduct construct, 
then it is considered appropriate to leave the construct with its original name (codes 
of conduct). 
 
6.3.2.12 Organisational Performance Construct (OP) 
The Organisational Performance construct initially consisted of 8 variables 
(Appendix 2). Following the factor, reliability and construct validity analyses, the 
number of variables of this construct was reduced to 4, which summarised the most 
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essential information. A complete output of factor analysis was shown in Appendix 
4, and the summary of the factor analysis was described below. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were twenty-eight pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the 
correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Communalities 
There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0, and this explained 68.457% of the variance.  
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 5.477 explained 68.457% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As six (6) pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found 
and two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two or more factors 
emerged, rotation was necessary. 
  
Rotated Component Matrix 
• Results showed that there were 2 pure indicators with loadings above 0.3 in 





As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators OP2, OP4, OP5, and OP6 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the Organisational Performance construct, which 
originally consisted of 8 indicators. OP2 indicates to what degree the organisation 
needs to improve in customer satisfaction criteria; OP4 indicates to what degree the 
organisation needs to improve in professional behaviour criteria; OP5 indicates to 
what degree the organisation needs to improve in service quality criteria; and OP6 
indicates to what degree the organisation needs to improve in contact with clients 
criteria. It is acknowledged that labelling or naming these indicators can be made. 
However, considering that these indicators come from a single factor solution with 
the eigenvalue of 5.477 that portrays organisational performance construct, it is 
considered appropriate to leave the construct with its original name (organisational 
performance). 
 
6.3.3 Factor Analysis Summary 
Throughout the chapter, factor analysis was applied to the 12 constructs of this study 
of organisational culture, internal corporate governance, and organisational 
performance. Utilising pre-determined requirements based on the guidelines of 
Coakes and Steed (1999) and Hair et al. (1998), the study observed the following 
results: 
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a. Factor 1 represents the Autonomy construct, and its indicators are Auto3, 
Auto4, Auto5, and Auto6. 
b. Factor 2 represents the External Orientation construct, and its indicators are 
EO2, EO3, EO4, and EO5. 
c. Factor 3 represents the Inter-departmental Coordination construct, and its 
indicators are IDC1, IDC2, IDC3, and IDC4. 
d. Factor 4 represents the Human Resource Management construct, and its 
indicators are HRM1, HRM2, HRM5, and HRM6. 
e. Factor 5 represents the Improvement Orientation construct, and its indicators 
are IO3, IO4, IO5, and IO6. 
f. Factor 6 represents the Board of Commissioners construct, and its indicators 
are BOC3, BOC4, BOC8, and BOC9. 
g. Factor 7 represents the Independent Commissioners construct, and its 
remaining indicators are IC4, IC5, IC6, and IC7. 
h. Factor 8 represents the Audit Committee construct, and its indicators are 
AC6, AC7, AC8, and AC9, 
i. Factor 9 represents the Board of Directors construct, and its indicators are 
BOD7, BOD8, BOD9, and BOD17. 
j. Factor 10 represents the Internal Control Group construct, and its indicators 
are ICG1, ICG2, ICG3, and ICG4.  
k. Factor 11 represents the Code of Conducts construct, and its indicators are 
COC4, COC5, COC6, and COC7. 
l. Factor 12 represents the Organisational Performance construct, and its 
indicators are OP2, OP4, OP5, and OP6. 
 
6.4 Chapter Summary  
The questionnaire surveys were sent to 1000 managers or executives of Indonesian 
companies, which were selected based on purposive sampling method. To endorse 
the response, a summary of result was offered to those who responded. This resulted 
66.9 per cent of response rate, but only 496 of 1000 were useable for data analysis 
purposes. 
 The demographic data showed the interesting information. Among other 
things, it was shown that more than 79 per cent of respondents were experienced 
managers or executives who had been in the current company for more than 5 years. 
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With such figures, it is believed that their understanding about the company is 
deemed appropriate.  
The aim of the factor analysis to reduce the number of variables to four (4) 
indicators for every construct was achieved, limiting the final data ready for 
subsequent Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to 48 variables (4 variables x 12 
constructs). As highlighted in section 6.3, this process was considered very important 
as the SEM technique requires a minimum sample size of 200 to be classified as 
appropriate (see section 7.2.2 for detailed discussion on the sample size required for 
SEM technique). All 12 constructs were confirmed as robust, satisfying the statistical 
thresholds outlined, including those for reliability and validity. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis of Results (Stage 2) – 




In this chapter, the results of the questionnaire survey and factor analysis are 
analysed using Structural Equation Modelling. In particular, LISREL 8.8 software is 
utilised to run the analysis. LISREL is an acronym of LInear Structural 
RELationship. Originally, the LISREL methodology was developed by Karl G. 
Jöreskog in 1973 (Holmes-Smith 2001). Later, Karl G. Jöreskog and Dag Sörbom 
published numerous journal articles and books on the LISREL model and its  
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software package. The widespread use of  LISREL in today’s research and 
publications may be the result of its being the first program developed for structural 
equation modelling. Since the first LISREL program (version 3) launched in 1975 
(du Toit and du Toit 2001), several updates had been made to expand its 
functionality, capability, and interactively. The software used in this analysis is 
LISREL 8.8, which was released on 25 July 2006 (SSI Scientific Software 
International 2006). 
Structural Equation Modelling, which is also known as Latent Variable 
Structural Equation, Causal Modelling, and Analysis of Covariance Structure, is ‘an 
analytical tool that improves upon, and supersedes, other tools such as multiple and 
multivariate regression, recursive path analysis and non-recursive econometric 
modelling, ANOVA, analysis of covariance, factor analysis, principal component 
analysis, and classical test theory’ (Holmes-Smith 2001 p. 1). As a ‘second-
generation of multivariate analysis’ (Fornell 1987, p. 408), Structural Equation 
Modelling has several advantages compared to first generation statistical tools such 
as regression, path analysis, and factor analysis. Structural Equation Modelling 
enables researchers to do the following (Byrne 2006; Holmes-Smith 2001; SSI 
Scientific Software International 2006): 
a. Explore the relationships amongst the dependent variables; 
b. Incorporate and estimate the relationships not only amongst observed 
variables but also latent constructs which are reflected with or formatted by 
several observed variables/indicators; 
c. Permit the measurement error of indicators to be unequal and correlate; 
d. Allow unequal weights for indicators of any latent constructs. 
e. Measure recursive and non-recursive relationship between constructs; and  
f. Allow for estimation of higher-order latent construct where no observed 
indicators of the higher-order are available. 
 
There are several statistical packages for performing Structural Equation 
Modelling, such as Arbuckle’s (SPSS) AMOS, Hartmann’s (SAS) Proc Calis, 
Multivariate Software’s EQS, Browne and Mel’s (Systat) RAMONA, Lohmoller’s 
PLS-PC, and Scientific Software International’s LISREL, among many others 
(Rigdon 2006; Holmes-Smith 2001). Currently, AMOS, EQS, and LISREL are the 
most popular software; however, LISREL is still the software of reference in most 
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journal articles about Structural Equation Modelling (Garson 2006). Recent LISREL 
software also distinguishes itself from any other softwares in its ability to specify the 
model in one of four ways (Holmes-Smith 2001): 
a. Original LISREL syntax (text) input in Greek letters, 
b. SIMPLIS syntax (text) input, 
c. Graphics (path diagram) input, or 
d. Interactive, windows-based input. 
In addition, ‘the LISREL program is the most longstanding and widely distributed’ 
(Byrne 1998 p. 9). Based on the advantages of this software, LISREL 8.8 – as the 
most recent version – was used as the data analysis tool in this study.  
 
7.2 Selection of Estimation Method 
Concerning the method of estimation, LISREL offers several methods such as 
Instrumental Variables (IV), Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS), Unweighted Least 
Squares (ULS), Generalised Least Squares (GLS), Maximum Likelihood (ML), 
Generally Weighted Least Squares (WLS), and Diagonally Weighted Least Squares 
(DWLS) (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996). The choice of one among the available 
methods is based on the type of data, the multivariate distribution of the data, and the 
sample size. As such, the properties or the characteristics of the data used in this 
study are discussed first, before moving to the primary analysis of LISREL. 
 
7.2.1 Data Examination 
The raw data indicated some missing values which were substituted with series 
means (see discussion in chapter 4 section 4.6.1). The observed variables were 
measured using 6-point Likert scales. These types of scales have been subject to 
academic debate in several studies. Jöreskog (2005) claimed that the Likert scale is 
an ordinal variable in essence of its not having origins or units of measurement, its 
distribution being discrete, and its not having values between the numbers. Hence, to 
use structural equation modelling with ordinal variables requires other techniques 
than those traditionally employed with continuous variables – Maximum Likelihood 
(ML). In practice, however, Byrne (2006) reports that during the past 15 years, the 
application of structural equation modelling has mostly relied on the Likert scale, in 
which Maximum Likelihood (ML) is used to estimate the parameters. Reporting the 
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reviews of the Monte Carlo studies that addressed this issue, West, Finch and Curran 
(1995) summarised the following conclusions: 
a. Variables with fewer than 5 categories are likely to generate low Pearson 
correlations.  
b. If the categorical variables above follow a normal distribution, the chi-square 
likelihood ratio test of model fit is affected very little, and factor loadings and 
factor correlations are modestly underestimated.  
c. Loadings and correlation become underestimated if variables have less than 3 
categories.  
d. In addition, error variance estimate is likely to be most sensitive to 
categorical variables and standard error estimates tend to be too low.  
 
Further, Byrne (2006) posited that the failure to address the ordinality of the data is 
likely to be negligible in the case that the number of categories is large (more than 5) 
and the data approximates a normal distribution. In a similar vein, Bentler and Chou 
(1987) strongly argued that given normally distributed categorical variables, a 
continuous method can be used with confidence if the variables have four or more 
categories. Thus, in practices, researchers were treating variables with Likert scales 
as continuous variables, and using Maximum Likelihood (ML) as the method of 
estimation.  
Moving to multivariate distribution characteristics, it is observed that 
Kolmogorov Smirnov’s normality test of the data showed distribution anomalies in 
all indicators. Skewness and kurtosis values, although fell within the acceptable 
range (±2), they had non-zero univariate skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, it is 
certain that multivariate normal distribution can not be assumed. Byrne (2006) 
suggests that although aberrant indicators are not extremely kurtotic, they may be 
adequately non-normal in which goodness-of-fit indices such as the usual chi-squares 
(χ2), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) become problematic. As a result, the Satorra-Bentler scaled statistic is 
used to make adjustments to standard errors and chi-squares for non-normal 
multivariate data. The Satorra-Bentler test statistics, such as S-B χ2, RMSEA, Root 
Mean Square Residual (RMR), and other fit indices are available in LISREL 8.8 by 
setting the estimation method to Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML).  
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7.2.2 Sample Size 
As the analysis was ultimately to rely on Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), 
sample size was an important issue. It is commonly agreed that sample size will 
influence the result of structural equation analysis. Even though exact guidelines of 
minimum sample size are absent, researchers have highlighted this issue. 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) suggested that a sample size of 150 or more is 
needed to perform SEM. Hair et al. (1998 p. 605) stated more convincingly that 
‘Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), the most common estimation procedure, 
had been found to provide valid results with sample size as small as 50, but a sample 
this small is not recommended’. However, in case of the existence of 
misspecification, a complex or large model, non-normal characteristics of data, and 
the use of a method of estimation other than the MLE procedure, Hair et al. (1998) 
recommended a minimum sample size of 200. Using different approaches (Monte 
Carlo and Analytic work), Tanaka (1987) suggested the ratio of sample size to the 
number of parameters being estimated be considered. Following this argument, 
Bentler (1995) specifically recommended that the ratio of the number of cases to 
estimated variables should be between 5:1 to 10:1. Still using the Monte Carlo 
approach, researchers examined the stability of parameter estimates in relation to the 
sample size (Boomsma 1983; Guadagnoli and Velicer 1988; Gerbing and Anderson 
1985). While Boomsa and Gerbing and Anderson agreed that a sample less than 100 
would provide instability of parameter estimates, Gerbing and Anderson argued that 
sample does not need to surpass 200 – the number that Boomsa recommended to 
have a fairly robust estimate. In a similar vein, Guadagnoli and Velicer 
recommended that applied research proceed with as small a sample as 150 if the 
loading of variables is high. For instance, if constructs have four or more variables 
with loadings above .60 then researchers can have a high degree of confidence in 
interpreting the results.  
By contrast, Holmes-Smith (2001 p. 197) denied the ratio of subjects per 
variable above, stating ‘…statistical theory underlying parameter estimation is 
asymptotic in nature. This means that statistics such as the standard error for 
parameter estimates can only be given confidently as the total number of cases 
approaches infinity’. To obtain meaningful results, a large sample is needed. In this 
regard, Holmes-Smith states that ‘when the number of variables (k) is 12 or greater, 
the sample size must be at least 1.5k(k+1)’ (2001 p. 198). For a study such as this, 
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with 48 variables, a sample size of 3528 is required. However, Hair et al. (1998 p. 
605) caution that ‘as the sample size becomes large (exceeding 400 to 500), the 
method becomes “too sensitive” and almost any difference is detected, making all 
goodness-of-fit measures indicate poor fit’. Tanaka (1987) and Hu and Bentler 
(1995), indeed, stressed that the statistical power of having a large sample would be 
high, meaning that even models with only trivial misspecifications would be likely to 
be rejected. 
Although less important, additional factors that impacted sample size were 
considered during the fieldwork stage of this study. In this regard, given data 
distribution and collection in 4 cities in Java (Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and 
Yogyakarta), and associated printing, postage and handling, as well as time 
constrains and costs during the fieldwork for this study, 496 completed valid 
questionnaires were deemed sufficient to be analysed in final stage.   
 
7.2.3 Estimation Method 
LISREL provides several methods of estimation for structural equation modelling, 
namely Instrumental Variables (IV), Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS), Unweighted 
Least Squares (ULS), Generalised Least Squares (GLS), Maximum Likelihood 
(ML), Generally Weighted Least Squares (WLS), and Diagonally Weighted Least 
Squares (DWLS) (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996). Among the above estimation 
methods, GLS and ML were considered the most common fitting criteria, along with 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (Kelloway 1998). In processing the data, the iterative 
procedure for parameter estimation begins by taking a guess at the parameter values. 
Based on these values, it then calculates the implied covariance matrix (S), which is 
compared with the observed (actual) covariance matrix (C) at a later stage. If the 
discrepancy between S and C becomes too small then iteration stops, otherwise it 
will start with new values and go through the process until the discrepancy function 
is deemed to have been minimised (Kelloway 1998; Holmes-Smith 2001). The key 
difference among these above methods of estimation is in the way they minimise the 
discrepancy between implied covariance matrix (S) and observed (actual) covariance 
matrix (C) (Holmes-Smith 2001).   
ML and GLS are methods of estimation for standard and multilevel structural 
equation modelling that assume the data to follow a multivariate normal distribution. 
In practice, however, the assumption of a multivariate data distribution often does 
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not hold (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2006), in particular in behavioural research (Bentler 
1996), as was the case of this research. As an alternative, LISREL 8.8 recommends 
other methods such as WLS, DWLS, and Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML) to fit 
the structural equation models with the data sets. These methods of estimation are 
available in LISREL 8.8. 
Comparing the three of estimation methods – WLS, DWLS, and RML – there 
are important issues to be considered. Relating to the use of WLS, Gefen, Straub and 
Boudreau (2000) stated that this method requires polychoric correlations or there are 
substantial deviations from a multivariate-normal distribution. Describing and 
distinguishing this method from others, Jöreskog and Sörbom (1996) acknowledged 
that although theoretically attractive, the use of WLS presents several difficulties in 
practical applications, such as the demand for huge computer memory, very large 
sample size, and difficulties in dealing with missing observations in the data. As a 
result, this WLS estimation method was rarely used (Holmes-Smith 2001).  
As an alternative to WLS, Jöreskog and Sörbom (1996) recommended the use 
of DWLS. Instead of calculating asymptotic covariance matrices of estimated 
coefficients, this method only computes the asymptotic variances of the estimated 
coefficients. However, using the DWLS method is recommended if data are ordinal, 
categorical or mixed (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2006).  
In regard to Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML), LISREL 8.8 clearly 
recommends that: 
If the data are continuous and approximately do not follow a multivariate Normal 
distribution and the sample size is not large, then the Robust Maximum Likelihood 
Method is recommended. This method will require an estimate of the asymptotic 
covariance matrix of the sample variances and covariances (Jöreskog and Sörbom 
2006 p. 7). 
 
Supporting this recommendation, researchers have highlighted valuable features of 
this method, such as its ability to produce robust chi-square statistic and robust 
standard errors under the condition of non-normality in large samples (Byrne 2006), 
and also in small samples (Bentler 1995). 
 In summary, as the data characteristics showed non-normality in distribution, 
were continuously scaled, and, relatively speaking not a very large sample, then the 
method of estimation applied to the current analysis was Robust Maximum 
Likelihood, which is available in LISREL 8.8 SEM software. 
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7.3 Model Assessment 
SEM researchers are urged to test the measurement model underlying full structural 
equation modelling before proceeding to test the structural model (Anderson and 
Gerbing 1988; Jöreskog and Sörbom 2006; Holmes-Smith 2001). This approach is 
known as two-step modelling. In the measurement part, the relationship of observed 
variables and their underlying construct is measured, while in the structural part, the 
casual relationship between constructs is examined. The detailed advantages of two-
step modelling were discussed by Anderson and Gerbing (1988)23.  
In pursuing the fit of a measurement model, Holmes-Smith (2001 p. 201) 
recommended the one-factor congeneric model as ‘the simplest form of a 
measurement model and it represents the regression of a set of observed variables on 
a single latent variable’. Model modification or re-specification is then performed to 
improve the model fit as well as to derive parameters that have real significance and 
substantive meaning (Sethi and King 1994). In this regard, one can delete non-
significant estimated parameters and/or set free the parameters that share large error 
variance. As recommended by Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989; 1996), Sethi and King 
(1994), and LISREL 8.8 (2006), only one parameter was changed at every step. The 
model modifications or re-specifications are continued until all parameter estimates 
and overall fit measures are judged to be statistically and substantially satisfactory 
(Sethi and King 1994). Following this step, reliability and validity tests of 
measurement properties are carried out before proceeding to subsequent structural 
model analysis. 
The structural part permits the relationships between constructs to be 
examined. It is also possible and often desirable to include observed variables as part 
of the structural model. To improve the structural relation between constructs or 
latent variables, modification or re-specifications are again carried out. These 
processes will be stopped when there is no more statistical evidence and theoretical 
justification that suggests further refining of the structural model is required. That is, 
statistical model fit has been achieved (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2006). 
                                                 
23 A summary of these advantages of two-step modelling is as follow: (1) it allows tests of the 
significance for all pattern coefficient; (2) it allows an assessment of whether any structural model 
would give an acceptable fit; (3) one can make an asymptotically independent test of the substantive 
or theoretical model of interest; (4) respecification can be made to achieve acceptable unidimensional 
construct measurement; (5) it provides a particularly useful framework for formal comparisons of the 
substantive model of interest with nest most likely theoretical alternatives. 
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7.3.1 Assessment of Measurement properties 
7.3.1.1 Assessment of Unidimensionality (and Convergent Validity) of Each 
Latent Variable 
The objective of assessing unidimensionality is to ensure that a set of items 
(indicators) measure the underlying latent trait or construct (Sethi and King 1994; 
Venkatraman 1989). In pursuing this objective, model re-specifications in the 
iterative process were undertaken to improve the fit of the model and to derive 
parameters that have real significance and substantive meaning (Sethi and King 
1994). These can be achieved by deleting non-significant estimated parameter and 
freeing the parameters that share large error variance (Holmes-Smith 2001). In 
assessing the fit of the model, a number of diverse perspectives and several different 
criteria are available (Byrne 2006; Kelloway 1998). The approach taken to assess the 
model fit in this study was based on the suggestions of a number or researchers  
(Byrne 1998; Schumacker and Lomax 1996; Holmes-Smith 2001; Jöreskog and 
Sörbom 1996; Sethi and King 1994). Firstly, parameters estimates were examined to 
identify the viability of their estimated values, and goodness-of-fit indices were 
examined to discover the extent to which the hypothesised model adequately 
described the sample data. Secondly, sources of misfit were detected. In this regard, 
LISREL produces two types of outputs bearing on model misspecification — the 
residuals, and the modification indices. 
7.3.1.1.1 Examination of Parameter Estimates 
To determine the viability of its values, parameter estimates should exhibit the 
correct sign and size, and be consistent with underlying theory (Byrne 1998; 
Jöreskog and Sörbom 2006). To assess these requirements, Byrne (1998) states that 
(1) parameters should not fall outside the admissible range, as this indicates either 
the model is wrong or the input matrix lacks sufficient information. Examples are 
correlations > 1, negative variances, and covariance or correlation matrices which are 
not positive definite. (2) Standard error of parameters should not be excessively large 
or small. Extremely small standard error causes test statistic for its related parameter 
cannot be defined (Bentler 1995); likewise, extremely large standard error indicates 
that parameters cannot be determined (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989). However, no 
definitive value of ‘small’ and ‘large’ has been established. (3) The t-value of 
individual parameters should not be less than ±1.96 (at 5% significance level) (Byrne 
1998; Holmes-Smith 2001). Non-significant parameters are considered unimportant, 
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and therefore should be deleted from the model (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996; Byrne 
1998; Schumacker and Lomax 1996; Holmes-Smith 2001). 
7.3.1.1.2 Squared Multiple Correlations (R2) 
These measures show how well the observed variables serve as measurement 
instruments for the latent variables (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996). Jöreskog (1993), 
explains that a small squared multiple correlation value indicates a weak relationship 
and reflects that the model is not good. The squared multiple correlations can be 
calculated by squaring the standardised loading. To pass this model-based estimate 
the squared multiple correlations should exceed .50, which is roughly equivalent to a 
standardised loading of.70 (Holmes-Smith 2001). 
7.3.1.1.3 Evaluation of Overall Model Fit 
Unlike other multivariate dependence techniques – multiple regression, discriminant 
analysis, multivariate analysis of variance, or even conjoint analysis – there is no 
single statistical test to assess the overall goodness-of-fit in SEM (Hair et al. 1998). 
Instead, researchers have been using a combination of a number of goodness-of-fit 
measures to assess the model. In essence, the goal is to find a model that not only 
statistically fits with the data, but also to have parameters whose properties are 
substantively meaningful (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). In doing so, LISREL’s 
iteration calculates the implied covariance matrix (S) and then compares it with the 
observed (actual) covariance matrix (C). If the discrepancy between S and C 
becomes so small then iteration stops, otherwise it will start with new values and go 
through the process until the discrepancy function is deemed to have been minimised 
(Kelloway 1998; Holmes-Smith 2001; Byrne 1998).The null hypothesis is then that 
there is no difference between the implied and the observed covariance matrix. Based 
on a 5% significance level, one can conclude that if the probability of the test is less 
than 5%, the hypothesised model has significant discrepancy with the sample data, 
otherwise there is no statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis (Byrne 1998; 
Holmes-Smith 2001).  
 There are a number of goodness-of-fit indices to choose from. LISREL itself 
provides more than 15 indices. LISREL 8.8 also provides the results of tests under 
conditions of non-normality in the data – as was the case in this study – by invoking 
the Robust Maximum Likelihood RML) method of estimation. In this study, the 
overall model fit was based on the following indices, namely Satora-Bentler Chi-
Square (S-B χ2), Root Mean Square Residual (RMR), Root Mean Square Error of 
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Approximation (RMSEA), Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit 
Index (AGFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI). These indices represented an 
absolute and an incremental (also called comparative) fit index. An absolute index 
directly assesses how well an a priori model reproduces the sample data, while an 
incremental index measures the proportionate improvement in fit by comparing a 
target model with a more restricted nested baseline model (Hu and Bentler 1995). S-
Bχ2, GFI, RMR, and RMSEA represent an absolute fit index, while AGFI and CFI 
symbolise an incremental fit index.   
a. Satora-Bentler Chi-Square (S-B χ2) 
Chi-square (χ2) is a test of whether the matrix of implied variances and covariances is 
significantly different to the matrix of empirical sample variances and covariances 
(Holmes-Smith 2001). This measure ‘is valid if all assumptions are satisfied, if the 
model holds and the sample size is sufficiently large’ (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993 p. 
121-122). When underlying distributional assumptions are violated a Satora-Bentler 
Chi-Square (S-B χ2) is more appropriate as it is an adjusted chi-square statistic which 
attempts to correct the bias introduced when data are markedly non-normal in 
distribution (Garson 2006). In addition, ‘the S-B χ2 has been shown to be the most 
reliable test statistic for evaluating mean and covariance structure models under 
various distributions and sample sizes’ (Byrne 2006 p. 136). Looking at this 
measurement, the S-B χ2 should be insignificant with a p-value of >.05 (Jöreskog and 
Sörbom 1989; Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau 2000), as this indicates that the 
discrepancy between the implied variances (and covariances) and empirical sample 
variances and (covariances) is very small. Another way to judge the result of chi-
square is by taking into account the degree of freedom. Hair et al. (1998) recommend 
the ratio of chi-square (χ2) to degree of freedom (df) be between 1 and 2. 
b. Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) 
RMR measures the average difference between the implied variances (and 
covariances) matrix and the empirical sample variance (and covariance) matrix 
(Holmes-Smith 2001). The threshold for accepting the model fit is to have RMR 
below .05 (Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau 2000). 
c. Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
As with RMR, RMSEA is the discrepancy per degree of freedom; but, it differs from 
RMR in that the discrepancy is measured in terms of the population, not just the 
sample utilised for estimation (Steiger 1990). Holmes-Smith noted that RMSEA will 
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consider the error of approximation in the population and relaxes the strict 
requirement on chi-square that the model holds exactly in the population (2001). To 
be classified as an adequat fit, the model should have a RMSEA value of less than 
.05 (although values between .05 and .08 indicate reasonable fit) (Holmes-Smith 
2001). Others recommend a cutoff value of ≤.06 (Hu and Bentler 1999). Another 
characteristic of RMSEA is that it is among the measures least affected by sample 
size (Fan, Thompson, and Wang 1999). 
d. Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) 
GFI is the most widely used goodness-of-fit measure in many studies of SEM. It 
‘measures the absolute fit (unadjusted for the degrees of freedom) of the combined 
measurement and structural model to the data’ (Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau 2000 p. 
35). The acceptable level of GFI is to have values greater than .95, although the 
value of .90 is deemed a reasonable fit (Holmes-Smith 2001). 
e. Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI) 
To complement the measure of goodness-of-fit indices, the AGFI is proposed. AGFI 
adjusts the values of GFIs for the degree of freedom in the model (Gefen, Straub, and 
Boudreau 2000). The threshold for this index is greater than .90 or .95 (Holmes-
Smith 2001). 
f. Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) was suggested by Bentler (1990) with the purpose 
of overcoming the deficiencies in the normed fit index (NFI) for a nested model. The 
NFI has the tendency to underestimate fit in small sized samples (Byrne 2006). Here, 
the comparative fit index compares whether the model under consideration is better 
than some baseline model, which in most cases is the null or independence model. 
The CFI ranges should fall between 0 and 1, with values exceeding .90 indicating a 
good fit to the data (Kelloway 1998). In cases where the value of CFI is above 1, 
there is an indication that the model is overfit as too many parameters have been 
freed to be estimated (Holmes-Smith 2001).  
 
7.3.1.2 Model Re-specification/Modifications 
Once the model has been run and output produced, the researcher’s next task is to 
examine whether the result indicates goodness-of-fit or not of the particular model. 
The tools for examining the fit in detail are the residuals and standardised residuals, 
the modification indices, as well as the expected change. Each of these quantities 
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may be used to locate the source of misspecification and to suggest how the model 
should be modified to fit the data better (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). 
 Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993) explain in detail how the process of examining 
the model should be carried out. A residual is an observed minus a fitted covariance 
(variance). A standardised residual (SR) is a residual divided by its estimated 
standard error. A large positive residual indicates that the model underestimates the 
covariance between the two variables. On the other hand, a large negative residual 
indicates that the model overestimates the covariance between the variables. 
Meanwhile, the Modification Index (MI) measures how much chi-square is expected 
to decrease if a particular parameter is set free and the model is reestimated. 
Expected parameter change (EC) measures how much the parameter is expected to 
change, in the positive or negative direction, if it is set free. Modification indices are 
used in the process of model evaluation and modification. The process begins with 
the parameter that has the largest MI, but if it does not make sense to relax this, then 
the second largest MI is considered, and so forth. If the signs of certain parameters 
are specified a priori, positive or negative, the expected parameter change associated 
with the modification indices for these parameters can be used to exclude from the 
model parameters having the wrong sign. In case a problematic variable is identified, 
Holmes-Smith (2001) suggested estimating additional parameters or deleting that 
variable from the model. It is worth noting that although there were many studies 
dealing with model specification, no optimal strategy has been found yet 
(Schumacker and Lomax 2004). In this model re-specification, deleting instead of 
setting free the parameter for the sake of parsimony/simplicity (Holmes-Smith 2001; 
Sethi and King 1994) is applied. The result is shown in table 7.1 below. 
  
Table 7.1: Assessment of Unidimensionality and Convergent Validity using the 
One-factor Congeneric Model 




Auto3, Auto4, Auto5, Auto6 
S-Bχ2=8.53,  df=2,   χ2/df=4.265,  p-value=0.014, RMSEA=0.081,  
RMR=0.048,  GFI=0.987,  AGFI=0.933, CFI=0.987. 
Iteration 1 Auto4, Auto5, Auto6 
S-Bχ2=0,  df=0,   p-value=1.000 
The model is saturated, the fit is perfect. 
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Auto3 shared significant error variance with Auto6 (MI=30.354). But their 
expected change (EC) was negative, which indicates the wrong sign 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). Thus, the second largest MI was examined. 
Auto3 shared significant error variance with Auto4 (MI=22.545), and their 
EC was positive. Since Auto3 had a lower loading than Auto4, then Auto3 
was deleted. 




EO2, EO3, EO4, EO5 
S-Bχ2=15.98, df=2,   χ2/df=7.99, p-value=0.000, RMSEA=0.119, 
RMR=0.068,  GFI=0.960,  AGFI=0.800, CFI=0.988. 
Iteration 1 EO2, EO3, EO4 
S-Bχ2=0,  df=0,   p-value=1.000 
The model is saturated, the fit is perfect. 
EO2 shared significant error variance with EO5 (MI=202.807), with 
expected change (EC) being positive. As EO5 had a lower loading than 
EO2, then EO5 was deleted. 




IDC1, IDC2, IDC3, IDC4 
S-Bχ2=27.39, df=2,   χ2/df=13.695, p-value=0.000.   RMSEA=0.160, 
RMR=0.090, GFI=0.917, AGFI=0.584, CFI=0.986. 
Iteration 1 IDC1, IDC2, IDC3 
S-Bχ2=0,  df=0,   p-value=1.000 
The model is saturated, the fit is perfect. 
Following Holmes-Smith’s (2001) recommendation in dealing with 
problematic situation, IDC4 was deleted to improve model fit. IDC4 also 
had a lower loading than the other parameters. 
The results show the final model. 
Human Resource Management 
Hypothesised 
Model 
HRM1, HRM2, HRM5, HRM6 
S-Bχ2=39.37, df=2,   χ2/df=19.685, p-value=0.000.   RMSEA=0.194, 
RMR=0.103, GFI=0.894, AGFI=0.470, CFI=0.974. 
Iteration 1 HRM1, HRM2, HRM5 
S-Bχ2=0,  df=0,   p-value=1.000 
The model is saturated, the fit is perfect. 
Following Holmes-Smith’s (2001) recommendation in dealing with 
problematic situation, HRM6 was deleted to improve model fit. HRM6 
also had a lower loading than the other parameters. 




IO3, IO4, IO5, IO6 
S-Bχ2=0.10,  df=2,   χ2/df=0.05,  p-value=0.953,  RMSEA=0.000,  
RMR=0.004,  GFI=1.000,  AGFI=0.999, CFI=1.000. 
No further re-specification was needed. The MI matrix and SR matrix 
were not shown by LISREL output, indicating that there were no non-zero 
modification indices and no SR values needed to be accounted for. 
The results show the final model. 
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Board of Commissioners 
Hypothesised 
Model 
BOC3, BOC4, BOC8, BOC9 
S-Bχ2=24.58,  df=2,   χ2/df=12.29,  p-value=0.000,  RMSEA=0.151,  
RMR=0.400,  GFI=0.782,  AGFI=0.088, CFI=0.988. 
Iteration 1 BOC3, BOC8, BOC9 
S-Bχ2=0,  df=0,   p-value=1.000 
The model is saturated, the fit is perfect. 
Following Holmes-Smith’s (2001) recommendation in dealing with 
problematic situation, BOC4 was deleted to improve model fit. BOC4 also 
had a lower squared multiple correlations than the other parameters. 




IC4, IC5, IC6, IC7  
S-Bχ2=21.73, df=2,   χ2/df=10.865,  p-value=0.000, RMSEA=0.141,  
RMR=0.173,  GFI=0.883,  AGFI=0.417, CFI=0.991. 
Iteration 1 IC4. IC5, IC6 
S-Bχ2=0,  df=0,   p-value=1.000 
The model is saturated, the fit is perfect. 
Following Holmes-Smith’s (2001) recommendation in dealing with 
problematic situation, IC7 was deleted to improve model fit. IC7 also had 
a lower loading than the other parameters. 




AC6, AC7, AC8, AC9 
S-Bχ2=2.31, df=2,   χ2/df=1.155, p-value=0.315,   RMSEA=0.018, 
RMR=0.029,  GFI=0.986,  AGFI=0.929, CFI=1.000. 
No further re-specification was needed. The MI matrix and SR matrix 
were not shown by LISREL output, indicating that there were no non-zero 
modification indices and no SR values needed to be accounted for. 
The results show the final model. 
Board of Directors 
Hypothesised 
Model 
BOD7, BOD8, BOD9, BOD17 
S-Bχ2=3.57, df=2,   χ2/df=1.785,  p-value=0.168,   RMSEA=0.040,  
RMR=0.023,  GFI=0.986,  AGFI=0.929, CFI=0.999. 
No further re-specification was needed. The MI matrix and SR matrix 
were not shown by LISREL output, indicating that there were no non-zero 
modification indices and no SR values needed to be accounted for. 
The results show the final model. 
Internal Control Group 
Hypothesised 
Model 
ICG1, ICG2, ICG3, ICG4 
S-Bχ2=2.83, df=2,   χ2/df=1.415,  p-value=0.242,   RMSEA=0.029,  
RMR=0.033,  GFI=0.972,  AGFI=0.862, CFI=0.999. 
ICG1 and ICG2 shared the largest standardised residual (SR=0.466). Since 
this value was well below the cut-off point of ±2.58 (Hair et al. 1998) there 
was no further re-specification.  




Codes of Conduct 
Hypothesised 
Model 
COC4, COC5, COC6, COC7 
S-Bχ2=3.66, df=2,   χ2/df=1.83,  p-value=0.160,   RMSEA=0.041,  
RMR=0.043,  GFI=0.983,  AGFI=0.916, CFI=0.999. 
No further re-specification was needed. The MI matrix and SR matrix 
were not shown by LISREL output, indicating that there were no non-zero 
modification indices and no SR values needed to be accounted for. 




OP2, OP4, OP5, OP6 
S-Bχ2=0.91, df=2, χ2/df=0.455, p-value=0.635,   RMSEA=0.000, 
RMR=0.009, GFI=0.993, AGFI=0.965, CFI=1.000. 
OP6 and OP5 shared the smallest standardised residual (SR=-0.213). As 
the critical point was ±2.58 (Hair et al. 1998), then no further specification 
was needed. 
The results show the final model. 
 
The results of the analysis of the one-factor congeneric models are presented in the 
following tables. Table 7.2 shows the results of parameter estimates, and table 7.3 
presents overall model fit for the analysis of the one-factor congeneric models. The 
satisfactoriness of the one-factor congeneric models was based on t-values (shown in 
table 7.2), Satorra Bentler Chi-Square (S-Bχ2), p-value, RMSEA, RMR, GFI, AGFI, 
and CFI (Shown in table 7.3).  
 











Auto4 0.638 0.407 0.053 12.902 
Auto5 0.693 0.480 0.074 11.744 
Auto6 0.731 0.534 0.096 13.392 
External Orientation (EO) 
EO2 0.733 0.538 0.054 18.093 
EO3 0.912 0.832 0.036 31.255 
EO4 0.791 0.626 0.069 23.610 
Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 
IDC1 0.928 0.861 0.037 39.340 
IDC2 0.956 0.913 0.034 56.184 
IDC3 0.812 0.660 0.051 28.681 
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Human Resource Management (HRM) 
HRM1 0.854 0.729 0.046 23.780  
HRM2 0.916 0.839 0.029 38.613 
HRM5 0.742 0.550 0.055 22.803 
Improvement Orientation (IO) 
IO3 0.826 0.682 0.059 20.539 
IO4 0.870 0.757 0.033 40.369 
IO5 0.734 0.539 0.027 33.547 
IO6 0.781 0.610 0.047 22.905 
Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
BOC3 0.803 0.645 0.117 18.267 
BOC8 0.947 0.897 0.038 41.630 
BOC9 0.955 0.912 0.055 55.983 
Independent Commissioners (IC) 
IC4 0.960 0.922 0.043 55.934 
IC5 0.981 0.962 0.022 77.267 
IC6 0.883 0.781 0.063 37.061 
Audit Committee (AC) 
AC6 0.889 0.790 0.032 39.205 
AC7 0.843 0.711 0.060 25.199 
AC8 0.927 0.859 0.038 41.037 
AC9 0.908 0.824 0.032 41.282 
Board of Directors (BOD) 
BOD7 0.924 0.854 0.021 57.104 
BOD8 0.927 0.859 0.020 65.888 
BOD9 0.875 0.766 0.032 33.690 
BOD17 0.795 0.632 0.051 23.769 
Internal Control Group (ICG) 
ICG1 0.835 0.697 0.051 19.172 
ICG2 0.919 0.845 0.034 33.880 
ICG3 0.899 0.808 0.039 29.293 
ICG4 0.779 0.607 0.051 22.519 
Codes of Conduct (COC) 
COC4 0.846 0.716 0.041 34.470 
COC5 0.907 0.823 0.032 47.447 
COC6 0.890 0.792 0.053 30.169 
COC7 0.904 0.817 0.056 40.454 
Organisational Performance (OP) 
OP2 0.884 0.781 0.023 38.301 
OP4 0.797 0.635 0.025 31.338 
OP5 0.947 0.897 0.023 40.867 
OP6 0.868 0.753 0.035 23.075 
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It was noted that the observed variables Auto4 and Auto5 squared multiple 
correlations below the threshold of .50 as suggested by the literature (Holmes-Smith 
2001). Keeping the above variables was based on the following reasons. Firstly, their 
t-values were significant (greater than ± 1.96 at 5% significance level) (Sethi and 
King 1994). Secondly, as explained in more detail in a previous chapter (see Chapter 
2: Literature Review), they were important variables which were derived from the 
literature review and empirical studies.  
 





RMSEA RMR GFI AGFI CFI 
Autonomy (Auto) 0(0) 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
External Orientation 
(EO) 
0(0) 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Inter-departmental 
Coordination (IDC) 
0(0) 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Human Resource 
Management (HRM) 





0.953 0.000 0.004 1.000 0.999 1.000 
Board of 
Commissioners (BOC) 
0(0) 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Independent 
Commissioners (IC) 
0(0) 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Audit Committee (AC) 2.31 
(2) 
0.315 0.029 0.018 0.986 0.929 1.000 









0.242 0.029 0.033 0.972 0.862 0.999 









0.635 0.000 0.009 0.993 0.965 1.000 
 
Initially, there were 48 observed variables and 12 unobserved variables in the 
models. Following the analysis of the one-factor congeneric models, there were 42 






Table 7.4: The Results of the One-Factor Congeneric Measurement Model on 
Each Construct 
Autonomy (Auto) 
Auto4 Employees influence important decisions concerning work. 
Auto5 There is freedom for employees to plan their own work. 
Auto6 There is an opportunity for employees to bring forward ideas before decisions 
are made. 
External Orientation (EO)  
EO2 There is an investigation of the wishes and needs of customers. 
EO3 There is active canvassing of new customers. 
EO4 Company is working to improve the local market position. 
Inter-Departmental Coordination (IDC) 
IDC1 There is useful cooperation between departments. 
IDC2 There is exchange of useful information between departments 
IDC3 Departments support one another in the resolution of problems 
Human Resource Management (IDC) 
HRM1 Performance appraisals are taken seriously. 
HRM2 Employees obtain useful information about their functioning 
HRM5 Employees are told when a good job is done. 
Improvement Orientation (IO) 
IO3 There are initiatives taken by employees to improve the way in which the work 
is done. 
IO4 New and improved ways to do work are continually adopted. 
IO5 Employees try to be pioneers. 
IO6 People put in maximum effort. 
Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
BOC3 BOC ensures that BOD complies with Articles of Association 
BOC8 BOC ensures that BOD protects the interests of shareholders. 
BOC9 BOC ensures that BOD protects the interests of stakeholders. 
Independent Commissioners (IC) 
IC4 IC ensures that company establishes control system. 
IC5 IC ensures that company establishes audit system 
IC6 IC ensures that company complies with regulations. 
Audit Committee (AC) 
AC6 AC creates disciplines and control which lessen the possibility the company 
being jeopardised 
AC7 AC empowers internal audit. 
AC8 AC promotes adequate structures of internal control. 
AC9 AC improves the quality of financial disclosure and reporting. 
Board of Directors (BOD) 
BOD7 BOD creates an ethical environment. 
BOD8 BOD creates a proper human resource management function. 
BOD9 BOD enforces codes of conduct. 
BOD17 BOD ensures transparency in the financial framework of the company. 
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Internal Control Group (ICG) 
ICG1 ICG creates policies to secure the assets of the company. 
ICG2 ICG creates policies to increase the operational efficiency and effectiveness of 
the company. 
ICG3 ICG develops the reliability and the comprehensiveness of accounting/financial 
information. 
ICG4 ICG ensures compliance with the applicable policies and regulatory 
requirements. 
Codes of Conduct (COC) 
 My company has codes of conduct which 
COC4 … make certain that no one engages in activities that jeopardise the 
company’s reputation. 
COC5 … treat all stakeholders fairly and honestly. 
COC6 … develop mechanisms where violations of company policy can be reported 
without fear of retribution. 
COC7 … create an environment in which the decisions of the company’s organs are 
obeyed. 
Organisational Performance (OP) 
 In your opinion, to what degree does your organisation need to improve in 
the following performance criteria? 
OP2 Customer satisfaction 
OP4 Professional behaviour 
OP5 Service quality 
OP6 Contact with clients. 
 
 
7.3.1.3 Test of Reliability and Validity of Measurement Model 
As suggested by Venkatraman (1989), following the one-factor congeneric test, the 
measurement part of structural equation modelling was continued by assessing the 
reliability and validity of variables. It is also the recommendation of Holmes-Smith 
(2001) that evidence of reliability and validity tests be provided in order for research 
to be classified as ‘good’ research. In accordance with the above suggestions, the 
following sections present the results of the reliability and validity tests.  
7.3.1.3.1 Measurement of Reliability 
a. Measurement of Reliability of Observed Variables 
The reliability of observed variables can be measured by squared multiple 
correlations. Basically, the squared multiple correlations are the squares of the 
standardised loadings of the observed variables. The squared multiple correlations 
should exceed .50, which is roughly equivalent to a standardised loading of .70 
(Holmes-Smith 2001). Table 7.2, column 3 above shows the values of the squared 
multiple correlations. 
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b. Measurement of Construct Reliability 
In assessing the reliability of multiple measures for an individual construct, the 
internal consistency measure developed by Fornell and Larcker (1981) was applied. 
This measure is equivalent to composite reliability (Chin 1998). Compared to 
Cronbach’s alpha, this measure is believed to be superior since it uses the item 
loadings obtained within the causal model, is not influenced by the number of 
indicators within the construct, and is more general (Barclay, Higgins, and 













where iλ = Standardised loading 
 iδ = Measurement Error. 
 
A commonly used threshold value for acceptable reliability is .50, which roughly 
corresponds to a standardised loading of .70 (Hair et al. 1998; Holmes-Smith 2001). 
c. Variance Extracted Estimate 
Another measure of construct reliability is the variance extracted estimate. This 
reflects the overall amount of variance in the indicators accounted for by the latent 
construct. Fornell and Larcker (1981) developed the formula for assessing this 













where iλ = Standardised loading 
  iδ = Measurement Error. 
 
Higher variance extracted values occur when the indicators are truly representative of 
the latent construct. The variance extracted measure is a complementary measure to 
the construct reliability. Guidelines suggest that the variance extracted value should 
exceed .50 for a construct (Hair et al. 1998; Holmes-Smith 2001). 
 Table 7.5 below presents the results of the construct reliability and variance 
extracted estimate measures. The table indicates that all constructs had good 
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construct reliability (>.50). All but one had variance extracted estimates >.50. The 
construct that had a variance extracted estimate less than .50 was Autonomy (0.474). 
Given this, there was the possibility of dropping this construct from subsequent 
analysis. However, considering that the construct reliability of the construct 
Autonomy was very good (0.729) and taking into consideration that variance 
extracted estimate is a complementary measure, the study decided to maintain this 
construct. In addition, past literature and empirical studies support the existence of 
this construct (Van den Berg and Wilderom 2004; Van Muijen et al. 1999). 
 
Table 7.5: Construct Scale Reliability and Variance Extracted Estimate 




Autonomy (Auto) 0.729 0.474 
External Orientation (EO) 0.855 0.665 
Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 0.928 0.881 
Human Resource Management (HRM) 0.877 0.706 
Improvement Orientation (IO) 0.891 0.673 
Board of Commissioners (BOC) 0.931 0.818 
Independent Commissioners (IC) 0.960 0.888 
Audit Committee (AC) 0.940 0.796 
Board of Directors (BOD) 0.933 0.777 
Internal Control Group (ICG) 0.985 0.944 
Codes of Conduct (COC) 0.936 0.787 
Organisational Performance (OP) 0.929 0.710 
 
 
7.3.1.3.2 Measure of Convergent Validity  
Convergent validity measures the magnitude of the direct structural relationship 
between an observed variable and a latent construct. It is achieved when this 
relationship (factor loading) is significant from zero (Holmes-Smith 2001). At 5% 
significance level the t-value of the parameter should be higher than 1.96. In this 
regard, structural equation modelling provides an input for calculating convergent 
validity. By looking table 7.2, column 5, it can be seen that all 42 observed variables 
employed in this study had t-values higher than the benchmark of 1.96. 
7.3.1.3.3 Measure of Discriminant Validity 
Another measure of validity is discriminant validity (Venkatraman 1989). This 
represents the extent to which the constructs in a model are different. Constructs are 
supposed to be not highly correlated, as they are measuring different concepts. 
Therefore, a correlation between constructs that is greater than .80 or .90 represents a 
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lack of discriminant validity (Holmes-Smith 2001). Fornel and Larcker (1981) 
recommend that discriminant validity is fulfilled if the average variance extracted for 
two constructs is greater than the square of the correlation between the two 
constructs.  
 Following the above recommendations, table 7.6 and table 7.7 report the 
correlations between constructs and the comparison of average variance extracted 
and square of correlation between constructs respectively. It is observed that, firstly, 
none of correlations between constructs was equal or higher than the threshold of .80. 
Secondly, all average variance extracted between two constructs was greater than 









Table 7.6: Correlations among Constructs 
 
 
Auto EO IDC HRM IO BOC IC AC BOD ICG COC OP 
Auto 1  
EO 0.389 1  
IDC 0.387 0.587 1  
HRM 0.377 0.607 0.635 1  
IO 0.397 0.570 0.494 0.684 1  
BOC 0.263 0.434 0.498 0.512 0.439 1  
IC 0.219 0.464 0.487 0.460 0.433 0.696 1  
AC 0.282 0.561 0.539 0.593 0.546 0.659 0.697 1  
BOD 0.337 0.533 0.612 0.725 0.554 0.711 0.581 0.725 1  
ICG 0.189 0.464 0.480 0.532 0.470 0.462 0.524 0.662 0.603 1  
COC 0.311 0.535 0.573 0.697 0.519 0.569 0.465 0.647 0.739 0.568 1  







Table 7.7: Assessment of Discriminant Validity 
 








Auto with EO 0.569 0.183 Yes 
 IDC 0.643 0.169 Yes 
 HRM 0.590 0.131 Yes 
 IO 0.595 0.158 Yes 
 BOC 0.646 0.078 Yes 
 IC 0.681 0.057 Yes 
 AC 0.658 0.080 Yes 
 BOD 0.647 0.114 Yes 
 ICG 0.626 0.036 Yes 
 COC 0.653 0.097 Yes 
 OP 0.641 0.012 Yes 
EO with IDC 0.739 0.368 Yes 
 HRM 0.687 0.365 Yes 
 IO 0.677 0.319 Yes 
 BOC 0.742 0.231 Yes 
 IC 0.778 0.238 Yes 
 AC 0.741 0.338 Yes 
 BOD 0.730 0.301 Yes 
 ICG 0.708 0.237 Yes 
 COC 0.735 0.295 Yes 
 OP 0.723 0.000 Yes 
IDC with HRM 0.760 0.419 Yes 
 IO 0.740 0.266 Yes 
 BOC 0.816 0.255 Yes 
 IC 0.851 0.258 Yes 
 AC 0.803 0.316 Yes 
 BOD 0.793 0.372 Yes 
 ICG 0.771 0.241 Yes 
 COC 0.798 0.328 Yes 
 OP 0.786 0.003 Yes 
HRM with IO 0.695 0.475 Yes 
 BOC 0.763 0.293 Yes 
 IC 0.798 0.251 Yes 
 AC 0.758 0.381 Yes 
 BOD 0.748 0.546 Yes 
 ICG 0.725 0.309 Yes 
 COC 0.721 0.516 Yes 
 OP 0.741 0.005 Yes 
IO with BOC 0.743 0.228 Yes 
 IC 0.773 0.210 Yes 
 AC 0.741 0.299 Yes 
 BOD 0.732 0.308 Yes 
 ICG 0.713 0.223 Yes 
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 COC 0.736 0.270 Yes 
 OP 0.726 0.002 Yes 
BOC with IC 0.855 0.534 Yes 
 AC 0.807 0.494 Yes 
 BOD 0.797 0.539 Yes 
 ICG 0.774 0.285 Yes 
 COC 0.800 0.352 Yes 
 OP 0.789 0.003 Yes 
IC with AC 0.837 0.549 Yes 
 BOD 0.826 0.393 Yes 
 ICG 0.804 0.359 Yes 
 COC 0.830 0.252 Yes 
 OP 0.819 0.000 Yes 
AC with BOD 0.788 0.526 Yes 
 ICG 0.768 0.438 Yes 
 COC 0.791 0.420 Yes 
 OP 0.781 0.002 Yes 
BOD with ICG 0.759 0.364 Yes 
 COC 0.782 0.546 Yes 
 OP 0.772 0.006 Yes 
ICG with COC 0.763 0.323 Yes 
 OP 0.753 0.005 Yes 
COC with OP 0.777 0.015 Yes 
 
7.3.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis - Second Order 
Theoretically, as shown in the research model (Figure 3.1, page 48) organisational 
culture and internal corporate governance are second-order constructs. In this regard, the 
first-order factors are explained by a higher order structure. The first-order factors or 
constructs of Autonomy (Auto), External Orientation (EO), Inter-Departmental 
Coordination (IDC), Human Resource Management (HRM) and Improvement 
Orientation (IO) belong to the higher (second-order) construct of Organisational 
Culture. Meanwhile, the first-order constructs of Board of Commissioners (BOC), 
Independent Commissioners (IC), Audit Committee (AC), Board of Directors (BOD), 
Codes of Conduct (COC) and Internal Control Groups (ICG) reflects the second-order 
construct of Internal Corporate Governance. 
 Confirmatory second-order factor analysis was initially introduced by Jöreskog 
(1970). Basically, every first-order construct is assumed to be a function of two 
components, namely a component that is shared with the other primary factors and 
corresponds to the construct of interest, and a component unique to that factor (Gerbing, 
Hamilton, and Freeman 1994). In doing so, each first-order construct’s contribution to 
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the second-order construct is quantified by the corresponding coefficient and is directly 
related to the second-order construct. This practice was believed to be superior to 
summing all the items that define a measurement scale and inserting only the 
corresponding total score into the structural part. Gerbing and Anderson (1988) 
acknowledged that the summation procedure was simple, but they noted the cost of a 
loss of rigor and meaning as the procedure ignored the relations of individual items with 
each other and the latent variables. In proposing the second-order factor analysis 
Gerbing, Hamilton and Freeman (1994) recommended that beside having the advantage 
of evaluating construct validity with goodness-of-fit indices, this perspective provides 
the conceptual advance of providing a definite definition of the domains of content that 
operationalise the construct of the interest.  
 First of all, to properly specify a second-order construct it is important to ensure 
that all first-order constructs are unidimensional (Kotha, Vadlamani, and Nair 1997). In 
this regard, this requirement was fully satisfied as shown in the above sections and tables 
depicting the Tests of Reliability and Validity of Measurement. To evaluate the fit of the 
second-order construct, researchers recommend the use of CFI along with other fit 
indices (Gerbing, Hamilton, and Freeman 1994). Although the common fit indices such 
as chi-square, GFI, AGFI, and RMSEA/RMR were in practice applied in many studies 
of second-order constructs (e.g., Kaplan and Elliott 1997; Farmer et al. 1997) it is for the 
sake of completeness of goodness-of-fit indices that CFI is called for. This index was 
indeed applied in the not so recent study of Goldman, Greenbaum andDarkes (1997), 
and in more recent studies of Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2005) and Laroche et al.(2005). 
Marsh (1994) applied the RNI (Relative Non-centrality Index), which is essentially the 
same as CFI, in his study of confirmatory factor analysis on second-order constructs. 
The results of second-order confirmatory factor analysis are presented below.  
 
7.3.2.1 Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis — Organisational Culture 
Based on the results of the one-factor congeneric measurement model presented in table 
7.2 above, there were 16 remaining observed variables which were utilised for 
performing second-order confirmatory factor analysis of the organisational culture 
construct. These variables are modelled in the following figure: 
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In this part, the processes of searching model fit are depending upon the remaining 
number of parameters. If possible to drop a parameter, then this action would be 
executed otherwise the parameters are set free. Thus, the study combines the 
recommendation of Holmes-Smith (2001), namely freeing or deleting parameters. Table 


















Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3 Iteration 4 Iteration 5 Iteration 6 Iteration 7 Iteration 8
(Final) 




















p-value 0.00001 0.00005 0.0010 0.00063 0.0010 0.00152 0.01151 0.02191 0.06102 
RMSEA 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.031 0.028 
RMR 0.122 0.113 0.114 0.108 0.109 0.107 0.0961 0.0968 0.0858 
GFI 0.918 0.925 0.931 0.939 0.940 0.942 0.953 0.956 0.964 
AGFI 0.887 0.895 0.900 0.907 0.908 0.910 0.922 0.925 0.933 




EO4 shared significant error variance with IO5 (MI=15.388). But their expected change (EC) was negative, which indicate 
the wrong sign (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). Thus, the second largest MI was examined. IDC3 shared significant error 
variance with HRM5 (MI=12.158), and their EC was positive. HRM5 also shared significant SR with EO2 (=7.565), EO3 
(=6.719), and IO6 (=5.687). All SR values were higher than the threshold of ±2.58 (Hair et al. 1998). Since HRM5 had a 
lower loading than IDC3 (0.767 and 0.822 respectively), HRM5 was dropped. 
Iteration 2 EO4 shared significant error variance with IO5 (MI=15.520). However, their expected change (EC) was negative, which 
indicate the wrong sign (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). Thus, the second largest MI was examined. EO2 shared significant 
error variance with HRM2 (MI=11.601) and their EC was positive. EO2 also shared significant SR with Auto6 (=3.140), 
IDC2 (=2.844), HRM1 (=3.587), and HRM2 (=6.125). All SR values were above the threshold of Hair et al. (1998). As the 
loading of EO2 was lower than HRM2 (0.763 and 0.885 respectively), EO2 was dropped. 
Iteration 3 EO5 shared significant error variance with IO5 (MI=15.018). But their expected change (EC) was negative, which indicate 
the wrong sign (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). Thus, the second largest MI was examined. Auto5 shared significant error 
variance with IO3 (MI=10.644) and their EC was positive. Auto5 also shared significant SR with HRM1 (=-3.216), HRM2 
(=-3.533), and Auto4 (=3.539). All SR values were above the threshold of Hair et al. (1998). Since the loading of Auto5 
was lower than the loading of IO3 (0.634 and 0.814 respectively), Auto5 was dropped. 
Iteration 4 Two pairs of indicators shared the largest significant error variance with negative ECs. These were: 
EO4-IO5 (MI=14.874; EC=-0.170), and 
 IDC2-HRM1 (MI=10.232; EC=-0.103). 
Consequently, the model re-specification was directed to the third largest pairs – EO4 and IO4 – in which the MI=8.262 
and EC=0.164. EO4 had a lower loading than IO4 (0.830 and 0.876 respectively). Considering the remaining items 
construct EO were only 2 items, dropping EO4 would have contributed to the condition of empirical underindentification. 
As a consequence, these parameters were set free. From a substantive perspective, it would be reasonable that having 
continually adopted new and improve ways to do work would improve the local market position of the company. 
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Iteration 5 Five pairs of indicators shared the largest significant error variance with negative ECs. These were: 
EO4-IO5 (MI=11.459; EC=-0.163), 
IDC2-HRM1 (MI=10.357; EC=-0.104), 
EO4-HRM1 (MI=9.100; EC=-0.151), 
Auto4-EO3 (MI=8.419; EC=-0.101), and 
EO3-IO3 (MI=8.100; EC=-0.102). 
With the sixth largest significant error variance was the pair of HRM1-IO4 (MI=7.960), and with positive EC (0.090), 
model re-specification was directed to this pair. Additionally, IO4 shared SR with IDC2 (=-3.148). Considering the 
remaining items construct HRM were only 2 items, dropping HRM1 would have contributed to the condition of empirical 
underindentification. Thus, these parameters were set free. From a substantive perspective, taking performance appraisals 
seriously are judged to be a motivation for employee to continually adopt the new and improved ways to do work. 
Iteration 6 HRM1 shared significant error variance with IO6 (MI=13.929 with EC=0.136). IO6 also shared significant SR with EO3 
(=4.244), IDC3 (=3.507), and HRM2 (=4.105). Since IO6 had a lower loading than HRM1 (0.795 and 0.880 respectively), 
IO6 was dropped. 
Iteration 7 EO3 shared significant error variance with IO4 (MI=30.660 with EC=0.431). EO3 also shared significant SR with HRM2 
(=-2.613) and IO4 (=3.366). Dropping one of these two items would have contributed to the condition of empirical 
underindentification. Consequently, these parameters were set to free. From a substantial standpoint, an active canvassing 
of new customer was supported by continually adopting the new and improved ways to do work. 
Iteration 8 The first pair of indicators shared the largest significant error variance with negative EC. This was EO4-IO5 (MI=12.362; 
EC=-0.192). As the second largest pair of indicators that shared the largest significant error variance (MI=9.009) with 
positive EC, the pair of EO3-IO5 was subject to model re-specification. IO5 also shared SR with IDC1 (=-2.802), IDC2 (=-
3.489) and HRM1 (=3.378). All SR values were higher than the threshold of ±2.58 (Hair et al. 1998). Since the loading of 






From iteration 8 or the final model, it was shown that most of fit indices satisfied the 
benchmarks applied to this study. The ratio of S-Bχ2/df was 1.388, which is within the 
threshold range of 1-2; the p-value was well above the .05 benchmark (=0.06102); 
RMSEA was well below the .05 cut-off point (=0.028); GFI and AGFI showed very 
good values (=0.964 and 0.933 respectively); and CFI was excellent. The RMR score 
was not as good as the recommended benchmark of less than or equal to .05. However, 
since the RMSEA index was excellent, and RMSEA is superior to RMR in terms of its 
characteristic of being less affected by sample size (Fan, Thompson, and Wang 1999), 
this study considered that goodness-of-fit indices were satisfactory. The remaining 
indicators or observed variables of the second-order construct of organisational culture 
are shown in figure 7.2. 
 
 




In this part, the processes of searching model fit depend upon the remaining number of 
parameters. If possible to drop parameter, then this action would be executed otherwise 
the parameters are set free. Thus, the study combines the recommendation of Holmes-
Smith (2001), namely freeing or deleting parameters. Table 7.9 below summarises the 
processes of model re-specifications for the internal corporate governance construct. 
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Based on the results of the one-factor congeneric measurement model presented in table 
7.2 above, there were 22 remaining observed variables to be utilised for performing 
second-order confirmatory factor analysis of the internal corporate governance 
construct. These variables are modelled in the following figure: 
7.3.2.2 Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis — Internal Corporate 
Governance 
Figure 7.3: Second-Order Construct of Internal Corporate Governance 
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p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.025 0.016 0.022 0.025 0.028 0.029 0.050 
RMSEA 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.027 
RMR 0.233 0.239 0.237 0.237 0.190 0.198 0.197 0.208 0.210 0.160 0.156 0.157 0.158 0.157 0.163 
GFI 0.851 0.860 0.869 0.885 0.896 0.898 0.899 0.903 0.912 0.927 0.933 0.935 0.936 0.938 0.948 
AGFI 0.815 0.823 0.832 0.850 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.865 0.873 0.891 0.895 0.896 0.897 0.909 0.909 




IC4 shared the largest significant error covariance with AC8 (MI=25.149 with positive EC=0.144). AC8 also shared a significant 
SR with ICG4 (=3.699). Since AC8 had a lower loading than IC4 (0.920 and 0.967 respectively), AC8 was dropped. 
Iteration  
2 
There were two pairs of indicators which shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs: 
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=23.425; EC=-0.085) and BOC8-ICG3 (MI=23.005; EC=-0.098).  
Thus model re-specification was directed to the third largest pair that shared significant error variance. That was AC6-COC6 
(MI=20.125; EC=0.135). COC6 also shared SR with BOC8 (=-4.051), BOC9 (=-3.166), IC4 (=-4.648), IC5 (=-6.025), and AC7 (=-
4.357). All the SR values were above the ±2.58 threshold of Hair et al. (1998). As the loading of COC6 was lower than AC6 (0.881 
and 0.913 respectively), COC6 was dropped. 
Iteration  
3 
Three pairs of indicators shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs. These were: 
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=23.170; EC=-0.084), 
BOC8-ICG3 (MI=22.924; EC=-0.098), and  
BOC3-ICG2 (MI=17.819; EC=-0.192). 
With the fourth largest significant error variance was the pair of BOD17-ICG4 (MI=16.877), and with positive EC (0.164), model 
re-specification was directed to this pair. Additionally, ICG4 shared SR with IC4 (=3.390), IC5 (=3.669), IC6 (=5.019), AC 
(=2.936), AC7 (=8.590), AC9 (=3.438), BOD17 (=5.593), COC5 (=3.534), and COC7 (=3.367). All SR values were higher than the 
benchmark of Hair et al. (1998). Since ICG4 had a lower loading than BOD17 (0.794 and 0.813 respectively), ICG4 was dropped. 
Iteration  
4 
BOC3 shared significant error variance with ICG3 (MI=23.220 with EC=0.244). BOC3 also shared significant SR with BOD17 
(=6.629), and COC5 (=2.999). Since BOC3 had a lower loading than ICG3 (0.814 and 0.882 respectively), BOC3 was dropped. 
Iteration  
5 
There were two pairs of indicators which shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs: 
BOD17-ICG3 ((MI=18.864; EC=-0.080), and  
BOC9-COC4 (MI=12.207; EC=-0.204). 
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Thus model re-specification was directed to the third largest pair that shared significant error variance. That was AC9-ICG3 
(MI=11.718; EC=0.086). As the loading of AC9 was lower than ICG3 (0.880 and 0.882 respectively), AC9 was dropped. 
Iteration  
6 
Four pairs of indicators shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs. These were: 
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=18.002; EC=-0.078), 
BOC9-COC4 (MI=12.492; EC=-0.206), 
BOD8-ICG1 (MI=10.646; EC=-0.070), and 
BOC8-ICG3 (MI=9.751; EC=-0.068). 
With the fifth largest significant error variance was the pair of IC4-AC7 (MI=8.310), and with positive EC (0.117), model re-
specification was directed to this pair. Dropping one of these two items would have contributed to the condition of empirical 
underindentification. Consequently, these parameters were set to free. From a substantive point of view, fulfilling the duties of AC 
of empowering internal audit provides assurances to IC that company establishes control system. Consequently, these parameters 
were set to free. 
Iteration  
7 
There were four pairs of indicators which shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs: 
BOD1-ICG3 ((MI=17.944; EC=-0.078),  
BOC9-COC4 (MI=12.482; EC=-0.206), 
BOD8-ICG1 (MI=10.655; EC=-0.071), and 
BOC8-ICG3 (MI=9.768; EC=-0.068). 
Thus model re-specification was directed to the fifth largest pair that shared significant error variance. That was IC9-ICG1 
(MI=9.461; EC=0.054). ICG1 also shared SR with BOD8 (=-2.756), IC4 (=3.054), IC5 (=3.759), and AC7 (=4.150). All SR values 
were higher than the benchmark of Hair et al. (1998). Since ICG1 had a lower loading than IC9 (0.833 and 0.972 respectively), 
ICG1 was dropped. 
Iteration  
8 
Three pairs of indicators shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs. These were: 
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=16.410; EC=-0.076), 
BOC8-ICG3 (MI=13.559; EC=-0.082), and 
BOC9-COC4 (MI=12.563; EC=-0.206). 
As the fourth largest pair of indicators that shared the largest significant error variance (MI=8.007) with positive EC, the pair of 
IC5-BOD17 was subject to model re-specification. BOD17 also shared SR with IC4 (=4.899), and ICG3 (=4.710). These two SR 
values were above the ±2.58 threshold of Hair et al. (1998). As the loading of BOD17 was lower than IC5 (0.812 and 0.972 
respectively), BOD17 was dropped. 
Iteration  
9 
There were four pairs of indicators which shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs: 
BOC8-ICG3 ((MI=13.552; EC=-0.082),  
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=12.995; EC=-0.069), 
BOC9-COC4 (MI=12.750; EC=-0.208), and 
BOD8-ICG2 (MI=9.411; EC=-0.063). 
Thus model re-specification was directed to the fifth largest pair that shared significant error variance. That was IC6-COC5 





Four pairs of indicators shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs. These were: 
BOC8-ICG3 (MI=13.301; EC=-0.081), 
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=13.213; EC=-0.058), 
BOC9-COC4 (MI=12.899; EC=-0.209), and 
BOD8-ICG2 (MI=9.702; EC=-0.064). 
With the fifth largest significant error variance was the pair of ICG3-COC4 (MI=6.513), and with positive EC (0.079), model re-
specification was directed to this pair. COC4 also shared SR with BOC8 (=-3.024), BOC9 (=-3.352), IC4 (=-4.051), IC5 (=-4.801), 
AC7 (=-4.059), and ICG3 (=3.321). As COC4 had a lower loading than ICG3 (0.852 and 0.904 respectively), COC4 was dropped. 
Iteration 
11 
There were three pairs of indicators which shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs: 
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=13.132; EC=-0.069), 
BOC8-ICG3 ((MI=12.663; EC=-0.079), and 
BOD8-ICG2 (MI=9.749; EC=-0.064). 
Thus model re-specification was directed to the fourth largest pair that shared significant error variance. That was BOC8-ICG2 
(MI=6.124; EC=0.053). Dropping one of these two items would have contributed to the condition of empirical underindentification. 
Consequently, these parameters were set to free. One substantial consideration was that the fulfilment of duties of ICG in creating 
policies to increase the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the company is operationalised by BOC that ensures that BOD 
protects the interests of shareholders.  
Iteration 
12 
Two pairs of indicators shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs. These were: 
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=13.114; EC=-0.069), and BOD8-ICG2 (MI=9.206; EC=-0.062). 
As the third largest pair of indicators that shared the largest significant error variance (MI=6.141) with positive EC, the pair of 
AC6-BOD7 was subject to model re-specification. Dropping one of these two items would have contributed to the condition of 
empirical underindentification. Accordingly, these parameters were set to free. From a substantive perspective, fulfilling the duties 
of an AC of empowering internal audit facilitates BOD in creating ethical environment.  
Iteration 
13 
There were two pairs of indicators which shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs: 
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=12.847; EC=-0.068), and BOCD-ICG2 ((MI=9.728; EC=-0.064). 
With the third largest significant error variance was the pair of BOC-IC5 (MI=5.549), and with positive EC (0.043), model re-
specification was directed to this pair. From a substantive viewpoint, the fulfilment of duties of IC in ensuring that the company 
establishes audit system facilitates BOC in ensuring that BOD protects the interests of shareholders. Based on this argument, these 
parameters were set free. 
Iteration 
14 
Two pairs of indicators shared the largest significant error variance, but with negative ECs. These were: 
BOD7-ICG3 (MI=12.751; EC=-0.067), and BOD8-ICG2 (MI=9.834; EC=-0.064). 
As the third largest pair of indicators that shared the largest significant error variance (MI=6.141) with positive EC, the pair of IC4-
BOD7 was subject to model re-specification. Considering BOD7 had a lower loading than IC4 (0.926 and 0.984 respectively), 
BOD7 was dropped. The result showed the final model 
 
From iteration 14 or the final model, it has been shown that most of the fit 
indices satisfied the benchmark applied to this study. The ratio of S-Bχ2/df was 
within the acceptable range of 1-2 (=61.63/45=1.370); the p-value was equal to the 
benchmark (=0.050); RMSEA was satisfactory (=0.027); GFI was acceptable 
(=0.948); AGFI was good (=0.909), and CFI’s value was excellent (=0.999). The 
RMR score was not as good as the recommended benchmark of less than or equal to 
.05. However, since the RMSEA index was excellent, and RMSEA is superior to 
RMR in terms of its characteristic of being less affected by sample size (Fan, 
Thompson, and Wang 1999), this study considered that goodness-of-fit indices were 
satisfactory. Further, Byrne (1998) claimed that interpreting RMR is difficult since 
the residual values derived from the fitting of the variance-covariance matrix for the 
hypothesised model to those of the matrix of the sample data are relative to the sizes 
of the observed variance and covariance. The remaining indicators or observed 
variables of the second-order construct of Internal Corporate Governance are shown 
in figure 7.4. 
 




7.3.3 Assessment of the Structural Model 
Following the comprehensive assessment of measurement part of the SEM 
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Holmes-Smith 2001; Jöreskog and Sörbom 2006), the 
next step was to assess the structural part of SEM. In the previous section 
(measurement), the relationship of observed variables and their underlying constructs 
was measured. In this section, the structural part permits relationships between 
constructs to be examined. It is also possible, and often desirable to include observed 
variables as part of structural model. 
As stated by Gefen, Straub and Boudreau, the objective of covariance-based 
SEM is: 
to show that the null hypotheses – the assumed research model with all its paths – is 
insignificant, meaning that the complete set of paths as specified in the model that is 
being analysed is plausible, given the sample data. Moreover, its goodness of fit 
tests, such as χ2 test the restrictions implied by a model. In other words, the objective 
of covariance-based SEM is to show that the operationalization of the theory being 
examined is corroborated and not disconfirmed by the data. (2000 p. 24-25)  
 
This can be met with, for example, insignificant χ2 with p-value above .05, GFI 
above .90, among many other criteria that are discussed in detail in the section above 
addressing the evaluation of overall model fit. To improve the structural relation 
between constructs or latent variables, modification or re-specifications are again 
carried out. That is, a modification index and its associated expected change is 
examined. In this part, depending upon the remaining number of parameters, the 
study combines the recommendation of Holmes-Smith (2001), namely freeing or 
deleting parameters. Of the remaining observed variables and constructs there were 
10 constructs with two observed variables. Deleting one of the observed variables of 
these 10 constructs would have contributed to the condition of empirical 
underindentification. As recommended by Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989; 1996), Sethi 
and King (1994) and LISREL 8.8 (2006), only one parameter was changed at every 
step. These processes were to be stopped when there was no more statistical evidence 
and theoretical justification to suggest further refining of the structural model. That 
is, statistical model fit was achieved (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2006). Compressing the 
full model into one page, the path structure of the model is shown in the figure 7.5 
below. The figure shows the relationship between dependent and independent 
constructs. The rectangle represents the indicator or observed variables and the 
ellipses or circles indicate the constructs or unobserved variables. A single-headed 
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arrow indicates the effect of first-order construct and its indicators upon second-order 
construct. It also indicates the effect of an independent construct on a dependent 





















































Figure 7.5: The Full Research Model  
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Three hypotheses developed in chapter 3 will be tested in the structural part. 
The relationship between dependent constructs and an independent construct is 
shown in the LISREL path diagram. The paths between dependent constructs and 
independent construct are measured by the Gamma (γ) coefficient, and the path 
between dependents construct is measured by the Beta (β) coefficient. Considering 
the study employs second-order constructs in measuring organisational culture and 
internal corporate governance, and first-order construct of organisational 
performance, there are two Gamma (γ) coefficients – the path between the 
Organisational Culture construct and Organisational Performance, and the path 
between Organisational Culture and Internal Corporate Governance, and one Beta (β) 
coefficient – the path between Internal Corporate Governance and Organisational 
Performance — in structural path.  
 In assessing the structural paths the t-value was applied. The path was to be 
considered statistically significant if the t-value was greater than ± 1.96 at a 5% 
significance level (greater than ± 1.645 at a 10% significance level and ± 2.575 at a 
1% significance level).   
 
7.3.3.1 Results of Structural Model Fit 
Following the second-order confirmatory factor analysis of the previous stage, the 
full research model relating dependent and independent constructs was entered in and 
run by LISREL software. The result, a set of statistics which is shown in table 7.10 
column 1 (Initial Model), was examined so that each construct was psychometrically 
sound.  
 
Table 7.10: Model Re-specification of Full Model  
Overall Fit 
Indices 











p-value 0.000 0.002 0.036 0.053 
RMSEA 0.024 0.023 0.018 0.017 
RMR 0.134 0.134 0.122 0.122 
GFI 0.884 0.886 0.898 0.900 
AGFI 0.856 0.858 0.872 0.873 




Iteration 1 The first pair of indicators shared the highest significant error variance, 
but with negative EC. This was EO3-BOC9 (MI=23.674; EC=-0.233). 
With the second largest significant error variance was the pair of EO3-
BOC8 (MI=20.570), and with positive EC (0.122), model re-specification 
was directed to this pair. Instead of dropping one of the items, freeing the 
pair of items was selected in this iteration. This was because dropping 
strategy would have contributed to the condition of empirical 
underindentification. From a substantive perspective, it would seem 
reasonable that having BOC who ensures that BOD protects the interests 
of stakeholders would assist members of an organisation in canvassing 
new customers. This is because their effort to investigate new customers -
– as part of stakeholders – could be guided by BOC direction in 
protecting the stakeholders’ interest. Therefore, freeing these parameters 
was justified. 
Iteration 2 Two pairs of indicators shared the largest significant error variance, but 
with negative ECs. These were: 
COC5-OP6 (MI=16.523; EC=-0.087), and 
HRM1-IC5 (MI=15.372; EC=-0.077). 
As the third largest pair of indicators that shared the largest significant 
error variance (MI=13.085) with positive EC (0.226), the pair of IDC3-
BOC9 was subject to model re-specification. IDC3 also shared SR with 
HRM2 (=5.436), BOC8 (=4.559), BOC9 (=9.431), IC4 (=3.276), AC6 
(=4.225), BOD8 (=4.276), BOD9 (=15.244), COC5 (=9.2050, and COC7 
(=4.325). As the loading of IDC3 was lower than BOC9 (0.825 and 0.958 
respectively), IDC3 was dropped. 
Iteration 3 There were two pairs of indicators which shared the largest significant 
error variance, but with negative ECs: 
COC5-OP6 (MI=16.592; EC=-0.087), and 
HRM1-IC5 (MI=15.690, EC=-0.078). 
With the third largest significant error variance was the pair of HRM2-
ICG2 (MI=12.885), and with positive EC (0.078), model re-specification 
was directed to this pair. Instead of dropping one of the items, freeing the 
pair of items was selected in this iteration. This was because dropping 
strategy would have contributed to the condition of empirical 
underindentification. From a substantive point of view, having practices 
that allow employee obtain useful information about their functioning 
would be considered as increasing the operational efficiency and 
effectiveness of the company – policy that created by ICG. As a result, 
freeing these parameters was substantiated. The result showed the final 
model. 
 
This process is repeated up to the point where researcher believes that there is no 
more room for improving the fit of the model24. The initial model revealed the 
results of the structural relationship of the constructs under examination; these are 
shown in table 7.11. First, the structural path of Organisational Culture to 
                                                 
24 Byrne (1998, p. 251) recommended that ‘Although there are no firm rules or regulations to guide 
this decision, the researcher’s best yardsticks include (a) a thorough knowledge of the substantive 
theory, (b) an adequate assessment of statistical criteria based on information pooled from various 
indices of fit, and (c) a watchful eye on parsimony.’ 
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Organisational Performance with a standardised structural coefficient of 0.009 was 
not significant at the 5% significance level. Second, having a standardised structural 
coefficient of 0.879, the structural path of Organisational Culture to Internal 
Corporate Governance was significant at the 5% significance level. Third, the 
structural path of Internal Corporate Governance to Organisational Performance, 
with a standardised structural coefficient of 0.080, was not significant at the 5% 
significance level. From the overall fit indices in table 7.10 and table 7.11, it was 
observed that model optimisation or re-specification was needed before evaluation of 
the structural model could be finalised. 
  
Table 7.11: Results of Hypotheses Testing based on the Hypothesised Model 






Organisational Culture to 
Organisational Performance 
H1 0.009 (0.058) No 
Organisational Culture to 
Internal Corporate Governance 
H2 0.879 (9.275) Yes 
Internal Corporate Governance 
to Organisational Performance 
H3 0.080 (0.533) No 
 
7.3.3.2 Model Re-specification 
It must be noted that the research model developed for this study consisted of two 
second-order constructs and one first-order construct within which three structural 
parts were hypothesised. In this regard, the model re-specification that was to be 
applied was intended to affect the modification index measure and associated 
expected change only. Deleting or fixing to zero the non-significant parameter was 
not chosen as this alternative would have resulted in deleting the hypothesis. In 
examining the modification index measure and associated expected change the 
following guidelines was followed. Start with the parameter that has the largest MI, 
and if the sign of the expected change of this largest MI is theoretically justifiable 
then the parameter can be set free or deleted to increase model fit. Subsequently, if it 
does not make sense to set the parameter free or to delete parameter then consider the 
second largest MI, and so forth. Any model modification should be reasonable and 
be supported by literature (Byrne 1998; Schumacker and Lomax 2004; Jöreskog 
1993; Holmes-Smith 2001). The process of model re-specification is presented in the 
table 7.10. 
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 The results of model re-specification revealed the structural paths of this 
study shown in table 7.12. First, the structural path of Organisational Culture to 
Organisational Performance with a standardised structural coefficient of 0.019 was 
not significant at the 5% significance level. Second, having a standardised structural 
coefficient of 0.874 the structural path of Organisational Culture to Internal 
Corporate Governance was significant at the 5% significance level. Third, the 
structural path of Internal Corporate Governance to Organisational Performance, 
with a standardised structural coefficient of 0.072 was not significant at the 5% 
significance level. Model re-specification resulted in the improvement of the 
standardised structural coefficient of the first path of the research model; however, 
this coefficient was not strong enough to make the structural path to significant.  
 
Table 7.12: Assessment of Structural Model — Final Model 






Organisational Culture to 
Organisational Performance 
H1 0.019 (0.126) No 
Organisational Culture to 
Internal Corporate Governance 
H2 0.874 (9.390) Yes 
Internal Corporate Governance 
to Organisational Performance 
H3 0.072 (0.503) No 
 
Summing up the final model, the goodness-of-fit indices are presented in 
table 7.13. From iteration 3, or the final model, it is shown that most of the fit indices 
satisfied the benchmark applied to this study. The ratio of S-Bχ2/df was within the 
acceptable range of 1-2 (=316.08/277=1.141), the p-value was greater than the 
benchmark (=0.053), RMSEA was satisfactory (=0.017), GFI was good (=.900), and 
CFI’s value was excellent (=0.999). In regard to RMR, its score was not as good as 
the recommended benchmark of less than or equal to .05. However, since the 
RMSEA index was excellent, and RMSEA is superior to RMR in terms of its 
characteristic of being least affected by sample size (Fan, Thompson, and Wang 
1999), then this study considered that goodness-of-fit indices were satisfactory. 
Further, Byrne (1998) claimed that interpreting RMR is difficult since the residual 
values derived from the fitting of the variance-covariance matrix for the hypothesised 
model to those of the matrix of sample data are relative to the sizes of the observed 
variance and covariance. In regard to AGFI, it is acknowledged that this index is less 
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than the restrictive threshold of .90, but it exceeded the threshold of .80 (Gefen, 
Straub, and Boudreau 2000). AGFI in the .80 to .89 range are believed to represent a 
reasonable fit (Doll, Xia, and Torkzadeh 1994). Moreover, as Kotha, Vadlamani and 
Nair (1997) argue, such an AGFI index is still appropriate as long as other indices 
perform well, as was the case in this study; then, it could be concluded that overall fit 
indices do well. 
Table 7.13: Goodness-of-Fit of Final Model 
Goodness-of-Fit Index Value 








The results of squared multiple correlations (R2) are reported in the table 
7.14. The value of R2 for the independent constructs shows the degree of reliability 
of measurement indicators in explaining the underlying constructs – it ranged from 
0.235 to 0.791 for the AUTO construct and the AC construct respectively. The value 
of R2 for the dependent constructs (ICORGOV and OP) represents the degree of 
variance explained by the research model. In this study the model explained 76.4% 
of the variance in ICORGOV, and only 0.8% of the variance in OP. 

















7.4 Hypothesis Testing  
Having analysed the measurement and structural part of structural equation 
modelling, it was possible to evaluate the hypotheses developed for this study. A 
hypothesis is assessed through examining the t-values. There were mixed results on 
the proposed relationship, as shown in table 7.12. 
 
7.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
In Chapter 3 it was hypothesised that there was a positive and significant relationship 
between Organisational Culture and Organisational Performance. The present study, 
with a t-value of 0.126, provides evidence that the relationship of OC to OP is not 
significant — although the relationship is in right direction. This path indicates that 
OC has little positive impact on OP.  
 
7.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 stated that there was a positive and significant relationship between 
Organisational Culture and Internal Corporate Governance. Having a t-value of 
9.390, the present research confirms the relationship of OC to ICORGOV. This path 
signifies that OC has a significant positive impact on ICORGOV. 
 
7.4.3 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 stated that there was a positive and significant relationship between 
ICORGOV to OP. Looking at the t-value of 0.503, the present study presents 
evidence that the relationship of ICORGOV to OP is not significant, albeit in the 
right direction. This path denotes that ICORGOV has little impact on OP. 
 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter has described the analysis of the data using Structural Equation 
Modelling – LISREL software. In the first part of this chapter, discussion relating to 
estimation method, data examination, and sample size was presented.  
This chapter has also presented the model assessment, including assessment 
of its measurement properties, confirmatory factor analysis of the second-order 
constructs of organisational culture and internal corporate governance, and 
assessment of the structural model. In doing so, several goodness-of-fit benchmarks 
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were applied, including Satorra-Bentler Chi-Square, degree of freedom, p-value, 
RMSEA, RMR, GFI, AGFI, and CFI. Overall, it was concluded that most of fit 
indices satisfied the threshold applied. 
In the third part of this chapter, the testing of the hypotheses was presented. 
This suggested that although the relationships of organisational culture and 
organisational performance, and internal corporate governance and organisational 
performance, were in the right direction, these relationships were not significant. The 
hypothesis proposed about the relationship between organisational culture and 
internal corporate governance was in the right direction and significantly confirmed 




Chapter 8: Results, Interpretation and Discussion 
 
8.1 Overview 
Chapter 8 presents the interpretation and analysis of the results of the Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM) described in chapter 7. The research model is analysed 
by examining validity and reliability of constructs, the direct and indirect effect, and 
total effect of organisational culture and internal corporate governance on 
organisational performance. A detailed discussion related to the three hypotheses 
proposed in chapter 3 is presented, followed by a general summary and a description 
of the research implications. 
 
8.2 Model Analysis 
8.2.1 Validity and Reliability of Constructs 
In regard to the organisational culture construct, the study showed that the 
measurement part of this construct is reliable and valid (see section 7.3). Its first-
order construct was dimensional (Kotha, Vadlamani, and Nair 1997), and its second-
order construct satisfied the benchmark applied in this study – as indicated by the 
results of its confirmatory factor analysis. Similarly, the results of the measurement 
part of internal corporate governance satisfied the threshold applied in this research – 
unidimensionality of the first-order construct, and confirmatory factor analysis of the 
second-order construct (see section 7.1). The importance of developing standardised 
instruments for measuring the organisational culture construct has been stressed as 
‘there is a strong need for speculating less and measuring more’ (Hofstede 1986, p. 
256). The requirement of having a valid measurement of internal corporate 
governance is no less important, as this construct was developed to overcome 
‘empirical dogmatism’ in the form of negligence of alternative approaches of 
measurement in the field of corporate governance (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella Jr 
2003). Further, the confirmatory factor analysis applied to this construct provided a 
rigorous and systematic test of the factor structure of this domain (Jöreskog and 
Sörbom 1989). In regard to the organisational performance construct, the 
measurement part indicated that the requirements of validity and reliability all were 
fulfilled. Therefore, the results enhance the utility of organisational culture, internal 
corporate governance and organisational performance instruments by presenting 
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confirmation that these constructs explain and measure the construct of 
organisational culture, internal corporate governance and organisational 
performance.  
 
8.2.2 Direct, Indirect and Total Effect 
The total effect was examined by summing the direct and indirect effect among the 
constructs in the research model. Direct effect between two constructs occurs when a 
single-directed line or a one-way arrow connects them, while indirect effect takes 
place when no single straight line or arrow directly joins them; that is, when the first 
latent variable may be reached from the second latent variable through the path of 
one or more other latent variables (Schumacker and Lomax 1996). In measuring 
direct effect LISREL utilises the structural coefficient, while in counting indirect 
effects it uses the product of the structure coefficients involved (Jöreskog and 
Sörbom 1996; Schumacker and Lomax 1996). The direct, indirect, and total effects 
of the independent construct on the dependent construct in this study were analysed 
from two perspectives, namely the predication of Internal Corporate Governance and 
the predication of Organisational Culture. These were based on the final model (see 
figure 7.5 and table 7.10) and are presented in the following sections. 
 
8.2.2.1 Internal Corporate Governance 
The result of the effect of organisational culture on internal corporate governance is 
reported in table 8.1. The effect was to be considered statistically significant if the t-
value was greater than ± 1.96 at a 5% significance level (greater than ± 1.645 at a 
10% significance level and ± 2.575 at a 1% significance level) (Hair et al. 1998). 
This table shows that organisational culture had a strong direct effect/total effect – 
shown by the structural coefficient – on internal corporate governance (γ=0.874 with 
P<0.001 and t-values=9.390). The structural coefficient of the relationship between 








Table 8.1: Prediction of Internal Corporate Governance 













Organisational Culture 0.874*** - 0.874*** Yes 
Note:*** P<0.001 with t-values of 9.390 
 
8.2.2.2 Organisational Performance 
The results of the effect of organisational culture and internal corporate governance 
on organisational performance are shown in table 8.2. The effect was to be 
considered statistically significant if the t-value was greater than ± 1.96 at a 5% 
significance level (greater than ± 1.645 at a 10% significance level and ± 2.575 at a 
1% significance level) (Hair et al. 1998). This table shows that organisational culture 
had a weak direct effect, indirect effect, and total effect on organisational 
performance (γ=0.019, γ=0.063, and γ=0.082, with P>0.10, P>0.10, and P>0.10, 
respectively). The similar results are shown by t-values (t-values=0.126, t-
values=0.505, and t-values=1.313, respectively). Table 8.2 also shows that internal 
corporate governance had a weak direct effect/total effect on organisational 
performance (β=0.072 with P<0.10 and t-values=0.503). The structural coefficient of 
the relationship between organisational culture and organisational performance is 
symbolised by γ, while the structural coefficient of the relationship between internal 
corporate governance and organisational performance is symbolised with β in SEM. 
The γ represents the relationship between independent constructs, while the β 
signifies the relationship between dependent constructs. 
 












Organisational Culture 0.019# 0.063## 0.082### No 
Internal Corporate 
Governance   
0.072$ - 0.072$ No 
Note: # P>0.10 with t-values of 0.126, ## P>0.10 with t-values of .505, ### P>0.10 




8.3 Interpretation and Discussion of the Results of Data Analysis 
Evidence from chapter 7 showed that overall model fit was satisfactory. However, 
not all proposed hypotheses were supported by the data. Hypothesis testing was 
performed by examining the t-values and standardised structural coefficients (table 
7.12). It was revealed that only H2 was significant. In regard to the remaining 
hypotheses, there was not statistical evidence to conclude the significance of H1 and 
H3.  
 
8.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
The lack of evidence to support H1 indicated that organisational culture is not a 
significant determinant of organisational performance. This is not consistent with the 
findings of previous studies, such as Denison and Mishra (1995), Peters and 
Waterman (1982), Petty et al. (1995), and Wilderom and Van den Berg (2000; 1998). 
However, the tenuous relationship between organisational culture and organisational 
performance was also documented in the study of Lewis (1994), Lim (1995), and 
Chan, Shaffer and Snape (2004), among many others. In particular, Arogyaswamy 
and Byles (1987) have claimed that culture is not always crucial in determining 
performance.  
Given the pace of change confronting companies as a result of the Indonesian 
monetary crises, reformation, privatisation and adjustment to new regulatory regime, 
it appears the current organisational culture practice in Indonesia is unable to help 
companies to respond appropriately to those challenges and perform better. 
Organisational culture needs not only to be maintained (Redmon and Mason 2001), 
but also directed to enable firms to deliver a better performance. Directing 
organisational culture is particularly important if the environment surrounding 
companies is a dynamic one that demands organisational culture’s response to ensure 
not only organisations’ survival but also an organisations’ performance. In directing 
organisational culture to performance, goals and plans of the organisation need to be 
clearly understood by its members. 
 Another possible reason for the insignificant relationship of these constructs 
is time. That is, the impact of organisational culture on organisational performance 
may materialise later in time. This would be in accordance with the studies of 
Denison (1984; 1990) which show the time-dependence of the effects of 
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organisational culture on performance. Here, investment in organisational culture, as 
organisational practices which are visible and audible, requires longer to be 
expressed in better organisational performance. At the beginning, culture requires 
investment, and then at a later stage culture produces returns as no further 
improvements are needed in the dimensions of organisational performance construct. 
A similar conclusion was made by Lim (1995) who noted that there is little 
indication to conclude that there is causal relationship between culture and the short-
term performance of organisations. 
 In addition, the inclusive sampling used in this study can nullify the effect, 
thereby, contributing to the non-significance of the model. Peters and Waterman’s 
(1982) study was also wide-ranging, but they deliberately chose only the excellent 
(high performance) companies, and then studied their cultural traits. This study did 
not make any attempt to follow their approach, and thus treated the respondents from 
‘excellent’ and ‘non-excellent’ companies equally. 
There was also the possibility that the non-significant relationship was due to 
the tenure of respondents. That is, the new managers who attended the educational 
courses and/or training programs may not have had enough exposure in order to 
gauge their organisation’s culture and performance. However, looking at the 
demographic characteristics of the sample – only 2.0 per cent of respondents had had 
tenure less than 1 year – this possibility is unlikely25.  
 
8.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
The strong evidence in support of H2 suggests that organisational culture is a 
determinant of internal corporate governance. This is in accordance with the studies 
of Semenov (2000) and Licht (2001). It must be noted, however, that these 
aforementioned studies were carried out using national culture – for the culture 
variable – and secondary/archival data – for internal corporate governance variables. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no empirical studies test the relationship 
of organisational culture – defined as organisational practices – and internal 
corporate governance – defined as the fulfilment of duties of companies’ governance 
structures. In addition, almost every study of the culture–governance relationship has 
been carried out in developed countries.  
                                                 
25 Similar result was obtained using reduced data – 396 respondents with tenure more than 5 years. 
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Based on the above significant relationship, it is possible to interpret that 
organisational culture is a pillar of the fulfilment of duties of companies’ governance 
structures. That is to say that having organisational practices in place in terms of 
empowerment (autonomy), being outward looking (external orientation), 
coordination of activities (interdepartmental coordination), objective assessment of 
human resource practice (human resource management), and the basic nature of 
human beings to serve others well (improvement orientation) is a requirement for 
company officers – those who enact internal corporate governance – to accomplish 
the duties assigned to them. It is also possible to interpret that organisational culture 
provides members of an organisation, including those who comprise the companies’ 
governance structures or organs, with guidance in fulfilling role expectations, giving 
meaning to daily lives and behaviour (Hofstede et al. 1990; Saffold III 1988; Schein 
1991). This is especially important when companies are shifting strategic direction – 
including the establishment of governance structures in compliance to regulation, and 
the consequences associated with this – where the impact of organisational culture is 
foremost (Schwartz and Davis 1981).  
 
8.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
Contrary to the findings of other corporate governance–organisational performance 
studies (Florackis 2005; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999; Hoskisson, 
Harrison, and Dubofsky 1991; Thomsen and Pedersen 2000),  there was no empirical 
finding in this research to suggest that internal corporate governance is significantly 
associated with organisational performance (H3). However, this research is not alone 
in providing evidence of a non-significant relationship between corporate governance 
and organisational performance. For example, in their study of Australian listed 
companies, Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) revealed no evidence of a significant 
relationship. Similarly, studies carried out in Singapore (Mak and Li 2001) and the 
UK (Faccio and Lasfer 1999) have produced the same results. Two studies 
performed by Bhagat and Black (1999; 2002) using US data have also revealed the 
non-correlation between internal corporate governance and firm performance. 
One possible interpretation is that in Indonesian context, governance 
compliance is superficial, with governance structures established but little activity 
associated with these structures. What companies need is the substance of these 
corporate structures – the fulfilment of duties. In this regard, although Daniri (2005) 
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reported that the number of companies that has established Independent 
Commissioners and Audit Committee is nearly 100 per cent of listed companies in the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX), the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia claimed 
that their duties are rarely executed and proffered this as evidence of very limited 
governance — otherwise company failures would have been solved (SCTV 2007; 
BPK 2007). Thus the raison d’etre of governance structures is questioned – are they 
just for the sake of compliance with regulations or to better govern companies and 
improve performance? In particular in the absence of rigorous evaluation of 
compliance program effectiveness, the speculation that they are more concerned with 
conformance than performance is unavoidable (Parker 2007). Tricker’s (1994) model 
of corporate governance incorporates both compliance and performance roles. In 
Indonesia context, current orientation is focused on compliance roles. Tricker (1994) 
proposes that better organisational performance is linked to skills and strategy 
making – the roles that belong to performance roles of the governance structure. The 
performance roles are expected to be fulfilled once the compliance roles are 
undertaken. It is possible to speculate that internal-institution building – the 
establishment of companies’ corporate governance structures or corporate organs – 
needs time to deliver duties assigned to them. Initially, the appointment of 
companies’ governance structures or corporate organs demands costs and is 
compliance focused, but then at a later stage their fulfilment of duties improves the 
companies’ position, including improvement in organisational performance 
dimensions. In this regard, Leblanc and Gillies (2005) admit that there is time-lag 
between when governance structures act and when company performance responds. 
 In terms of regulations, in Indonesian Company Law 1995, there is neither a 
limitation nor prohibition of individuals from holding multiple board positions 
simultaneously. This may also contribute to underperforming firms. That is, the 
internal corporate governance mechanisms within one company are rarely fully 
fulfilled if the members of the Board of Commissioners and Directors also serve the 
same position in other companies. This is especially the case for the directors, as 
directors are normally full-time employees of the company. In regard to Board of 
Commissioners, the workload is increasing for board members, making more likely 
that individuals who serve many boards simply won’t have enough time to perform 
effectively. They, possibly, will gain valuable experience by becoming member of 
board of other organisations, but a law of diminishing returns might apply, such that 
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being on a number of outside boards could easily have an overall negative impact as 
the time demands outweigh the learning opportunities (Lawler III and Finegold 
2005). 
In regard to Independent Commisioners, there is a possibility that these 
appointed Commissioners are ignorant of the operation of the company. Their 
ignorance may result from the fact that their appointment was not based on expertise, 
but rather on other considerations, such as politics or government connections. The 
independence of Independent Commissioners in Indonesian companies was also 
questioned by Tabalujan (2002). The Code for Good Corporate Governance 
stipulates that at least 20 per cent of commissioners must be independent of the 
directors and controlling shareholders and must hold no interest which may impair 
their ability to perform duties impartially. However, as the adoption of this code is 
not yet mandatory, the query of Tabalujan may be justified. Further, while a 
commissioner may be viewed and classified as independent, he or she may not 
behave independently (Leblanc and Gillies 2005) as independence may be more a 
‘state of mind’ (Leblanc 2004) than a definable function. 
Further, Lawler III and Finegold (2005) revealed that the overlapping nature 
and long tenure of board of commissioners contribute to the non-independence of the 
board. They stated that when the same people sit on each others’ boards, they may 
lose objectivity and independence; and when people remain in a board for a long 
time, they can become too close to senior management and lose their objectivity. In 
essence, they may become too comfortable with the status quo. 
Another possible explanantion of a weak relationship between internal 
corporate governance and organisational performance constructs is that the various 
roles or duties of the board of commissioners are in conflict. In this regard, Herman 
(1981) and Brennan (2006) claimed that in exercising the roles of monitoring 
performance and controlling operations of the firm, the board could help company 
perform better, but these could also impose constraints on managers’ freedom to 
generate shareholder value. 
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8.4 Result Summary and Implications 
The following findings resulted from the study of the impact of organisational 
culture and internal corporate governance on organisational performance in 
Indonesian companies: 
a. Organisational culture defined as organisational practices has a positive but 
insignificant relationship with organisational performance.  
b. Organisational culture defined as organisational practices has a positive and 
significant relationship with internal corporate governance.  
c. Internal corporate governance defined as the fulfilment of the duties of 
companies’ governance structures or organs, and the reinforcement of codes 
of conduct, has a positive but insignificant relationship with organisational 
performance.  
 
This research has produced a valid and reliable measure of organisational 
culture, internal corporate governance and organisation performance. Researchers 
can utilise these constructs with confidence. This is especially significant as internal 
corporate governance is a new construct in the field of corporate governance studies.  
 The result of the hypotheses testing suggests that successful fulfilment of 
duties of internal corporate governance structures directly links with the existence of 
organisational culture. Of particular importance in the findings is that the existence 
of organisational culture and internal corporate governance can not in and of 
themselves produces significant performance improvements. Accordingly, 
organisations need to not only establish the organisational practices but also unite 
and direct these practices toward better organisational performance. Organisations 
facing substantial environmental changes need direction to soften the force of 
challenges and to help them make sense of how best to confront these changes.  
Organisations also need to recognise that the form of internal corporate 
governance – as shown by the establishment of governance structures – is not enough 
to increase organisational performance. More important is the accomplishment of the 
duties assigned to these governance structures.  If better organisational performance 
is to take place, adoption of the regulations to have internal corporate governance in 
place should be accompanied by the performance of duties by those selected to enact 
the governance measures. For example, do the existence of companies’ boards of 
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commissioners and independent commissioners merely act as ‘rubber stamps’ of 
boards of directors’ decisions? Is it true that the independent commissioners are 
making decisions independently, and for the benefit of companies’ performance? Is it 
true the boards of commissioners are supervising the boards of directors effectively, 
and for the benefit of general stockholders and stakeholders? Similar questions can 
be raised and directed to other governance structures or organs, such as audit 
committees, internal control groups, boards of directors, and codes of conduct. 
Similar questions have been raised in the latest report of the Audit Board of the 


























Chapter 9: Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
9.1 Summary of Research 
The research examined firm managers’ and executives’ perception of the impact of 
organisational culture and internal corporate governance on organisational 
performance. The research – carried out in Indonesia – was motivated by the slow 
progress in improving organisational performance following the economic crisis in 
this country from 1997 to 1998.  
 Instead of relying on secondary data of annual reports of Indonesian 
companies which has been subject to debate in term of its validity and reliability, this 
study researched the perception of managers and executives via a questionnaire. A 
research model was developed that linked organisational culture, internal corporate 
governance and organisatonal performance. The constructs and research instruments 
were developed from the literature and interviews which were tested in a two stage 
pilot study. The final instruments were sent to 1,000 respondents in four cities – 
Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya and Yogyakarta. Results were analysed in two stages, 
namely Factor Analysis and structural equation modelling (SEM).  
 The results of this research indicated that, in the Indonesian context, 
organisational culture is not a strong determinant of organisational performance. 
Organisational culture, however, is a statistically significant determinant of internal 
corporate governance. Lastly, internal corporate governance does not significantly 
impact on organisational performance. 
 
9.2 Significance of the Research Results  
The research tested three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 examined the impact of 
organisational culture on organisational performance. It found that organisational 
culture is positively, though not statistically significant, linked to performance. 
Hypothesis 2 examined the impact of organisational culture on internal corporate 
governance. The result indicated that organisational culture does significantly impact 
on internal corporate governance. Hypothesis 3 examined the impact of internal 
corporate governance on organisational performance. It suggested that internal 
corporate governance is positively, though not statistically significant, related to 
organisational performance. 
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 The lack of evidence to support H1 indicated that in the Indonesian context 
current organisational culture was unable to help companies to respond appropriately 
to changes resulted from monetary crises, privatisation and adjustment to new 
regulatory regime and to perform better. Organisational culture needs to be directed 
to enable firms to deliver a better performance. In doing so, goals and plans of the 
organisation need to be clearly understood by its members. 
 The strong evidence to support to H2 suggested that organisational culture 
was a significant determinant of the duties of companies’s governance structures 
being fulfilled. In the context of companies shifting strategic direction such as the 
establishment of governance structures to comply with regulations and the 
consequences associated with them, organisational culture provides members of 
organisations with guidance in fulfilling their duties that are assigned to them.  
 The lack of evidence to support H3 indicated that the orientation of internal 
corporate governance in the Indonesian context was not on performance roles, but 
rather on compliance roles. The establishment of internal corporate governance 
structures (conformance roles) should be accompanied by the performance roles by 
those selected to enact the governance measure if better organisational performance 
is to take place. 
 Another important contribution of this research was the development of valid 
and reliable second-order constructs of organisational culture and internal corporate 
governance. Firstly, in regard to the organisational culture construct, prior studies 
have loosely designed this as a first-order construct (Marcoulides and Heck 1993), 
and as a result have captured the complex phenomenon of culture only in a limited 
sense (Gordon and DiTomaso 1992; Kotter and Heskett 1992; O'Reilly and Chatman 
1996). They have also specifically measured organisational culture in developed 
nations (Wilderom and Van den Berg 1998; Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski 2000; 
Van den Berg and Wilderom 2004). This study proposed a new second-order 
construct of organisational culture in Indonesia, which is statistically valid and 
reliable. Secondly, the second-order internal corporate governance construct was a 
new concept, developed from the literature review and adjusted to the research 
context through a series of interviews and pilot studies. None of the previous studies 
have developed this construct empirically and tested its significance.  
 Other significant contributions are related to the incorporation of 
organisational culture into the study of internal corporate governance, and the 
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inclusion of internal corporate governance in organisational performance research, 
both of which have not been investigated previously. Many studies of internal 
corporate governance have been dominated by secondary or archival data, while this 
study employed primary data which sought to overcome the absence of reliable, 
transparent, and accountable companies’ reports (Nasution 2003). Further, prior 
corporate governance research tends to treat governance structures or company 
organs as a single variable (e.g. a board size, a representation of outside directors, an 
independency of governance structures, an establishment of committees) (Brennan 
2006), while this study proposed six first-order constructs to capture the 
contributions of different governance structure within organisations.  
The utilisation of structural equation modelling (SEM) analysis further 
contributes to the research in this field, as much previous research has been executed 
using the first generation of statistical tools, such as regression, path analysis, and 
factor analysis. SEM is able to test both measurement and the structural relationship 
simultaneously. 
 Finally, by referring to the indicators that were developed, organisations are 
provided with a checklist of the important variables in the research in this area. 
Further, providing there were valid and reliable measures of constructs, these 
indicators could help organisations that are planning to assess the practice of 
organisational culture, and to evaluate the implementation of duties assigned to 
companies’ governance structures in their effort to improve organisational 
performance.  
 
9.3 Limitations of the Research  
No research study is without limitation. This study is no exception. The first 
limitation is related to the construct of internal corporate governance. The concept of 
internal corporate governance is relatively new to organisations in Indonesia. Media 
publications on this topic only began following the economic crises in 1997-1998. It 
is possible that respondents may not have had enough exposure in order to gauge this 
topic, even though they had had long tenure in their organisations (only 2.0 per cent 
of respondents had had tenure less than 1 year).  
The second limitation is related to the cross-sectional nature of the study. 
This snapshot study suffers from potential development of the linkage of 
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organisational culture, internal corporate governance and organisational performance 
over time. For example the extent to which the concept of internal corporate 
governance has been embrace over time by managers can not be revealed. The 
similar concern is raised in regard to other constructs. 
The third limitation is related to potential self-report, due to the use of single 
source respondents. Efforts were taken to remedy this biases by applying the 
procedural remedies proposed by Podsakoff et al. (2003). 
The fourth limitation is related to the narrow demographic scope of the study. 
Indonesia is a developing country which practiced different organisational culture 
and applied different system of corporate governance compared to the rest of the 
world. The results of the study may not be representative of the broader developing 
countries in the world. 
     
9.4 Future Research Direction 
In pursuing an answer to the impact of organisational culture and internal corporate 
governance on organisational performance, the study developed a model and 
instruments to measure the constructs utilised in this research. In the future, research 
may look at the longitudinal view of the relationship of the constructs in the research 
model. Such an approach would provide fresh evidence about the above 
relationships, and also reveal the extent to which the new concept of internal 
corporate governance has been embraced by corporate officers over time. Further, 
this would also give Indonesian regulatory bodies evidence about their efforts to 
socialise the practice of good corporate governance among companies’ managers and 
executives in Indonesia. 
 Another prospect of examining this research topic in the future lies in the 
context of comparing the successful and unsuccessful companies. The current 
research does not make any effort to differentiate the sample; thus it does not provide 
evidence of how internal corporate governance and organisational culture are 
practiced in good and poor-performing companies. Therefore, it would be possible to 
make a comparison between the two groups using a similar model in future research 
on this topic, to identify the best practice.  
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 Finally, the results of this study were gathered from Indonesian companies. 
The validity of generalising the results to other non-western styles of corporate 
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Appendix 1: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
 
1. To date there are many discussions in regard to internal corporate 
governance. As a manager or executive or commissioner of the company/an 
expert or a researcher of this topic, what does come up in your mind when 
you hear the term internal corporate governance? 
2. Could you explain in details about this, please? 
3. Are there any particular characteristics that can differentiate well-governed 
firm with those of bad-governed firm? Please explain. 
4. How do you measure these characteristics? 
5. Could you provide examples–according to your evaluation–that the board of 
commissioners has performed a proper act? 
6. Could you give examples–according to your evaluation–that the board of 
commissioners has performed an improper act? 
7. Could you provide examples–according to your evaluation–that the board of 
directors has performed a proper act? 
8. Could you give examples–according to your evaluation–that the board of 
directors has performed an improper act? 
9. Could you provide examples–according to your evaluation–that the internal 
control group has performed a proper act? 
10. Could you give examples–according to your evaluation–that the internal 
control group has performed an improper act? 
11. With corporate governance in place within organisation, what impacts would 
emerge? 




Appendix 2: Questionaire in English 
No: 
   
Dear Participant, 
 
This questionnaire is designed to study aspects of organisational culture, internal 
corporate governance and performance at a company. The information you provide 
will help me better understand the way organisation is run. Because you are the one 
who can give me a correct picture of how organisation is performing, I request you 
to respond to the question frankly and honestly. 
 
Your response will be kept strictly confidential. No one other than me will have 
access to the information you give. In order to ensure the utmost privacy, I have 
provided an identification number for each participant. This number will be used for 
follow-up procedure only. The numbers, names, and questionnaire will not be made 
available to anyone other than me. 
 
A summary of the result will be mailed to you upon your request after the data are 
analysed.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. I greatly appreciate your 









Address for Correspondence: 
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11/77 Leonard Street      Timoho Asri IV/ B 5 C 
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• There is no right or wrong answer. Therefore, please answer the questions 
to the best of your knowledge by giving a circle to the most appropriate 
number provided. 
• The example of how to answer the questionnaire: 
 Strongly                                              Strongly 
Disagree                                             Agree 
The sky is blue 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
With the following scale: 










Therefore, by giving a circle to number 5, you would be saying that you 
agree with the given statement. 
 
DEFINITION 
For the purpose of this study, the following definition will be used: 
• Organisational Culture: Particular ways of conducting organisational 
functions that have evolved over time under the influence of an 
organisation’s history, people, interests, and actions and that have become 
institutionalised in the organisation (Wilderom and Van den Berg 2000). 
• Internal Corporate Governance: The specific mechanisms and actions 
taken by individual firms to enforce control and accountability which are 
centred on board commissioners, independent commissioners, audit 
committee, board of directors (executive management), internal control 
group, within which their activities are reinforced by codes of conduct that 
intended to promote proper behaviour.  
• Perceived Performance: The degree of improvement needed by the 
organisation in the following dimensions: efficiency, customer satisfaction, 
managerial behavior, professional behavior, service quality, contact with 










SECTION 1: ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
 
Subsection 1.1: Autonomy 
These statements below are associated with the degree to which employees have 
decision latitude in their jobs. Please express your opinion on each statement by 
giving a circle to the most appropriate number provided. 
 
To what extent does the following occur in your organisation? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
There is room for non-managerial employees to make 
their own decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is freedom for employees to depart from rules 1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is freedom for employees to implement decisions 
according to their own views 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Employees influence important decisions concerning work 1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is freedom for employees to plan their own work 1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is an opportunity for employees to bring forward 
ideas before decisions are made 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Subsection I.2: External Orientation 
These statements below are associated with the degree to which employees see the 
practice of the relationship between organisation and its environments. Please 
express your opinion on each statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate 
number provided. 
 
To what extent does the following occur in your organisation? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
There is a quick reaction to developments in the market 1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is an investigation of the wishes and needs of 
customers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is active canvassing of new customers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Company is working to improve the local market position 1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is a thorough training of employees in 
systematically gathering information on what customers 
want to see improved 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





Subsection 1.3: Inter-departmental Coordination 
These statements below are associated with the degree to which employees see the 
practice of the relationship between their department and other department within 
organisation. Please express your opinion on each statement by giving a circle to 
the most appropriate number provided. 
 
To what extent does the following occur in your organisation? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
There is useful cooperation between departments 1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is exchange of useful information between 
departments 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Departments support one another in the resolution of 
problems 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is mutual communication between heads of 
departments 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Working with someone from another part of this 
organisation is like working with someone from a different 
organisation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Work is organised so that each person can see the 
relationship between his or her job and the goals of the 
organisation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cooperation across different parts of the organisation is 
actively encouraged 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Subsection 1.4: Human Resource Management 
These statements below are associated with the degree to which employees see the 
practice of human resource management in their company. Please express your 
opinion on each statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate number 
provided. 
 
To what extent does the following occur in your organisation? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
Performance appraisals are taken seriously 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Employees obtain useful information about their 
functioning 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
There is careful selection of new personnel 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Job competency is the only criterion in hiring people 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Employees are told when a good job is done 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Managers help good people to advance 1 2 3 4 5 6 





Subsection 1.5: Improvement Orientation 
These statements below are associated with the degree to which employees see the 
practice of the improvement orientation within their organisation. Please express 
your opinion on each statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate number 
provided. 
 
To what extent does the following occur in your organisation? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
Employees closely monitor their own way of working 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Employees search for possibilities to improve the 
organisation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
There are initiatives taken by employees to improve the 
way in which the work is done 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
New and improved ways to do work are continually 
adopted 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Employees try to be pioneers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
People put in maximal effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Think three years or more ahead 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
2. INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1: Duties of Board of Commissioners 
These statements below associate with the degree to which employees see the 
fulfilment of the duties of board of commissioners in their company. Please express 
your opinion on each statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate number 
provided. 
Note of abbreviation: 
BOC: Board of Commissioners   BOD: Board of Directors 
 
To what extent do you see the following duty is fulfilled by Board of Commissioners 
(BOC)? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
BOC supervises the actions of BOD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOC gives advice to BOD when required 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOC ensures that BOD complies with Articles of 
Association 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOC ensures that BOD complies with regulations having 
the force of law 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOC draws-up minutes of each BOC meeting 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOC ensures that BOD reads minutes from each BOC 
meeting 




BOC creates an ethical environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOC ensures that BOD protects the interests of 
shareholders 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOC ensures that BOD protects the interests of 
stakeholders 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOC ensures that BOD applies a transparent system for 
the recruitment of executives other than members of  the 
BOD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOC establishes certain committees as needed (e.g. 
audit, compensation, nomination, remuneration, risk, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
2.2: Duties of Independent Commissioners 
These statements below associate with the degree to which employees see the 
fulfilment of the duties of independent commissioners in their company. Please 
express your opinion on each statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate 
number provided. 
 
Note of abbreviation: 
IC: Independent Commissioners 
 
To what extent do you see the following duty is fulfilled by Independent 
Commissioners (IC)? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
IC ensures that BOD defines business strategy of the 
company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
IC ensures that company hires professional managers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
IC ensures that company establishes communication 
reporting link 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
IC ensures that company establishes control system 1 2 3 4 5 6 
IC ensures that company establishes audit system 1 2 3 4 5 6 
IC ensures that company complies with regulations 1 2 3 4 5 6 
IC ensures that company manages risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 
IC ensures that company provides transparent financial 
reporting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
IC ensures that company treats minority shareholders 
fairly and honestly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
IC ensures that company discloses transactions that have 
conflicting interests 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





2.3: Duties of Audit Committee (AC) 
These statements below associate with the degree to which employees see the 
fulfilment of the duties of audit committee in their company. Please express your 
opinion on each statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate number 
provided. 
 
Note of abbreviation: 
AC: Audit Committee 
 
To what extent do you see the following duty is fulfilled by Audit Committee (AC)? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
AC oversees financial reports, ensuring they follow the 
Indonesian Accounting standard 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC monitors the external auditor’s audit of financial report  1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC monitors the process of managing risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC ensures that the report of internal auditor considers 
risk management 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC ensures that BOD complies with recommendations 
relating to risk management 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC creates disciplines and control which lessen the 
possibility the company being jeopardised 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC empowers internal audit 1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC promotes adequate structures of internal control 1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC improves the quality of financial disclosure and 
reporting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC reviews the scope, accuracy, and cost-effectiveness 
of external audit 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC reviews the independence and objectivity of external 
auditor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
AC acts as communication channel between external 
auditors and BOC 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





2.4: Duties of Board of Directors 
These statements below associate with the degree to which employees see the 
fulfilment of the duties of board of directors in their company. Please express your 
opinion on each statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate number 
provided. 
 
To what extent do you see the following duty is fulfilled by Board of Directors 
(BOD)? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
BOD defines strategy of the company 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD manages the implementation of strategy of the 
company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD protects the interests of shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD protects the interests of stakeholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD complies with the Articles of Association of the 
Company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD complies with regulations having the force of law 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD creates an ethical environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD creates a proper human resource management 
function 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD enforces codes of conduct 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD establishes internal control systems to safeguard 
company assets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD draws-up minutes for each BOD meeting 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD ensures that BOC reads minutes of BOD meetings 1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD advises the audit committee when to seek a second 
opinion on an accounting issue 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD ensures that BOC has access to information about 
the company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD provides shareholders with full and accurate 
information about the company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD communicates with internal parties on items of 
corporate importance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
BOD ensures transparency in the financial framework of 
the company 





2.5: Duties of Internal Control Groups 
These statements below associate with the degree to which employees see the 
fulfilment of the duties of internal control groups in their company. Please express 
your opinion on each statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate number 
provided. 
 
Note of abbreviation: 
ICG: Internal Control Group 
 
To what extent do you see the following duty is fulfilled by Internal Control Group 
(ICG)? 
 
 Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
ICG creates policies to secure the assets of the company 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ICG creates policies to increase the operational efficiency 
and effectiveness of the company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
ICG develops the reliability and the comprehensiveness of 
accounting/financial information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
ICG ensures compliance with applicable policies and 
regulatory requirements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
ICG ensures substantive audit findings are elevated and 
resolved 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
2.6: Codes of Conduct 
These statements below associate with the degree to which employees see the 
implementation of codes of conduct in their company. Please express your opinion 
on each statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate number provided. 
 
To what extent do you see the following statement is fulfilled by your company? 
 
My company has codes of conduct which 
 
Strongly                    Strongly  
Disagree                   Agree      
… create an environment where conflicts of interest are 
avoided or eliminated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… create an environment where people do not engage in 
insider trading for the benefit of individual interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… make certain that no one engages in corrupt practices 1 2 3 4 5 6 
… make certain that no one engages in activities that 
jeopardise the company’s reputation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… treat all stakeholders fairly and honestly 1 2 3 4 5 6 
… develop mechanisms where violations of company 
policy can be reported without fear of retribution 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… create an environment in which the decisions of 
company’s organs are obeyed 





SECTION 3: ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
These statements below are associated with the degree to which employees see the 
improvement is needed in their company. Please express your opinion on each 
statement by giving a circle to the most appropriate number provided with the 
following scale: 
 









In your opinion, to what degree does your organisation need to improve on the 
following performance criteria? 
 
 Very                                       Very   
Little                                      Much    
Efficiency 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Customer satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Managerial behaviour 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Professional behaviour 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Service quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Contact with clients 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Position on the market 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Reputation 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SECTION 4: DEMOGRAPHIC AND FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
 
To help classify your answer, we would like to ask you few demographic questions. 
Again, your answer will be kept in strict confidence. 
 
Gender    Female     Male 
 
How old are you: 
 Below 30 years old 
 Between 30 to 40 years old 
 Between 40+ to 50 years old 
 Between 50+ to 60 years old 
 Above 60 years old 
 
How long have you been in this company? 
 Less than 1 year 
 Between 1 to 5 year 
 Between 5+ to 10 year 
 Between 10+ to 15 year 
 Between 15+ to 20 year 




Where do you spend your childhood (up to 10 years old)? Please, write the city and 
nation 
City: …………………………….….           Nation: ………………………………. 
 
How many hierarchical layers above your current position to top? ___________ 
 
How many hierarchical layers below your current position to the lowest position? 
_________ 
 
What type of business your company is in? 
  Service Business     Manufacturing Business 
 
What type of ownership your company is classified? 
  Private Business     Public/SOE Business 
 
What department are you in? 
 Finance/Accounting    
 Marketing 
 Production/Operation 









REQUEST FOR THE RESULT OF THIS STUDY 
 
Do you want me to share the result of this study?   Yes    No 
 
If yes, please provide your contact details: 
 
Name of respondent:  ___________________________________________ 
Name of company:  ___________________________________________ 
Mailing address:  ___________________________________________ 
    ___________________________________________ 
    ___________________________________________ 
    Post Code: _____________________________  
E-mail:    ___________________________________________ 
Phone:    ___________________________________________ 
Fax:    ___________________________________________ 
 
Delivery preference: 
(please thick (√) in    Print out (post mail)  File (e-mail) 












Peserta yang terhormat, 
 
Daftar pertanyaan berikut ini disusun untuk mempelajari aspek budaya 
organisasi, tata kelola internal korporat dan kinerja pada perusahaan. Informasi 
yang anda berikan akan membantu saya memahami dengan lebih baik bagaimana 
organisasi dijalankan. Dikarenakan anda adalah seorang yang mampu memberi 
saya gambaran yang benar tentang bagaimana penyelenggaraan organisasi, maka 
saya memohon anda menanggapi pertanyaan dengan jujur dan terus terang. 
Jawaban anda akan sepenuhnya dirahasiakan. Tidak seorang pun kecuali 
saya akan memiliki akses terhadap informasi yang anda berikan. Supaya 
kerahasiaan dapat dijamin sepenuhnya, nomer identifikasi disediakan untuk setiap 
peserta. Nomer ini hanya akan digunakan untuk tindakan lanjutan. Nomer, nama 
dan kuesioner tidak akan dilihat oleh orang lain selain saya. 
Jika anda perlukan, ringkasan hasil akan dikirimkan kepada anda setelah 
data dianalisis. 
Terimakasih banyak atas waktu dan kerjasama anda. Saya sangat 








Alamat untuk Korespondensi 
Di Australia:      Di Indonesia: 
11/77 Leonard Street      Timoho Asri IV/ B 5 C 
Victoria Park WA 6100    Yogyakarta 55165 
Australia      Indonesia 
Telp: 61 08 94726860    Telp: 62 274 514989 





• Tidak ada jawaban yang salah atau benar. Oleh karena itu, mohon menjawab 
pertanyaan sesuai pengetahuan anda dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban 
yang paling sesuai. 
• Contoh cara menjawab daftar pertanyaan: 
 Sangat                                                  Sangat 
Tidak Setuju                                          Setuju       
Langit adalah biru  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Dengan skala sebagai berikut: 














Maka, dengan melingkari nomer 5, berarti anda menyatakan setuju pada 




Untuk keperluan studi ini, definisi berikut ini akan digunakan: 
 
• Budaya Organisasi: Cara tertentu untuk menjalankan fungsi organisasi yang 
telah dikembangkan dalam waktu yang panjang oleh sejarah, orang, 
kepentingan dan kegiatan organisasi, dan yang telah menjadi kebiasaan 
dalam organisasi itu (Wilderom and Van den Berg 2000). 
• Tata Kelola Internal Korporat: Mekanisme dan kegiatan khusus yang 
dilakukan perusahaan secara individual untuk memperkuat pengendalian dan 
akuntabilitas (pertanggungjawaban)  yang berpusat pada dewan komisaris, 
komisaris independen, komite audit, dewan direksi, satuan pengawasan 
internal, yang dalam menjalankan aktifitas-aktifitasnya mereka ini diperkuat 
dengan Pedoman Perilaku yang bertujuan memajukan perilaku yang pantas. 
• Persepsi atas Kinerja: Tingkat perbaikan yang diperlukan perusahaan pada 
dimensi berikut: efisiensi, kepuasan konsumen, perilaku manajerial, perilaku 
profesional, kualitas pelayanan, hubungan dengan pelanggan, posisi di pasar, 




BAGIAN 1: BUDAYA ORGANISASI 
 
Sub Bagian 1.1: Otonomi 
Pernyataan dibawah ini berhubungan dengan tingkat kebebasan karyawan dalam 
membuat keputusan di pekerjaannya. Silakan memberikan opini dengan cara 
melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat. 
Sejauh mana hal berikut ini berlangsung di organisasi anda?  
 
 Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
Ada ruang bagi karyawan non-manajerial untuk membuat 
keputusan sendiri 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Untuk kepentingan perusahaan pada saat yang 
diperlukan, karyawan diperbolehkan untuk tidak mengikuti 
peraturan secara ketat 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ada kebebasan bagi karyawan untuk 
mengimplementasikan keputusan berdasarkan 
pandangan mereka 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Karyawan mempengaruhi keputusan penting yang 
berhubungan dengan pekerjaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ada kebebasan bagi karyawan untuk merencanakan 
pekerjaan mereka sendiri 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ada kesempatan bagi karyawan untuk mengemukakan 
ide-ide sebelum keputusan diambil 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Sub Bagian I.2: Orientasi Eksternal 
Pernyataan di bawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan melihat 
praktik hubungan antara organisasi dengan lingkungannya. Silakan memberikan 
opini dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat. 
Sejauh mana hal berikut ini berlangsung di organisasi anda?  
 
 Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
Ada reaksi yang cepat terhadap perkembangan yang 
terjadi pasar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ada penelitian tentang keinginan dan kebutuhan 
pelanggan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Pelanggan baru dicari secara aktif 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Perusahaan bekerja untuk memperbaiki posisi pasar  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ada pelatihan sungguh-sungguh bagi karyawan tentang 
cara mengumpulkan informasi secara sistematis 
mengenai apa yang diinginkan pelanggan untuk 
diperbaiki 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





Sub Bagian I.3: Koordinasi antar Departemen 
Pernyataan di bawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan melihat 
praktik hubungan antara departemennya dengan departemen lain dalam satu 
organisasi. Silakan memberikan opini dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang 
dianggap paling tepat. 
Sejauh mana hal berikut ini berlangsung di organisasi anda?  
 
 Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
Ada kerjasama yang bermanfaat antar departemen 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ada pertukaran informasi yang bermanfaat antar 
departemen 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Departemen-departemen saling membantu dalam 
menyelesaikan masalah 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Kepala departemen saling berkomunikasi satu sama lain 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bekerja dengan seseorang dari bagian lain perusahaan 
ini, seperti bekerja dengan seseorang dari perusahaan 
lain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Pekerjaan diatur supaya setiap orang dapat melihat 
hubungan antara pekerjaannya dan tujuan-tujuan 
perusahaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Kerjasama antara bagian perusahaan yang berbeda 
dianjurkan secara aktif 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Sub Bagian I.4: Manajemen Sumberdaya Manusia 
Pernyataan di bawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan melihat 
praktik manajemen sumberdaya manusia di perusahaannya. Silakan memberikan 
opini dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat. 
Sejauh mana hal berikut ini berlangsung di organisasi anda?  
 
 Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
Penilaian kinerja dilakukan secara sungguh-sungguh 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Karyawan memperoleh informasi yang berguna mengenai 
fungsinya dalam perusahaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Karyawan baru diseleksi dengan hati-hati 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Kompetensi melaksanakan pekerjaan adalah satu-
satunya kriteria dalam merekrut karyawan baru 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Karyawan diberitahu jika pekerjaan mereka baik 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Manajer membantu karyawan yang baik untuk maju 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Tidak banyak perhatian tentang masalah pribadi 
karyawan 





Sub Bagian I.5: Orientasi Perbaikan 
Pernyataan di bawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan melihat 
praktik orientasi perbaikan di perusahaannya. Silakan memberikan opini dengan 
cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat. 
Sejauh mana hal berikut ini berlangsung di organisasi anda?  
 
 Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
Karyawan memeriksa dengan teliti cara bekerja mereka 
sendiri 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Karyawan mencari kemungkinan-kemungkinan untuk 
memperbaiki organisasi 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Karyawan mengambil inisiatif untuk memperbaiki cara 
kerja 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cara bekerja yang baru dan yang lebih baik selalu diambil 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Karyawan berusaha menjadi pelopor 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Orang berusaha bekerja semaksimal mungkin 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Berpikir tiga tahun ke depan atau lebih 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
BAGIAN 2: TATA KELOLA INTERNAL KORPORAT 
 
Sub Bagian 2.1: Tugas Dewan Komisaris 
Pernyataan dibawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan melihat 
pemenuhan tugas dewan komisaris di perusahaannya. Silakan memberikan opini 
dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat. 
Sejauh mana anda melihat tugas-tugas berikut dipenuhi oleh Dewan Komisaris 
(DK)? 
 
Catatan singkatan istilah: 
DK: Dewan Komisaris DD: Dewan Direksi 
Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
DK mengawasi tindakan DD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK memberikan nasehat kepada DD ketika diperlukan 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK memastikan bahwa DD patuh terhadap akta pendirian 
perusahaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK memastikan bahwa DD patuh terhadap peraturan 
yang memiliki kekuatan hukum 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK membuat laporan rapat untuk setiap rapat DK 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK memastikan bahwa DD menerima salinan laporan 
rapat DK 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK menciptakan lingkungan yang etis 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK memastikan bahwa DD melindungi kepentingan 
pemegang saham 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK memastikan bahwa DD melindungi kepentingan 
pemangku kepentingan/stakeholders 




DK memastikan bahwa DD menerapkan sistem yang 
transparan untuk merekrut eksekutif selain dari anggota 
DD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK membentuk komite tertentu jika diperlukan (contoh: 
komite audit, kompensasi, nominasi, renumerasi, risiko 
dan lainnya) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Sub Bagian 2.2: Tugas Komisaris Independen 
Pernyataan dibawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan melihat 
pemenuhan tugas komisaris independen di perusahaannya. Silakan memberikan 
opini dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat. 
 
Sejauh mana anda melihat tugas-tugas berikut dipenuhi oleh Komisaris Independen 
(KI)? 
 
Catatan singkatan istilah 
KI: Komisaris Independen 
DD:     Dewan Direksi 
Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
KI memastikan bahwa DD menetapkan strategi bisnis 
perusahaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KI memastikan bahwa perusahaan memperkerjakan 
manajer yang profesional 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KI memastikan bahwa perusahaan membentuk jalur 
laporan komunikasi 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KI memastikan bahwa perusahaan membentuk sistem 
pengawasan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KI memastikan bahwa perusahaan membentuk sistem 
audit 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KI memastikan bahwa perusahaan mematuhi hukum dan 
perundangan yang berlaku 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KI memastikan bahwa perusahaan mengelola risiko 1 2 3 4 5 6 
KI memastikan bahwa perusahaan menyediakan laporan 
keuangan yang transparan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KI memastikan bahwa perusahaan memperlakukan 
pemegang saham minoritas dengan adil dan jujur 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KI memastikan bahwa perusahaan mengungkapkan 
transaksi yang memiliki benturan kepentingan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





Sub Bagian 2.3: Tugas Komite Audit 
Pernyataan dibawah ini berhubungan dengan tingkat  sejauh mana karyawan 
melihat pemenuhan tugas komite audit di perusahaannya. Silakan memberikan 
opini dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat. 
Sejauh mana anda melihat tugas-tugas berikut dipenuhi oleh Komite Audit (KA)? 
 
Catatan singkatan istilah: 
KA: Komite Audit 
DD:     Dewan Direksi 
DK:     Dewan Komisaris 
Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
KA memastikan bahwa laporan keuangan sesuai standar 
akuntansi Indonesia 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA mengawasi audit laporan keuangan yang dilakukan 
oleh auditor eksternal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA mengawasi proses pengelolaan risiko 1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA memastikan bahwa laporan auditor internal 
mempertimbangkan manajemen risiko 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA memastikan bahwa DD mematuhi rekomendasi yang 
berkaitan dengan manajemen risiko 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA menciptakan iklim disiplin dan kontrol yang akan 
mengurangi kemungkinan penyelewengan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA memberdayakan audit internal 1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA memajukan struktur yang memadai untuk 
pengawasan  internal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA memperbaiki kualitas pengungkapan dan pelaporan 
keuangan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA meninjau ulang jangkauan, keakuratan, dan efektifitas 
biaya audit eksternal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA meninjau ulang independensi dan objektifitas  auditor 
eksternal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
KA berperan sebagai saluran komunikasi antara auditor 
eksternal dan DK 
1 2 3 4 5 6 






Sub Bagian 2.4: Tugas Dewan Direksi 
Pernyataan dibawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan melihat 
pemenuhan tugas-tugas dewan direksi di perusahaannya. Silakan memberikan 
opini dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat. 
Sejauh mana anda melihat tugas-tugas berikut dipenuhi oleh Dewan Direksi (DD)? 
 
Catatan singkatan istilah: 
DD: Dewan Direksi  
DK:     Dewan Komisaris 
Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
DD menetapkan strategi perusahaan 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD mengelola implementasi strategi perusahaan 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD melindungi kepentingan pemegang saham 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD melindungi kepentingan pemangku 
kepentingan/stakeholder 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD mematuhi akta pendirian perusahaan 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD mematuhi peraturan yang memiliki kekuatan hukum 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD menciptakan lingkungan yang etis 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD menciptakan fungsi sumber daya manusia yang 
memadai 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD melaksanakan Pedoman Perilaku 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD membentuk sistem pengawasan internal untuk 
melindungi aktiva perusahaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD membuat laporan rapat untuk setiap rapat DD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD memastikan bahwa DK menerima salinan laporan 
rapat DD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD memberi masukan komite audit manakala mencari 
opini kedua yang berkaitan dengan isu akuntansi 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD memastikan bahwa DK mempunyai akses terhadap 
informasi perusahaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD menyediakan informasi yang lengkap dan akurat 
tentang perusahaan kepada pemilik saham 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD berkomunikasi dengan pihak internal tentang hal-hal 
yang penting untuk perusahaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
DD memastikan adanya transparansi dalam kerangka 
keuangan perusahaan 





Sub Bagian 2.5: Tugas Satuan Pengawasan Internal 
Pernyataan dibawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan melihat 
pemenuhan tugas satuan pengawasan internal di perusahaannya. Silakan 
memberikan opini dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling 
tepat. 
Sejauh mana anda melihat tugas berikut dipenuhi oleh Satuan Pengawas Internal 
(SPI)? 
 
Catatan singkatan istilah: 
SPI: Satuan Pengawasan  Internal 
Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju     
SPI menciptakan kebijaksanaan untuk melindungi aktiva 
perusahaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
SPI menciptakan kebijaksanaan untuk meningkatkan 
efisiensi dan efektifitas operasional perusahaan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
SPI mengembangkan keandalan dan kelengkapan 
informasi akuntansi/keuangan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
SPI memastikan kepatuhan perusahaan terhadap 
persyaratan kebijakan dan peraturan yang berlaku 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
SPI memastikan temuan audit yang substantip diangkat 
dan dipecahkan 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Sub Bagian 2.6: Pedoman Perilaku 
Pernyataan dibawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan melihat 
implementasi Pedoman Perilaku di perusahaannya. Silakan memberikan opini 
dengan cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat.. 
Sejauh mana anda melihat pernyataan berikut dipenuhi oleh perusahaan anda? 
 
Perusahaan saya memiliki Pedoman Perilaku yang  Sangat                      Sangat 
Tidak Setuju              Setuju      
… menciptakan lingkungan dimana benturan kepentingan 
dihindari atau dikurangi 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… menciptakan lingkungan dimana orang tidak 
melibatkan diri pada perdagangan orang dalam 
(insider trading) untuk memperoleh keuntungan pribadi 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… memastikan bahwa siapapun tidak menjalankan 
praktik korupsi 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… memastikan bahwa siapapun tidak menjalankan 
aktifitas yang membahayakan reputasi perusahaan. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… memperlakukan semua pemangku 
kepentingan/stakeholder  secara adil dan jujur 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… mengembangkan mekanisme dimana pelanggaran 
atas kebijakan perusahaan dapat dilaporkan tanpa 
takut akan balas dendam  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
… menciptakan lingkungan untuk menghormati 
keputusan organ perusahaan 






BAGIAN 3: KINERJA ORGANISATIONAL 
Pernyataan dibawah ini berhubungan dengan sejauh mana karyawan merasa 
perbaikan diperlukan dalam perusahaan mereka. Silakan memberikan opini dengan 
cara melingkari nomer jawaban yang dianggap paling tepat dengan menggunakan 
skala sebagai berikut: 
 










Menurut anda, sejauh mana perusahaan anda perlu memperbaiki kriteria kinerja 
berikut ini? 
 
 Sangat                                      Sangat 
Sedikit                                      Banyak 
Efisiensi  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Kepuasan Pelanggan 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Perilaku manajerial  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Perilaku profesional  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Kualitas pelayanan 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Hubungan dengan Pelanggan 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Posisi di pasar  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Reputasi  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
BAGIAN 4: KHARAKTERISTIK DEMOGRAPHI DAN PERUSAHAAN 
Untuk mempermudah klasifikasi jawaban anda, saya ingin menanyakan beberapa 
pertanyaan tentang demographi dan perusahaan. Sekali lagi, jawaban anda akan 
sepenuhnya dirahasiakan. 
 
Jenis Kelamin   Wanita     Pria 
 
Berapa usia anda: 
 Di bawah 30 tahun 
 Di antara 30 sampai dengan 40 tahun 
 Di antara 40+ sampai dengan 50 tahun 
 Di antara 50+ sampai dengan 60 tahun 
 Di atas 60 tahun 
 
Berapa lama anda bekerja di perusahaan ini? 
 Belum sampai 1 tahun 
 Di antara 1 sampai dengan 5 tahun 
 Di antara 5+ sampai dengan 10 tahun 
 Di antara 10+ sampai dengan 15 tahun 
 Di antara 15+ sampai dengan 20 tahun 





Dimana anda menghabiskan masa kecil anda (sampai dengan usia 10 tahun)? 
Silakan, tulis kota dan Negara. 
 
Kota:……………………………….          Negara: ………………………………. 
 
Ada berapa jenjang hirarki di atas posisi anda sekarang? _____________ 
 
Ada berapa jenjang hirarki di bawah posisi anda sekarang? ____________ 
 
Apa jenis usaha perusahaan anda? 
  Jasa    Manufaktur   Lainnya 
 
Perusahaan tempat anda bekerja adalah: 
  Perusahaan Privat     Perusahaan Publik/BUMN  
 
Dalam departemen apa anda bekerja? 
 Keuangan/Akuntansi    
 Pemasaran 
 Produksi/Operasi  





Terima kasih atas partisipasi dan kerjasama anda 
 
 
PERMINTAAN HASIL PENELITIAN 
 
Saya berminat untuk mengetahui hasil dari survey ini. Silakan kirim kepada: 
 
Nama:  ________________________________________ 
Perusahaan: ________________________________________ 
Alamat Surat:_________________________________________ 
           _________________________________________ 
           _________________________________________ 
  Kode Pos: ___________________________ 
E-mail:  _________________________________________ 
Telepone: _________________________________________ 
Fax:  _________________________________________ 
 
Pilihan hasil survey: 
(beri tanda (√) dalam    Tercetak (via pos)   File (e-mail) 





Appendix 4: Output of Factor Analysis 
 
A. Autonomy Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were six pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation matrix 
was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.A.1: Correlation Matrix–Autonomy (Auto) 
Coefficient Correlation Pairs 
.351 Auto1 and Auto3 
.336 Auto3 and Auto4 
.304 Auto3 and Auto5 
.393 Auto4 and Auto5 
.396 Auto4 and Auto6 
.450 Auto5 and Auto6 
 
Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, appropriateness of factor analysis was deduced. 
 
Table 4.A.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-
MSA)–Autonomy (Auto) 
 auto1 auto2 auto3 auto4 auto5 auto6 
auto1 .793(a) -0.108 -0.243 -0.057 -0.069 -0.117 
auto2 -0.108 .842(a) -0.117 -0.046 -0.052 -0.046 
auto3 -0.243 -0.117 .766(a) -0.210 -0.150 -0.006 
auto4 -0.057 -0.046 -0.210 .782(a) -0.199 -0.248 
auto5 -0.069 -0.052 -0.150 -0.199 .771(a) -0.307 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
auto6 -0.117 -0.046 -0.006 -0.248 -0.307 .749(a) 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA) 
 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 






Table 4.A.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA)–
Autonomy (Auto) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .775 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.A.4: Communalities–Autonomy (Auto) 
Indicator Initial Extraction 
Auto1 1.000 .721 
Auto2 1.000 .999 
Auto3 1.000 .631 
Auto4 1.000 .565 
Auto5 1.000 .620 
Auto6 1.000 .662 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 40.573% of the variance.  
 
Table 4.A.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Autonomy (Auto) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.434 40.573 40.573 
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 2.434, explained 40.573% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As four (4) pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found 
and two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two or more factors 









Table 4.A.6: Component Matrix–Autonomy (Auto) 
Component  
1 2 3 
Auto1 .591 .350 -.499 
Auto2 .428 .675 .600 
Auto3 .658 .254 -.366 
Auto4 .706 -.254 .044 
Auto5 .709 -.311 .142 
Auto6 .684 -.384 .213 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 3 pure indicators with loadings above 0.3 in factor 
one, none complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two or more factors. 
 
Table 4.A.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Autonomy (Auto) 
Component  
1 2 3 
Auto1 .117 .838 .068 
Auto2 .105 .132 .985 
Auto3 .261 .742 .110 
Auto4 .702 .263 .050 
Auto5 .764 .172 .077 
Auto6 .807 .077 .067 
  Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
 
Reliability Analysis 
As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Table 4.A.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Autonomy (Auto) 
Correlation Matrix 
 Auto3 Auto4 Auto5 Auto6 
Auto3 1.000    
Auto4 .336 1.000   
Auto5 .304 .393 1.000  
Auto6 .201 .396 .450 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 






if Item Deleted 
Auto3 12.9877 6.805 .397 .675 
Auto4 12.3429 6.487 .515 590 
Auto5 12.0094 6.707 .510 .594 
Auto6 11.3912 7.620 .476 .624 
 






All but one of the inter-item correlations were above the threshold of 0.3; two out of 
four item-to-total correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5; and 
Cronbach’s alpha was above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were 
satisfactory. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.A.9: Construct Validity–Autonomy (Auto) 


































In conclusion, the indicators Auto3, Auto4, Auto5, and Auto6 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the construct Autonomy, which originally 


















B. External Orientation Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were fifteen pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analyses.  
 
Table 4.B.1: Correlation Matrix–External Orientation (EO) 

















Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Table 4.B.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) 
–External Orientation (EO) 
 eo1 eo2 eo3 eo4 eo5 eo6 
eo1 .889(a) -0.030 -0.251 -0.072 -0.196 -0.250 
eo2 -0.030 .872(a) -0.280 -0.095 -0.329 -0.150 
eo3 -0.251 -0.280 .839(a) -0.414 -0.117 -0.041 
eo4 -0.072 -0.095 -0.414 .869(a) -0.052 -0.137 
eo5 -0.196 -0.329 -0.117 -0.052 .886(a) -0.120 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
eo6 -0.250 -0.150 -0.041 -0.137 -0.120 .907(a) 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA) 
 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 





Table 4.B.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
External Orientation (EO) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .874 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.B.4: Communalities–External Orientation (EO) 
Indicator Initial Extraction 
EO1 1.000 .682 
EO2 1.000 .776 
EO3 1.000 .802 
EO4 1.000 .875 
EO5 1.000 .839 
EO6 1.000 .858 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and explained 60.867% of variance. 
 
Table 4.B.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–External Orientation (EO) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.652 60.867 60.867 
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue 3.652, explained 60.867% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As four (4) pure indicators with loadings greater than 0.3 were found in factor one 
and two (2) complex indicators with loadings more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 









Table 4.B.6: Component Matrix–External Orientation (EO) 
Component  
1 2 3 
EO1 .768 .255 .163 
EO2 .800 -.112 -.352 
EO3 .843 -.284 .103 
EO4 .769 -.405 .346 
EO5 .774 .084 -.483 
EO6 .722 .526 .244 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there was 1 pure indicator with a loading above 0.3 in factor 
one, 1 pure indicator with a loading above 0.3 in factor two, 1 pure indicator with a 
loading above 0.3 in factor three, 3 complex indicators with loadings of more than 
0.3 in two or more factors.  
 
Table 4.B.7: Rotated Component Matrix–External Orientation (EO) 
Component  
1 2 3 
EO1 .321 .361 .670 
EO2 .763 .383 .216 
EO3 .428 .734 .283 
EO4 .193 .882 .244 
EO5 .847 .178 .300 
EO6 .221 .192 .879 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 




As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, a 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 












Table 4.B.8: The Highest Reliability Score–External Orientation (EO) 
Correlation Matrix 
 EO2 EO3 EO4 EO5 
EO2 1.000    
EO3 .625 1.000   
EO4 .518 .662 1.000  
EO5 .606 .553 .467 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 






Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
EO2 13.3937 8.449 .697 .788 
EO3 13.2555 8.244 .734 .771 
EO4 13.0822 9.428 .641 .814 
EO5 13.7744 8.412 .635 .818 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .841 
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3; four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5; and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.B.9: Construct Validity–External Orientation (EO) 
Indicator   

























In conclusion, the indicators EO2, EO3, EO4, and EO5 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the External Orientation construct, which 






C. Inter-departmental Coordination Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were fifteen pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis. 
 
Table 4.C.1: Correlation Matrix–Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 

















Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Table 4.C.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) 
–Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 
 idc1 idc2 idc3 idc4 idc5 idc6 idc7 
idc1 .834(a) -0.599 -0.114 -0.173 -0.044 -0.028 -0.102 
idc2 -0.599 .827(a) -0.252 -0.099 -0.033 -0.053 0.013 
idc3 -0.114 -0.252 .893(a) -0.354 -0.022 -0.203 -0.089 
idc4 -0.173 -0.099 -0.354 .907(a) 0.000 -0.160 -0.096 
idc5 -0.044 -0.033 -0.022 0.000 .888(a) 0.061 -0.053 
idc6 -0.028 -0.053 -0.203 -0.160 0.061 .907(a) -0.272 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
idc7 -0.102 0.013 -0.089 -0.096 -0.053 -0.272 .915(a) 









Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability is inferred.  
 
Table 4.C.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .874 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.C.4: Communalities–Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 
Indicator Initial Extraction 
IDC1 1.000 .823 
IDC2 1.000 .842 
IDC3 1.000 .770 
IDC4 1.000 .724 
IDC5 1.000 .993 
IDC6 1.000 .693 
IDC7 1.000 .840 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 56.979% of the variance.  
 
Table 4.C.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Inter-departmental 
Coordination (IDC) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.989 56.979 56.979 
 
Scree Plotting 









As four (4) pure indicators with loadings more than 0.3 were found in one factor, and 
two (2) complex indicators with loadings more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Table 4.C.6: Component Matrix–Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
IDC1 .864 .028 -.275 
IDC2 .864 .022 -.310 
IDC3 .869 -.036 -.113 
IDC4 .844 -.051 -.098 
IDC5 .183 .976 .087 
IDC6 .742 -.164 .339 
IDC7 .667 -.038 .628 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 2 pure indicators with loadings above 0.3 in one 
factor, 3 complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors. 
 
Table 4.C.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
IDC1 .876 .220 .085 
IDC2 .895 .191 .075 
IDC3 .796 .368 .039 
IDC4 .766 .369 .022 
IDC5 .079 .035 .993 
IDC6 .451 .697 -.055 
IDC7 .228 .883 .091 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 




As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 








Table 4.C.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 
Correlation Matrix 
 IDC1 IDC2 IDC3 IDC4 
IDC1 1.000    
IDC2 .820 1.000   
IDC3 .688 .713 1.000  
IDC4 .666 .658 .720 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 






Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
IDC1 13.9709 6.602 .810 .873 
IDC2 14.0165 6.671 .819 .870 
IDC3 14.1983 5.519 .786 .882 
IDC4 14.0544 6.893 .750 .894 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .907 
 
Inter-item correlations were above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total correlations 
had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was above 0.60. 
The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.C.9: Construct Validity–Inter-departmental Coordination (IDC) 
Indicator   

























In conclusion, the indicators IDC1, IDC2, IDC3, and IDC4 summarised the 
most essential information contained in the Inter-departmental Coordination 





D. Human Resource Management Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were fifteen pairs with a correlation above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.D.1: Correlation Matrix–Human Resource Management (HRM) 

















Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Therefore, factor analysis was deemed appropriate. 
 
Table 4.D.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) 
–Human Resource Management (HRM) 
 hrm1 hrm2 hrm3 hrm4 hrm5 hrm6 hrm7 
hrm1 .835(a) -0.518 -0.110 -0.114 -0.080 -0.134 -0.097 
hrm2 -0.518 .820(a) -0.209 0.059 -0.207 -0.100 0.049 
hrm3 -0.110 -0.209 .903(a) -0.239 -0.100 -0.069 -0.078 
hrm4 -0.114 0.059 -0.239 .881(a) -0.077 -0.072 0.026 
hrm5 -0.080 -0.207 -0.100 -0.077 .836(a) -0.504 0.022 
hrm6 -0.134 -0.100 -0.069 -0.072 -0.504 .841(a) -0.045 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
hrm7 -0.097 0.049 -0.078 0.026 0.022 -0.045 .789(a) 







Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Table 4.D.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
Human Resource Management (HRM) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .846 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.D.4: Communalities–Human Resource Management (HRM) 
 Initial Extraction 
HRM1 1.000 .715 
HRM2 1.000 .759 
HRM3 1.000 .595 
HRM4 1.000 .939 
HRM5 1.000 .721 
HRM5 1.000 .690 
HRM6 1.000 .994 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0, and this explained 51.866% of variance.  
 
Table 4.D.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Human Resource 
Management (HRM) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 












As six (6) pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found, 
and 1 complex indicator with a loading of more than 0.3 in two factor was revealed, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Table 4.D.6: Component Matrix–Human Resource Management (HRM) 
Component  
1 2 3 
HRM1 .833 .017 -.144 
HRM2 .839 -.056 -.230 
HRM3 .744 .020 .203 
HRM4 .547 -.120 .791 
HRM5 .827 -.088 -.173 
HRM6 .811 -.045 -.172 
HRM7 .197 .975 .058 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 5 pure indicators with loadings above 0.3 in one 
factor, and 1 complex indicator with a loading of more than 0.3 in two factors. 
 
Table 4.D.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Human Resource Management (HRM) 
Component  
1 2 3 
HRM1 .816 .190 .109 
HRM2 .862 .121 .032 
HRM3 .597 .472 .124 
HRM4 .196 .949 .000 
HRM5 .832 .171 .003 
HRM6 .813 .162 .044 
HRM7 .072 .025 .994 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 




As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 








Table 4.D.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Human Resource Management (HRM) 
Correlation Matrix 
 HRM1 HRM2 HRM5 HRM6 
HRM1 1.000    
HRM2 .740 1.000   
HRM5 .584 .624 1.000  
HRM6 .577 .586 .719 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 






Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
HRM1 12.6155 9.322 .725 .844 
HRM2 12.4119 10.247 .757 .828 
HRM5 12.5289 10.130 .733 .837 
HRM6 12.3327 10.639 .715 .845 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .874 
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
  
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.D.9: Construct Validity–Human Resource Management (HRM) 
Indicator   

























In conclusion, the indicators HRM1, HRM2, HRM5, and HRM6 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the Human Resource Management 





E. Improvement Orientation Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were twenty-one pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the 
correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.E.1: Correlation Matrix–Improvement Orientation (IO) 























Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Thus, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Table 4.E.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) 
–Improvement Orientation (IO) 
 io1 io2 io3 io4 io5 io6 io7 
io1 .915(a) -0.238 -0.100 -0.037 0.036 -0.205 -0.065 
io2 -0.238 .897(a) -0.296 -0.160 -0.124 0.041 -0.022 
io3 -0.100 -0.296 .904(a) -0.241 -0.210 -0.129 -0.013 
io4 -0.037 -0.160 -0.241 .911(a) -0.267 -0.186 -0.133 
io5 0.036 -0.124 -0.210 -0.267 .912(a) -0.155 -0.191 
io6 -0.205 0.041 -0.129 -0.186 -0.155 .889(a) -0.355 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
io7 -0.065 -0.022 -0.013 -0.133 -0.191 -0.355 .902(a) 






Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Table 4.E.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
Improvement Orientation (IO) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .904 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.E.4: Communalities–Improvement Orientation (IO) 
Indicator Initial Extraction 
IO1 1.000 .956 
IO2 1.000 .809 
IO3 1.000 .761 
IO4 1.000 .745 
IO5 1.000 .752 
IO6 1.000 .784 
IO7 1.000 .801 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 61.120% of variance.  
 
Table 4.E.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Improvement Orientation (IO) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 












As five pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 were found in one factor and 
two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 emerged in two or more 
factor, rotation was necessary. 
 
Table 4.E.6: Component Matrix–Improvement Orientation (IO) 
Component  
1 2 3 
IO1 .664 .509 .506 
IO2 .749 .409 -.286 
IO3 .822 .120 -.266 
IO4 .839 -.098 -.177 
IO5 .816 -.204 -.212 
IO6 .809 -.244 .266 
IO7 .759 -.392 .267 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
  
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 5 complex indicators with loading above 0.3 in two 
factors.  
 
Table 4.E.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Improvement Orientation (IO) 
Component  
1 2 3 
IO1 .256 .256 .908 
IO2 .819 .110 .355 
IO3 .768 .361 .202 
IO4 .654 .551 .121 
IO5 .630 .596 .019 
IO6 .290 .781 .301 
IO7 .211 .850 .185 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 




As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 








Table 4.E.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Improvement Orientation (IO) 
Correlation Matrix 
 IO3 IO4 IO5 IO6 
IO3 1.000    
IO4 .660 1.000   
IO5 .631 .667 1.000  
IO6 .576 .623 .602 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 






Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
IO3 12.4923 8.250 .716 .837 
IO4 12.4237 7.605 .758 .819 
IO5 12.8837 7.742 .733 .829 
IO6 12.4332 7.932 .686 .849 
 
  Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .870 
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3; four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5; and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.E.9: Construct Validity–Improvement Orientation (IO) 
Indicator   

























In conclusion, the indicators IO3, IO4, IO5, and IO6 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the construct Improvement Orientation, which 





F. Board of Commissioners Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were fifty-six pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.F.1: Correlation Matrix–Board of Commissioners (BOC) 





























































Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 






Table 4.F.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) –Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
 boc1 boc2 boc3 boc4 boc5 boc6 boc7 boc8 boc9 boc10 boc11 
boc1 .926(a) -0.402 -0.309 -0.107 -0.008 0.002 0.017 -0.062 0.055 -0.071 -0.024 
boc2 -0.402 .935(a) -0.092 -0.001 -0.058 0.025 -0.150 -0.046 -0.066 0.093 -0.060 
boc3 -0.309 -0.092 .914(a) -0.507 -0.111 0.032 0.036 -0.095 -0.069 -0.107 -0.017 
boc4 -0.107 -0.001 -0.507 .926(a) 0.023 -0.142 -0.130 -0.029 -0.100 0.033 0.001 
boc5 -0.008 -0.058 -0.111 0.023 .893(a) -0.547 -0.188 0.040 -0.029 0.010 -0.154 
boc6 0.002 0.025 0.032 -0.142 -0.547 .884(a) -0.138 -0.078 0.081 -0.126 0.076 
boc7 0.017 -0.150 0.036 -0.130 -0.188 -0.138 .960(a) -0.018 -0.101 -0.177 -0.065 
boc8 -0.062 -0.046 -0.095 -0.029 0.040 -0.078 -0.018 .898(a) -0.630 -0.043 -0.054 
boc9 0.055 -0.066 -0.069 -0.100 -0.029 0.081 -0.101 -0.630 .884(a) -0.214 0.068 
boc10 -0.071 0.093 -0.107 0.033 0.010 -0.126 -0.177 -0.043 -0.214 .940(a) -0.299 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
boc11 -0.024 -0.060 -0.017 0.001 -0.154 0.076 -0.065 -0.054 0.068 -0.299 .931(a) 







Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Table 4.F.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .916 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.F.4: Communalities–Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
 Initial Extraction 
BOC1 1.000 .740 
BOC2 1.000 .658 
BOC3 1.000 .820 
BOC4 1.000 .767 
BOC5 1.000 .843 
BOC6 1.000 .854 
BOC7 1.000 .675 
BOC8 1.000 .752 
BOC9 1.000 .752 
BOC10 1.000 727 
BOC11 1.000 .816 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 61.248% of the variance.  
 
Table 4.F.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Board of Commissioners 
(BOC) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6.737 61.248 61.248 
 
Scree Plotting 







As there were seven pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor and 
four (4) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors, rotation 
was necessary. 
 
Table 4.F.6: Component Matrix–Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
BOC1 .802 -.278 -.138 
BOC2 .754 -.256 -.156 
BOC3 .877 -.204 -.096 
BOC4 .850 -.152 -.143 
BOC5 .757 .468 -.225 
BOC6 .723 .489 -.304 
BOC7 .794 .209 -.034 
BOC8 .823 -.241 .130 
BOC9 .821 -.241 .145 
BOC10 .780 .106 .328 
BOC11 .591 .277 .625 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
  
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 2 pure indicators with loadings of above 0.3 in one 
factor, 7 complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two or more factors. 
 
Table 4.F.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
BOC1 .802 .277 .140 
BOC2 .755 .276 .110 
BOC3 .804 .348 .228 
BOC4 .759 .394 .189 
BOC5 .304 .830 .247 
BOC6 .277 .865 .169 
BOC7 .467 .574 .357 
BOC8 .750 .188 .392 
BOC9 .746 .180 .403 
BOC10 .464 .322 .639 
BOC11 .165 .209 .863 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation 
 
Reliability Analysis 
As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 





Table 4.F.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
Correlation Matrix 
 BOC3 BOC4 BOC8 BOC9 
BOC3 1.000    
BOC4 .833 1.000   
BOC8 .697 .664 1.000  
BOC9 .692 .669 .843 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 






Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
BOC3 13.9865 6.383 .822 .886 
BOC4 13.9502 6.363 .795 .896 
BOC8 13.9354 6.589 .809 .891 
BOC9 13.9421 6.556 .808 .892 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .916 
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.F.9: Construct Validity–Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
Indicator   

























In conclusion, the indicators BOC3, BOC4, BOC8, and BOC9 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the construct Board of Commissioners, 






G. Independent Commissioners Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were fifty-five pairs with a correlation above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation 
matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.G.1: Correlation Matrix–Independent Commissioners (IC) 





























































Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 






Table 4.G.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) –Independent Commissioners (IC) 
 ic1 ic2 ic3 ic4 ic5 ic6 ic7 ic8 ic9 ic10 ic11 
ic1 .973(a) -0.213 -0.198 -0.108 -0.025 -0.066 -0.024 0.023 -0.085 0.076 -0.117 
ic2 -0.213 .946(a) -0.399 -0.056 0.114 -0.039 -0.015 -0.056 -0.061 -0.169 0.010 
ic3 -0.198 -0.399 .955(a) -0.073 -0.042 -0.004 -0.089 0.037 -0.036 -0.067 -0.131 
ic4 -0.108 -0.056 -0.073 .926(a) -0.633 -0.015 -0.020 -0.072 0.019 -0.044 -0.088 
ic5 -0.025 0.114 -0.042 -0.633 .915(a) -0.194 -0.174 -0.064 -0.015 0.018 0.004 
ic6 -0.066 -0.039 -0.004 -0.015 -0.194 .955(a) -0.297 -0.306 -0.091 0.090 -0.155 
ic7 -0.024 -0.015 -0.089 -0.020 -0.174 -0.297 .972(a) -0.111 0.000 -0.079 -0.078 
ic8 0.023 -0.056 0.037 -0.072 -0.064 -0.306 -0.111 .969(a) -0.191 -0.096 -0.056 
ic9 -0.085 -0.061 -0.036 0.019 -0.015 -0.091 0.000 -0.191 .967(a) -0.272 -0.218 
ic10 0.076 -0.169 -0.067 -0.044 0.018 0.090 -0.079 -0.096 -0.272 .954(a) -0.306 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
ic11 -0.117 0.010 -0.131 -0.088 0.004 -0.155 -0.078 -0.056 -0.218 -0.306 .964(a) 






Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Table 4.G.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
Independent Commissioners (IC) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .954 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.G.4: Communalities–Independent Commissioners (IC) 
 Initial Extraction 
IC1 1.000 .820 
IC2 1.000 .853 
IC3 1.000 .842 
IC4 1.000 .871 
IC5 1.000 .901 
IC6 1.000 .848 
IC7 1.000 .803 
IC8 1.000 .813 
IC9 1.000 .839 
IC10 1.000 .863 
IC11 1.000 .841 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 74.289% of the variance.  
 
Table 4.G.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.172 74.289 74.289 
 
Scree Plotting 








As nine pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found and 
two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Table 4.G.6: Component Matrix–Independent Commissioners (IC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
IC1 .817 .199 .334 
IC2 .809 .425 .136 
IC3 .857 .274 .183 
IC4 .883 -.244 .177 
IC5 .870 -.343 .160 
IC6 .894 -.219 -.009 
IC7 .874 -.200 .006 
IC8 .871 -.170 -.164 
IC9 .864 .095 -.288 
IC10 .836 .195 -.356 
IC11 .901 .052 -.159 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 11 complex indicators with loadings of above 0.3 in 
two or more factors. 
 
Table 4.G.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Independent Commissioners (IC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
IC1 .462 .227 .745 
IC2 .244 .432 .779 
IC3 .396 .387 .732 
IC4 .788 .292 .406 
IC5 .848 .276 .325 
IC6 .732 .452 .328 
IC7 .709 .433 .337 
IC8 .644 .575 .262 
IC9 .417 .730 .363 
IC10 .310 .791 .375 
IC11 .504 .638 .425 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 




As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 





Table 4.G.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Independent Commissioners (IC) 
Correlation Matrix 
 IC4 IC5 IC6 IC7 
IC4 1.000    
IC5 .891 1.000   
IC6 .781 .803 1.000  
IC7 .760 .781 .819 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 






Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
IC4 13.8750 8.114 .870 .923 
IC5 13.8085 7.945 .890 .917 
IC6 13.7964 8.223 .858 .927 
IC7 13.9294 7.892 .837 .934 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .943 
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.G.9: Construct Validity–Independent Commissioners (IC) 
Indicator   

























In conclusion, the indicators IC4, IC5, IC6 and IC7 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the construct Independent Commissioners, which 





H. Audit Committee Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were seventy-eight pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the 
correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.H.1: Correlation Matrix–Audit Committee (AC) 





















































































Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 





Table 4.H.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) –Audit Committee (AC) 
 ac1 ac2 ac3 ac4 ac5 ac6 ac7 ac8 ac9 ac10 ac11 ac12 ac13 
ac1 .942(a) -0.407 0.113 -0.126 -0.095 -0.096 -0.053 0.002 -0.042 0.099 -0.036 -0.095 0.026 
ac2 -0.407 .928(a) -0.256 -0.071 0.000 -0.019 0.083 0.067 -0.158 0.032 -0.113 0.109 -0.251 
ac3 0.113 -0.256 .929(a) -0.452 -0.232 -0.047 0.053 -0.070 0.085 0.041 -0.098 0.016 -0.045 
ac4 -0.126 -0.071 -0.452 .944(a) -0.149 -0.082 -0.239 -0.020 -0.039 -0.004 0.027 -0.033 0.039 
ac5 -0.095 0.000 -0.232 -0.149 .970(a) -0.070 -0.053 -0.084 0.009 -0.164 0.094 -0.060 -0.139 
ac6 -0.096 -0.019 -0.047 -0.082 -0.070 .974(a) -0.204 -0.180 -0.188 -0.055 -0.017 0.035 -0.046 
ac7 -0.053 0.083 0.053 -0.239 -0.053 -0.204 .962(a) -0.257 -0.046 0.019 -0.025 -0.089 -0.012 
ac8 0.002 0.067 -0.070 -0.020 -0.084 -0.180 -0.257 .956(a) -0.311 -0.174 0.030 -0.093 -0.002 
ac9 -0.042 -0.158 0.085 -0.039 0.009 -0.188 -0.046 -0.311 .960(a) -0.228 -0.054 -0.018 -0.062 
ac10 0.099 0.032 0.041 -0.004 -0.164 -0.055 0.019 -0.174 -0.228 .934(a) -0.462 -0.075 0.061 
ac11 -0.036 -0.113 -0.098 0.027 0.094 -0.017 -0.025 0.030 -0.054 -0.462 .941(a) -0.184 -0.176 
ac12 -0.095 0.109 0.016 -0.033 -0.060 0.035 -0.089 -0.093 -0.018 -0.075 -0.184 .953(a) -0.383 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
ac13 0.026 -0.251 -0.045 0.039 -0.139 -0.046 -0.012 -0.002 -0.062 0.061 -0.176 -0.383 .948(a) 





Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Table 4.H.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
Audit Committee (AC) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .950 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.H.4: Communalities–Audit Committee (AC) 
 Initial Extraction 
AC1 1.000 .712 
AC2 1.000 .829 
AC3 1.000 .757 
AC4 1.000 .828 
AC5 1.000 .724 
AC6 1.000 .770 
AC7 1.000 .775 
AC8 1.000 .831 
AC9 1.000 .774 
AC10 1.000 .804 
AC11 1.000 .814 
AC12 1.000 .748 
AC13 1.000 .782 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 66.809% of the variance.  
 
Table 4.H.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Audit Committee (AC) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.685 66.809 66.809 
 
Scree Plotting 







As nine pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found and 
four (4) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Table 4.H.6: Component Matrix–Audit Committee (AC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
AC1 .724 .406 .154 
AC2 .791 .387 .231 
AC3 .804 .309 -.122 
AC4 .846 .243 -.232 
AC5 .834 .111 -.129 
AC6 .846 -.062 -.225 
AC7 .806 -.112 -.335 
AC8 .857 -.221 -.216 
AC9 .858 -.191 -.044 
AC10 .813 -.370 .076 
AC11 .821 -.229 .296 
AC12 .796 -.201 .273 
AC13 .821 -.002 .329 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
  
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were as 1 pure indicator with a loading of more than 0.3 in 
one factor, and 12 complex indicators with loadings above 0.3 in two or more 
factors. 
 
Table 4.H.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Audit Committee (AC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
AC1 .247 .279 .757 
AC2 .231 .374 .797 
AC3 .527 .217 .658 
AC4 .648 .213 .602 
AC5 .587 .341 .513 
AC6 .701 .389 .358 
AC7 .770 .329 .271 
AC8 .730 .490 .239 
AC9 .592 .575 .304 
AC10 .506 .722 .163 
AC11 .315 .777 .333 
AC12 .312 .733 .336 
AC13 .246 .669 .524 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 








As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Table 4.H.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Audit Committee (AC) 
Correlation Matrix 
 AC6 AC7 AC8 AC9 
AC6 1.000    
AC7 .719 1.000   
AC8 .755 .744 1.000  
AC9 .745 .679 .790 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 






Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
AC6 13.4650 7.212 .814 .894 
AC7 13.3327 7.576 .778 .906 
AC8 13.5234 7.096 .848 .883 
AC9 13.5254 7.391 .813 .895 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .919 
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
 
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.H.9: Construct Validity–Audit Committee (AC) 
Indicator   




























In conclusion, the indicators AC6, AC7, AC8, and AC9 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the construct Audit Committee, which originally 
consisted of 13 indicators.  
 
 
I. Board of Directors Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were one-hundred-and-thirty-six pairs with correlations above 0.3. 
Accordingly, the correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.I.1: Correlation Matrix-Board of Directors–Board of Directors (BOD) 


















































































































































Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 






Table 4.I.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA)–Board of Directors (BOD) 
 bod1 bod2 bod3 bod4 bod5 bod6 bod7 bod8 bod9 bod10 bod11 bod12 bod13 bod14 bod15 bod16 bod17 
bod1 .935(a) -0.502 -0.143 -0.025 0.060 -0.077 0.060 0.006 0.004 -0.081 -0.041 -0.016 0.066 0.063 -0.075 -0.014 -0.054 
bod2 -0.502 .940(a) -0.088 -0.026 -0.063 -0.063 -0.146 -0.099 0.082 -0.046 0.036 0.003 -0.010 -0.087 0.080 -0.164 0.047 
bod3 -0.143 -0.088 .936(a) -0.556 -0.084 0.013 -0.039 0.022 0.054 0.012 -0.039 0.013 -0.134 -0.104 0.000 0.090 -0.101 
bod4 -0.025 -0.026 -0.556 .941(a) -0.146 -0.054 -0.026 -0.047 -0.091 0.034 0.027 -0.081 0.044 0.006 -0.071 -0.016 0.062 
bod5 0.060 -0.063 -0.084 -0.146 .949(a) -0.500 0.012 0.026 -0.092 -0.056 -0.107 0.018 0.027 0.040 -0.028 -0.098 -0.029 
bod6 -0.077 -0.063 0.013 -0.054 -0.500 .951(a) -0.162 0.048 0.004 -0.060 0.035 -0.025 -0.014 -0.041 -0.048 -0.011 -0.024 
bod7 0.060 -0.146 -0.039 -0.026 0.012 -0.162 .957(a) -0.402 -0.169 -0.033 -0.036 -0.010 0.058 0.042 -0.011 -0.021 -0.161 
bod8 0.006 -0.099 0.022 -0.047 0.026 0.048 -0.402 .943(a) -0.378 -0.054 0.008 0.082 0.006 -0.007 -0.044 -0.121 -0.037 
bod9 0.004 0.082 0.054 -0.091 -0.092 0.004 -0.169 -0.378 .961(a) -0.151 -0.030 -0.048 -0.094 -0.028 0.003 -0.002 -0.079 
bod10 -0.081 -0.046 0.012 0.034 -0.056 -0.060 -0.033 -0.054 -0.151 .975(a) -0.269 0.029 -0.097 -0.050 -0.028 0.020 -0.018 
bod11 -0.041 0.036 -0.039 0.027 -0.107 0.035 -0.036 0.008 -0.030 -0.269 .944(a) -0.424 0.005 -0.025 0.006 0.010 -0.025 
bod12 -0.016 0.003 0.013 -0.081 0.018 -0.025 -0.010 0.082 -0.048 0.029 -0.424 .933(a) -0.381 -0.074 -0.001 -0.061 -0.035 
bod13 0.066 -0.010 -0.134 0.044 0.027 -0.014 0.058 0.006 -0.094 -0.097 0.005 -0.381 .955(a) -0.155 -0.062 -0.047 -0.069 
bod14 0.063 -0.087 -0.104 0.006 0.040 -0.041 0.042 -0.007 -0.028 -0.050 -0.025 -0.074 -0.155 .961(a) -0.381 -0.052 -0.043 
bod15 -0.075 0.080 0.000 -0.071 -0.028 -0.048 -0.011 -0.044 0.003 -0.028 0.006 -0.001 -0.062 -0.381 .960(a) -0.221 -0.115 
bod16 -0.014 -0.164 0.090 -0.016 -0.098 -0.011 -0.021 -0.121 -0.002 0.020 0.010 -0.061 -0.047 -0.052 -0.221 .968(a) -0.276 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
bod17 -0.054 0.047 -0.101 0.062 -0.029 -0.024 -0.161 -0.037 -0.079 -0.018 -0.025 -0.035 -0.069 -0.043 -0.115 -0.276 .975(a) 





Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was signifacant. Consequently, 
factorability is inferred.  
 
Table 4.I.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA)–
Board of Directors (BOD) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .952 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.I.4: Communalities–Board of Directors (BOD) 
 Initial Extraction 
BOD1 1.000 .714 
BOD2 1.000 .755 
BOD3 1.000 .767 
BOD4 1.000 .730 
BOD5 1.000 .685 
BOD6 1.000 .680 
BOD7 1.000 .815 
BOD8 1.000 .837 
BOD9 1.000 .783 
BOD10 1.000 .591 
BOD11 1.000 .670 
BOD12 1.000 .790 
BOD13 1.000 .733 
BOD14 1.000 .637 
BOD15 1.000 .641 
BOD16 1.000 .679 
BOD17 1.000 .693 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Two factors had an Eigenvalues above 1.0 and these explained 66.807% of the 
variance.  
 
Table 4.I.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Board of Directors (BOD) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 10.325 60.734 60.734 






Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 10.325, explained 60.734% of the variance. Factor 2, 
with an Eigenvalues of 1.032 explained 6.073% of the variance 
 
Component Matrix 
As twelve pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found 
and five (5) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two or more factors 
emerged, rotation was necessary. 
 
Table 4.I.6: Component Matrix–Board of Directors (BOD) 
Component  
1 2 3 
BOD1 .705 -.325 .334 
BOD2 .783 -.326 .191 
BOD3 .799 -.114 .340 
BOD4 .798 -.156 .262 
BOD5 .811 -.138 .092 
BOD6 .803 -.173 .080 
BOD7 .822 -.203 -.313 
BOD8 .794 -.196 -.411 
BOD9 .806 -.028 -.363 
BOD10 .753 .117 -.104 
BOD11 .718 .387 .069 
BOD12 .734 .481 .143 
BOD13 .730 .441 .073 
BOD14 .763 .228 .047 
BOD15 .792 .109 -.039 
BOD16 .811 -.026 -.144 
BOD17 .812 .017 -.181 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
  
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were three pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 
in one factor, and 13 complex indicators with loadings above 0.3 in two or more 
factors.  
 
Table 4.I.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Board of Directors (BOD) 
Component  
1 2 3 
BOD1 .239 .788 .190 
BOD2 .395 .745 .208 
BOD3 .238 .734 .415 
BOD4 .308 .708 .367 
BOD5 .441 .601 .360 
BOD6 .454 .607 .325 
BOD7 .775 .392 .244 
BOD8 .832 .312 .217 




BOD10 .495 .311 .500 
BOD11 .274 .253 .728 
BOD12 .204 .258 .826 
BOD13 .266 .234 .780 
BOD14 .358 .350 .622 
BOD15 .470 .378 .527 
BOD16 .595 .396 .410 
BOD17 .614 .351 .439 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 




As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Table 4.I.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Board of Directors (BOD) 
Correlation Matrix 
 BOD7 BOD8 BOD9 BOD17 
BOD7 1.000    
BOD8 .799 1.000   
BOD9 .739 .775 1.000  
BOD17 .685 .649 .653 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 





Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
BOD7 13.4560 7.591 .832 .871 
BOD8 13.6694 7.136 .832 .871 
BOD9 13.5974 7.422 .806 .880 
BOD17 13.3724 8.233 .719 .909 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .910 
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 







Table 4.I.9: Construct Validity–Board of Directors (BOD) 
Indicator   

























In conclusion, the indicators BOD7, BOD8, BOD9, and BOD17 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the Board of Directors construct, which 
originally consisted of 17 indicators.  
 
 
J. Internal Control Group Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were ten pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the correlation matrix 
was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.J.1: Correlation Matrix–Internal Control Group (ICG) 













Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 





Table 4.J.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) 
–Internal Control Group (ICG) 
 icg1 icg2 icg3 icg4 icg5 
icg1 .857(a) -0.492 -0.079 -0.148 -0.021 
icg2 -0.492 .798(a) -0.485 -0.056 -0.063 
icg3 -0.079 -0.485 .853(a) -0.226 -0.179 
icg4 -0.148 -0.056 -0.226 .855(a) -0.455 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
icg5 -0.021 -0.063 -0.179 -0.455 .857(a) 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA) 
 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Table 4.J.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
Internal Control Group (ICG) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .842 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.J.4: Communalities–Internal Control Group (ICG) 
 Initial Extraction 
ICG1 1.000 .971 
ICG2 1.000 .891 
ICG3 1.000 .945 
ICG4 1.000 .835 
ICG5 1.000 .878 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 72.000% of the variance.  
 
Table 4.J.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Internal Control Group (ICG) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 






Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 3.600, explained 72.000% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As two pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found and 
three (3) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors emerged, 
rotation was necessary. 
 
Table 4.J.6: Component Matrix–Internal Control Group (ICG) 
Component  
1 2 3 
ICG1 .831 -.382 .367 
ICG2 .886 -.301 -.122 
ICG3 .885 -.096 -.390 
ICG4 .841 .331 .138 
ICG5 .796 .492 .041 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 1 pure indicator with a loading above 0.3 in one 
factor and 4 complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors. 
 
Table 4.J.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Internal Control Group (ICG) 
Component  
1 2 3 
ICG1 .281 .322 .888 
ICG2 .291 .700 .562 
ICG3 .401 .841 .276 
ICG4 .795 .291 .344 
ICG5 .875 .290 .168 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation 
 
Reliability Analysis 
As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 








Table 4.J.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Internal Control Group (ICG) 
Correlation Matrix 
 ICG1 ICG2 ICG3 ICG4 
ICG1 1.000    
ICG2 .760 1.000   
ICG3 .660 .784 1.000  
ICG4 .586 .623 .669 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 





Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
ICG1 13.3865 7.801 .755 .870 
ICG2 13.5872 6.994 .833 .840 
ICG3 13.5953 7.394 .804 .851 
ICG4 13.2209 8.608 .690 .893 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .895 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of reliability analysis were very good. 
  
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.J.9: Construct Validity–Internal Control Group (ICG) 
Indicator   

























In conclusion, the indicators ICG1, ICG2, ICG4, and ICG4 summarised the 
most essential information contained in the Internal Control Group construct, which 







K. Codes of Conduct Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were twenty-one pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the 
correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.K.1: Correlation Matrix–Code of Conducts (COC) 
























Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 
0.5. Consequently, the appropriateness of factor analysis was inferred. 
 
Table 4.K.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) 
–Code of Conducts (COC) 
 coc1 coc2 coc3 coc4 coc5 coc6 coc7 
coc1 .921(a) -0.370 -0.059 0.031 -0.189 -0.015 -0.229 
coc2 -0.370 .936(a) -0.115 -0.137 -0.102 -0.041 -0.087 
coc3 -0.059 -0.115 .876(a) -0.563 -0.154 -0.183 0.113 
coc4 0.031 -0.137 -0.563 .884(a) -0.141 -0.010 -0.186 
coc5 -0.189 -0.102 -0.154 -0.141 .948(a) -0.176 -0.221 
coc6 -0.015 -0.041 -0.183 -0.010 -0.176 .916(a) -0.438 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
coc7 -0.229 -0.087 0.113 -0.186 -0.221 -0.438 .897(a) 





Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Table 4.K.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
Code of Conducts (COC) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .910 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.K.4: Communalities–Code of Conducts (COC) 
 Initial Extraction 
COC1 1.000 .882 
COC2 1.000 .858 
COC3 1.000 .911 
COC4 1.000 .895 
COC5 1.000 .789 
COC6 1.000 .887 
COC7 1.000 .876 
 
Total Variance Explained 
One factor had an Eigenvalue above 1.0 and this explained 73.543% of the variance. 
 
Table 4.K.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Code of Conducts (COC) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.148 73.543 73.543 
 
Scree Plotting 









As five (5) pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found 
and two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two factors 
emerged, rotation was necessary. 
Table 4.K.6: Component Matrix–Code of Conducts (COC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
COC1 .829 .368 .244 
COC2 .841 .159 .355 
COC3 .853 -.414 .107 
COC4 .868 -.368 .070 
COC5 .883 .021 -.088 
COC6 .852 .056 -.396 
COC7 .875 .192 -.272 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 7 complex indicators with loadings above 0.3 in two 
or more factors. 
 
Table 4.K.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Code of Conducts (COC) 
Component  
1 2 3 
COC1 .399 .238 .816 
COC2 .271 .432 .774 
COC3 .326 .843 .306 
COC4 .374 .809 .318 
COC5 .600 .478 .448 
COC6 .825 .372 .260 
COC7 .777 .302 .425 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation 
 
Reliability Analysis 
As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 










Table 4.K.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Code of Conducts (COC) 
Correlation Matrix 
 COC4 COC5 COC6 COC7 
COC4 1.000    
COC5 .724 1.000   
COC6 .671 .724 1.000  
COC7 .695 .752 .782 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 





Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
COC4 13.1129 8.921 .760 .898 
COC5 13.2218 9.009 .814 .881 
COC6 13.4899 8.016 .803 .886 
COC7 13.2724 8.858 .830 .875 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 .911 
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.K.9: Construct Validity–Code of Conducts (COC) 
Indicator   

























In conclusion, the indicators COC4, COC5, COC6, and COC7 summarised 
the most essential information contained in the Code of Conducts construct, which 






L. Organisational Performance Construct 
 
Correlation Matrix 
There were twenty-eight pairs with correlations above 0.3. Accordingly, the 
correlation matrix was deemed appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 4.L.1: Correlation Matrix–Organisational Performance (OP) 






























Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) Matrix 
All anti-image correlations were small and MSA values were above the threshold of 











Table 4.L.2: Anti-image Correlation-Measure of Sampling Adequacy (AIM-MSA) 
–Organisational Performance (OP) 
 op1 op2 op3 op4 op5 op6 op7 op8 
op1 .945(a) -0.243 -0.228 -0.021 -0.091 0.054 -0.045 0.007 
op2 -0.243 .912(a) -0.204 0.077 -0.413 -0.117 -0.106 0.041 
op3 -0.228 -0.204 .853(a) -0.620 0.100 -0.015 0.020 -0.093 
op4 -0.021 0.077 -0.620 .868(a) -0.209 -0.131 -0.053 0.008 
op5 -0.091 -0.413 0.100 -0.209 .892(a) -0.376 -0.030 -0.203 
op6 0.054 -0.117 -0.015 -0.131 -0.376 .932(a) -0.185 -0.148 
op7 -0.045 -0.106 0.020 -0.053 -0.030 -0.185 .919(a) -0.428 
Anti-image 
Correlation 
op8 0.007 0.041 -0.093 0.008 -0.203 -0.148 -0.428 .914(a) 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA) 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) 
KMO was greater than 0.6, and Bartlett’s Test was significant. Consequently, 
factorability was inferred.  
 
Table 4.L.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) –
Organisational Performance (OP) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .902 








There were no exceptions, as all variables scored above the threshold of 0.5. The 
criterion for communality was fulfilled.  
 
Table 4.L.4: Communalities–Organisational Performance (OP) 
 Initial Extraction 
OP1 1.000 .914 
OP2 1.000 .794 
OP3 1.000 .904 
OP4 1.000 .916 
OP5 1.000 .819 
OP6 1.000 .788 
OP7 1.000 .788 
OP8 1.000 .797 
 
Total Variance Explained 





Table 4.L.5: Total Variance Explained-Eigenvalues–Organisational Performance 
(OP) 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.477 68.457 68.457 
 
Scree Plotting 
Factor 1, with an Eigenvalue of 5.477 explained 68.457% of the variance. 
 
Component Matrix 
As six (6) pure indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in one factor were found 
and two (2) complex indicators with loadings of more than 0.3 in two or more factors 
emerged, rotation was necessary. 
 
Table 4.L.6: Component Matrix–Organisational Performance (OP) 
Component  
1 2 3 
OP1 .725 .428 .453 
OP2 .859 .068 .224 
OP3 .823 .369 -.300 
OP4 .839 .256 -.382 
OP5 .896 -.101 .083 
OP6 .863 -.206 -.030 
OP7 .797 -.389 .035 
OP8 .805 -.384 -.039 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
  
Rotated Component Matrix 
Results showed that there were 2 pure indicators with loadings above 0.3 in one 
factor, and 6 complex indicators with loadings more than 0.3 in two or more factors. 
 
Table 4.L.7: Rotated Component Matrix–Organisational Performance (OP) 
Component  
1 2 3 
OP1 .217 .292 .884 
OP2 .559 .345 .601 
OP3 .299 .831 .352 
OP4 .387 .840 .243 
OP5 .700 .378 .432 
OP6 .749 .385 .281 
OP7 .836 .216 .207 
OP8 .835 .273 .159 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 






As the objective of the factor analysis was to have no more than 4 indicators, the 
process of deleting indicators was applied based on the highest possible Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item was to be deleted.  
 
Table 4.L.8: The Highest Reliability Score–Organisational Performance (OP) 
Correlation Matrix 
 OP2 OP4 OP5 OP6 
OP2 1.000    
OP4 .639 1.000   
OP5 .795 .699 1.000  
OP6 .709 .669 .804 1.000 
Item-Total Statistic 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 





Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
OP2 7.8357 10.715 .790 .886 
OP4 7.7027 10.779 .727 .909 
OP5 7.8206 10.273 .865 .860 
OP6 7.6845 10.529 .809 .880 
 
Number of Items  Cronbach’s Alpha 
4 0.910 
 
Inter-item correlations were all above the threshold of 0.3, four item-to-total 
correlations had values higher than the benchmark of 0.5, and Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.60. The results of the reliability analysis were very good. 
   
Construct Validity  
The Spearman correlation coefficients of four (4) indicators with their total score 
were significant, indicating that those indicators captured the underlying construct 
they purported to measure.  
 
Table 4.L.9: Construct Validity – Organisational Performance (OP) 
Indicator   



























In conclusion, the indicators OP2, OP4, OP5, and OP6 summarised the most 
essential information contained in the Organisational Performance construct, which 
originally consisted of 8 indicators.  
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